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Abstract 
The present M.A. thesis deals with the status and the distinct role that Luxembourg can 
carve out for itself in the current, post-Maastricht institutional and decision-making 
framework of the European Union (EU). Our aim is to understand the way Luxembourg 
operates in the EU's central decision-making body, the Council of Ministers. We do not 
analyse the policy output and its effects on Luxembourg but the formal and informal 
features of the Council of Ministers and Luxembourg's interaction with it. In view of the 
weaknesses that small-state status confers on Luxembourg, the small state has a 
persistent interest in finding strategies for managing smallness. Like other small states, 
the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg sees its small-state predicament best resolved by co-
operating at international level. In this respect the institutional and legal framework of 
the European Union offers unique benefits. The Council of Ministers is the central 
decision-making institution of the European Union and the institution via which 
Luxembourg's negotiating status and behaviour is analysed. The principle of equality of 
states and federal-type overrepresentation place Luxembourg in a particularly 
advantageous situation. Not only is the small state overrepresented but it also enjoys a 
disproportionately high influence under the current Council voting system. Things look 
different when it comes to exerting political weight. Still, Luxembourg has adopted a 
behaviour and strategies allowing it to overcome the weaknesses derived from its small 
size. It will be shown that the small state has important opportunities of action both 
when it acts in a neutral way and when it needs to defend important national interests. 
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Introduction 
We are currently experiencing two opposing trends on the European continent: one 
characterised by integrative, the other one by disintegrative forces. On the one hand a 
trend towards globalisation as exemplified by the internationalisation of economic, 
political, defensive as well as environmental problems and the dedicated commitment to 
an integrated Europe finds its expression in the workings of the European Union (EU) 
and other transnational organisations. On the other hand the European continent 
witnesses some disintegrative forces. These became ever more obvious since the 1989 
revolution of the international system leading to the breakup of the Soviet Empire and a 
few years later of Yugoslavia but also in the latent separatist tendencies of certain 
regions of Europe (e.g. regions in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain). These 
disintegrative forces have produced a proliferation of smaller states making small-state 
studies once more politically topical. 
Along with the Gulf and the Pacific region Europe has a high number of small 
states, which has increased ever since 1989. Most of these smaller units are now striving 
for membership in one or more western international organisations of which military 
security within NATO and economic and political integration within the European 
Union are the most attractive forms. In this context, the small state of Luxembourg with 
a surface area of 2,586 sq. km and a population of 420,000, with a successfully achieved 
transition from a poor rural-agrarian society to a prosperous and highly efficient 
services centre, with a long experience within international organisations, could 
function as a model for other small European democracies. As a founding member of 
many Western European international organisations Luxembourg exemplifies small-
state viability within the international system and the evidence that the answer to the 
small-state predicament lies in integration into larger units. Hence the smallest EU 
member state may well serve as a positive example in particular to those small states of 
Central and Eastern Europe and of the Mediterranean region that are currently applying 
for membership in the European Union. 
Small-state studies are also topical in another respect. The anxiety expressed by 
leaders from larger EU member states fearing that a proliferation of small partners in an 
enlarged Union would tip the balance to the latter's favour, resulted in efforts to 
undermine the representational status of small states in the EU's institutional 
framework. The present thesis is written less from this perspective even if this aspect 
could not completely be ignored. By taking Luxembourg as a case study we shall show 
that European integration provides a strategy - in Luxembourg's case the only possible 
strategy - for managing smallness when surrounded by larger and more powerful states. 
The thesis deals more specifically with the distinct role the Grand-Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the smallest member state of the European Union, can carve out for itself 
in the current institutional and decision-making framework of the European Union as 
well as its motives and goals in doing so. The institution via which Luxembourg's 
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behaviour is analysed is the Council of Ministers of the European Union. The reason 
being that the Council of Ministers is the EU's most 'powerful' institution and the one in 
which the national input is most visible. As such it is the chief forum for the 
representation of national interests in the EU's institutional setup and the institution via 
which a small state like Luxembourg can most obviously exert any influence in the 
decision-making process of the European Union. Being the smallest member in the 
Council of Ministers, the question that interests us most is what behaviour and strategies 
Luxembourg has adopted in the European Union's central decision-making body to 
overcome inherent weaknesses derived from its small size. In order to answer this 
question, the thesis wil l 
• analyse the influence Luxembourg exerts under the current institutional and 
decision-making framework of the Council of Ministers; 
• study the behaviour Luxembourg has adopted and the tools and strategies it applies 
in the decision-making process of the Council of Ministers; 
• explore the communication channels that have been established between the Grand-
Duchy and the Council of Ministers; 
• examine how Luxembourg reacts to institutional reforms affecting its status quo in 
the EU's institutional framework in general and in the Council's decision-making 
framework in particular. 
To fulf i l this task, Chapter One tries to define the concept of 'small state' for the 
purpose of this thesis, which cannot be done without resorting to a certain arbitrariness. 
It recalls some basic motivations for Luxembourg to join international organisations in 
general and the European Union in particular after having described the predicament 
that the small state faces in the international system under pre-membership conditions. 
It is shown that EU membership is an effective means for Luxembourg to manage its 
smallness. Active participation in the EU's central decision-making body, the Council of 
Ministers, is undoubtedly of great importance from a national angle for large and small 
member states alike. But what are the behavioural implications of small-state status in 
the Council of Ministers? 
As the central importance of the Council of Ministers has been shown in Chapter One, 
Chapter Two goes into greater detail to describe the communication links between 
the Council and Luxembourg's capital. This is important for the following reason: an 
efficient co-ordination mechanism between the national and the EU level is crucial to 
formulate a consistent and coherent bargaining position in the Council of Ministers. By 
focusing on the main aspects of co-ordination of EU policies at home, and between the 
capital and the Council, we can assess whether Luxembourg's coordination mechanism 
is an inherent advantage or disadvantage that would weaken or strengthen 
Luxembourg's position in the Council decision-making process right from the start. 
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Chapter Three examines the influence Luxembourg has on Council decision-making 
and how it determines the country's negotiating status. We need to distinguish between 
two different sorts of'influence': (1) the formal influence that the Council's institutional 
and decision-making framework - as set out in the Treaties - confers on the smallest 
member state, which seems to be disproportionate with regard to its small size and its 
pre-membership status; (2) the relative influence that lies in a state's ability to have the 
desired outcome on policy issues it has an interest in, and which is to be understood as 
the state's actual political weight. 
Having established what negotiating status and influence Luxembourg has in the 
Council of Ministers, Chapter Four explores the small state's consequent behaviour 
with regard to two different situations: (1) when the country has no particular interest in 
a policy field ; (2) when it is determined to defend a vital national interest. The tools 
and strategies that Luxembourg uses to maintain, justify and strengthen its presence and 
position in the Council show that the country is not necessarily in a weak position when 
it interacts with larger states in the Council. It shows that small size can even provide a 
small member state with important opportunities of action which it consistently tries to 
exploit. 
Chapter Five identifies the six-monthly Presidency of the Council of Ministers as an 
important task where a small EU member state has a disproportionate amount of 
influence. During this period of time the small state has a considerable impact on the 
running of Community business and its presence is most visible on the international 
stage, thus adding prestige and media attention to the small state. Chapter Four 
examines in greater detail how Luxembourg fulfilled the important task of running the 
Council for six months. It will be shown that some inherent weaknesses derived from 
small size, e.g. a small national administration, put a high pressure on Luxembourg and 
may constitute a weakness to fulf i l the job successfully. Practical experience has, 
however, proved that what - on the surface - seems to constitute a disadvantage may 
provide the small actor with important opportunities of action. What were the 
determinants of the Luxembourg Presidencies' effectiveness in the past? What was the 
reason for their success? Examples taken from Luxembourg's 1991 and 1997 Council 
Presidencies will provide a close empirical illustration of how Luxembourg's leaders run 
the Presidency. 
Chapter Six looks beyond today's situation to analyse how the small state's status and 
influence might be in a Council of Ministers of up to 27 members. An enlarged 
European Union will involve fundamental institutional changes for the Council of 
Ministers as well as for other EU institutions. An Intergovernmental Conference, 
launched in 1996 to meet the challenge of enlargement, was to prepare an institutional 
reform. We examine how this institutional reform and ensuing measures will affect 
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Luxembourg's status in the Council of Ministers and how the country's leaders react to 
any change of status quo in the European Union setup in general and in the Council of 
Ministers in particular. What institutional principles are of importance for Luxembourg? 
What solutions would be acceptable in an institutional debate that may well last into the 
next century? 
Our aim is to understand the way Luxembourg operates in the Council of Ministers by 
way of empirical investigation. Hence the methods used to explore the topic are to a 
great extent empirical. The problem we are facing is twofold. First of all the Council of 
Ministers is an institution that has been so little researched although it is a pivotal 
institution of the EU. This is largely due to the secrecy that surrounds the Council 
meetings and the lack of 'transparency' for which this institution is infamously known, 
leaving the researcher too much dependent on the often allusive and incomplete 
information available from the media and on the scarce references made in the available 
academic literature. The second problem is of a similar nature but due to different 
reasons. Literature about Luxembourg and its foreign policy is equally scarce for the 
very reason that the country has no consistent literary tradition in the field of 
international relations. Consequently not much has been published on Luxembourg's 
status in the international system. Another reason being that those primarily interested 
in the research topic, i.e. small-state researchers, tend to generalise, one state serving as 
a case study for all. Primary sources such as official (and unofficial) EU documents, 
media information such as Agence Europe information - which provides good inside 
information and often reprints documents not otherwise available - were used for our 
research on the Council of Ministers. Primary information on Luxembourg's interaction 
with the European Union was gained from government speeches, memoranda, press 
articles, theses, and most importantly from interviews. Interviewees were, inter alia, 
Jean-Jacques Kasel, the former Luxembourg Permanent Representative with the 
European Union and Gaston Thorn, former President of the European Commission and 
former Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. These interviews, 
which lasted between 30 and 100 minutes, provided an important insight into 
Luxembourg's formal and informal ways of interacting with the Council of Ministers. 
It is important to note that the period under consideration in this thesis is the post-
Maastricht period, the focus being on the Council as it operates today.1 Hence we do not 
consider Luxembourg's status within the Council during the various phases of 
integration but its present-day status. By the same token, we do not analyse the policy 
output of the Council and its effects on Luxembourg but the formal and informal roles 
and functions of the Council of Ministers and Luxembourg's interaction with it, and its 
' At time of writing the Amsterdam Treaty had not yet been ratified by all member states and was hence 
not yet in force. 
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status within it. It is equally worth mentioning that although small states share common 
features within the institutional framework of the European Union, it is important to 
bear in mind the uniqueness of Luxembourg's position even among small states when 
reading the present thesis. Hence Luxembourg cannot serve as a case study representing 
all small EU partners. Not only is it much the smallest of the smaller EU member states, 
but it also has particular geopolitical, economic, socio-political and historical features 
that place limits on the scope for any generalisations. 
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1 Small States in the European Union 
Where there is no vision 
the people perish. 
Jean Monnet 
European small states share structural weaknesses that are common to all of them even 
though they have a lot of historical, socio-political and economic dissimilarities. These 
inherent weaknesses conferred on them by their smallness places them in a 
disadvantageous position in the international system. Luxembourg is no exception as 
the following chapter will show. Luxembourg's history shows that the country 
constantly sought ways to overcome its weaknesses and to preserve its sovereignty. 
Today Luxembourg's leaders see the country's sovereignty best secured by integrating 
into larger units of which active participation in the European Union (EU) 2 is most 
important. In this respect representation in the Council of Ministers as the EU's central 
decision-making institution is crucial for Luxembourg to make its voice heard and to 
defend its interests. The following chapter describes the small-state predicament in the 
international system as well as the remedies found. 
1.1 Does the Category 'Small State' Matter? 
When writing from a small-state perspective, some clarification seems to be necessary 
to explain what the concept of 'small state' actually means.3 In the 1960s and 1970s 
when the small-state discussion was at its height, many a student struggled with the 
question of categorising states leading to long debates about whether there are 
characteristics typical of small states and whether there is anything like a specific small 
state behaviour.4 The core of the problem lies in the difficulty of determining what 
criteria or indicators should be applied to find in which 'category' a state belongs. 
Depending on what indicators students apply, they come up with differing definitions. 
Quantifiable and objective criteria such as total land area, population, military 
capacities (defence expenditure) or Gross National Product (GNP) have been 
predominant in the early research as small state indicators. Similarly, quantifiable and 
objective criteria might be used for the purpose of this thesis. When approaching the 
2 The term European Union or EU will be applied throughout this study to refer to the ECSC (European 
Coal and Steel Community), the EEC (European Economic Community), the EC (European Community), 
and the EU (European Union) unless specific reference is made to either the ECSC, the EEC or the EC. 
3 Some authors distinguish even further between 'small state', and 'microstate' or 'ministate'. The United 
Nations, an international organisation with an overload of small states, does not provide a definition for 
'small state'. It does, however, define 'microstates' as such territories of less than one million inhabitants, 
which is the accepted yardstick now used at the United Nations (see S. Harden, (ed) Small is Dangerous 
(New York, 1985) p. 9. 
4 For a critical overview of the research history on small states see W. Christmas-Meller, 'Some Thoughts 
on the Scientific Applicability of the Small State Concept: A Research History and a Discussion' in 0. 
H611 (ed) Small States in Europe and Dependence (Vienna, 1983) pp. 35-53. 
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small-state problem within the context of the European Union, in particular the Council 
of Ministers, the weighted votes each country has in the Council may be considered as 
indicators to categorise EU member states. Attributed roughly in rank order - but not in 
proportion - of population size, economic and historical weight for votes taken by 
qualified majority5, the weighted votes could be used to indicate - quite arbitrarily 
though - the category each European Union member state belongs to. Hence one could 
say that demographic, economic and historical criteria are indicators of a certain 'state 
category' an EU member state belongs to. Table 1.1 shows that France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom, each having 10 votes, plus Spain (8 votes) could be 
considered as a block of large states with Spain being a medium large member state. A 
category of medium-sized states would be made up of Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands 
and Portugal (5 votes each). Within the category of small states Austria and Sweden (4 
votes each) would be the largest states, Denmark, Finland and Ireland (3 votes) could be 
viewed as medium-sized small member states with Luxembourg (2 votes) being the 
smallest member. 
Category Sub-category E U mem her states Weighted Council 
votes (.QMV) 
Large Large 
Medium 
D ; F ; I ; U K 
SP 
10 
8 
Medium B; GR;NL; P 5 
Small Large A; SW 4 
Medium DK;FI;IRE 3 
Smallest L 2 
Table 1.1 Categorisation of E U member states according to weighted votes 
Legend: A=Austria; B=Belgium; D=Germany; DK=Denmark; F=France; FI=Finland; GR=Greece; 
I=Italy; IRE=Ireland; L=Luxembourg; NL=Netherlands; P=Portugal; UK=United Kingdom; SP=Spain; 
SW=Sweden, QMV=qualified majority voting 
Thus a smaller group of large member states is offset by a larger group of small and 
medium-sized member states in the EU. This example which - quite arbitrarily though -
classifies the European Union member states into different categories shows that the 
small state discussion is entirely characterised by a certain relativeness and 
arbitrariness.6 Whatever quantifiable criteria are applied for measuring smallness 
(weighted Council votes, population, total land area or GNP) 'small' is and will be the 
epithet attached to Luxembourg in whatever organised grouping of states it is to be 
M. O. Hosli 'Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects 
on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers' in International Organization 47:4 
(1993) pp. 633-4. 
6Whether a state is to be considered as big or small is highly relative indeed as it depends entirely on the 
classification criteria used. Different authors are considering different criteria, some of which are easily 
quantified, while others are highly intuitive and qualitative. A state may well be small in demographic or 
geographical terms and still be influential in many other respects. Furthermore a state is only small in 
relation to a larger one. 
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viewed. In this respect, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg is indisputably the smallest of 
all current EU member states. 
Instead of considering objective and quantifiable small-state indicators, present-
day research has shifted to analysing the relative influence of a state within the 
international system, i.e. the small state's interaction with other often more 'powerful' 
actors and neighbours. Hence we consider it more important to identify the problems 
which typically concern small states and the roles they can or might be able to play in 
the international system, and focus on the way the nature of smallness might manifest 
itself in its time and geopolitical context. Thus Keohane defines a small state as "a state 
whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a 
significant impact on the system".7 I f we apply this definition to the way Luxembourg 
views its status in the international system, the following statement by Colette Flesch, a 
former Luxembourg Foreign Minister, may serve as a self-definition of smallness: 
"N'ayant guere de poids intrinseque et n'etant guere a 1'origine des controverses agitant 
les diverses organisations, le Luxembourg joue d'ordinaire un role discret qui lui permet 
d'entretenir des contacts nombreux". Common to both definitions is the fact that the 
small state lacks weight within the system in which it acts, which forces it to play a 
discreet role and obliges it to compromise. 
7R. O. Keohane, 'Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics' in International 
Organization 23:2 (1969) p. 296. 
8 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'La diplomatic luxembourgeoise: necessite, realite et defi' in Bulletin 
de documentation 3/1983 p. 5. 
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1.2 Small-State Predicament in the International System 
The status of a state in the international system can be said to be determined by factors 
like physical size (in both demographic and geographic terms), geopolitical location, 
level of economic and social development, political environment within the state, 
military strength, i.e. factors which have an impact on the state's influence on otiier 
members within the international system. Table 1.2 shows quantifiable criteria like total 
land area, population and GDP of EU member states and places small EU members in 
relation with their larger partners. 
MS T L A (1,000 km2) Pop. (mio) (+%) GDP (bn E C U ) in 
in 1995 1994 
A 84 8.0(2.1%) 165.8 
B 31 10.1 (2.7%) 192.2 
D 357 81.6(22%) 1724.8 
DK 43 5.2 (1.4%) 123.7 
F 544 58.0(15.6%) 1121.9 
FI 338 5.1 (1.3%) 82.4 
GR 132 10.4 (2.8%) 80.3 
I 301 57.2(15.4%) 863.2 
IRE 70 3.6 (0.9%) 44.5 
L 3 r 0.4(0.1%) 11.6 
NL 42 15.4 (4.1%) 278.5 
P 92 9.9 (2.6%) 73.9 
UK 244 58.3 (15.7%) 856.6 
SP 506 39.1 (10.5%) 407.1 
SW 450 8.8 (2.3%) 165.7 
EU 3,237 371.1 6192.0 
Table 1.2 Total land area, population, GDP figures of E U member states 
Legend: A=Austria; B=Belgium; D=Germany; DK=Denraark; F=France; FI=Finland; GR=Greece; 
I=Italy; IRE=Ireland; L=Luxembourg; NL=Netherlands; P=Portugal; UK=United Kingdom; SP=Spain; 
SW=Sweden. MS=member state; TLA=total land area; pop.=population; GDP=Gross Domestic Product 
With a territory of 2,586 sq. km squeezed between Europe's most powerful states and a 
population of about 420,000, with a GDP amounting to 11.6 bn ECU and an army the 
size of a battalion, Luxembourg represents what has tempted Handel to refer to as 'weak 
state'9. Luxembourg is not only dependent on the international system in security but 
also in economic matters. In defence matters, it has neither the strength nor the financial 
resources to defend itself against external threats and is therefore highly dependent on 
external help. 
Luxembourg's economic system, like that of other European small states, is 
characterised by an inherent economic vulnerability which is due to a number of factors. 
First, although Luxembourg is highly developed economically, its economic system 
tends to be restrained by a less diversified structure and the smallness of its domestic 
9 M . Handel, Weak States in the International System (London, 1981). 
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market. The country's economy is largely based on the finance and media sectors, and 
the steel industry. Secondly, Luxembourg trades with a limited number of foreign 
trading partners which enables the latter to exert a considerable influence on the 
country. Major trading partners are France and Germany and Luxembourg's two 
Benelux partners. The EU countries absorb 86% of its total exports of manufactured 
goods of which 28% go to Germany, 21% to France and 13% to Belgium.1 0 Thirdly, it 
is highly specialised in a narrow range of goods, making its economy highly dependent 
on just a few sectors and therefore highly vulnerable; and last, its GNP is small in 
absolute terms. Luxembourg's economic relations are characterised by a strong 
interdependence which makes it highly dependent on the international economic 
environment. In this respect, we do agree with David Vital when he affirms that 
a small state is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under 
stress, more limited in respect of the political options open to it and subject to a 
tighter connection between domestic and external affairs. In other words the 
smaller the human and material resources of a state the greater are the 
difficulties it must surmount if it is to maintain any valid political options at all 
and, in consequence, the smaller the state the less viable it is as a genuinely 
independent member of the international community.1' 
With regard to these constraints how does the small state behave in the international 
system it operates in? What foreign policy options does it adopt to strengthen its 
position in the international system? Fully aware of its vulnerability and its limitations 
the small state tries to avoid conflicts, likes to leave room for alternatives and tries to 
remain as independent in its decisions as possible. Maurice A. East has tried to identify 
the behaviour small states adopt in foreign policy-making with regard to one or more of 
the following characteristics: small land area, small total population, small total GNP, 
and a low level of military capabilities. 
a) Low levels of overall participation in world affairs; 
b) high levels of activity in intergovernmental organisations (IGO's); 
c) high levels of support for international legal norms; 
d) avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft; 
e) avoidance of behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states 
in the system; 
f) a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities; 
g) frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues.'" 
Small states have indeed a low level of international involvement as their interests are 
usually limited to neighbouring and regional areas. The active foreign policies they 
1 0 These figures refer to 1996 (see Statec, Annuaire statistique 1997. Luxembourg (Luxembourg, Statec, 
1998). 
" D. Vital, The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford, 
1967) p. 1. 
I 2 M . A. East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models' in World Politics 25:4 (July 
1973) p. 557. 
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pursue beyond their own region are usually limited to a small number of issues and are 
of limited consequences to most of the other members of the international system. 
Hence they have little or no influence on the nature of the system they operate in. 
Generally speaking the small state pays more attention to the question of economic 
development in foreign policy making.13 Although East's conclusions, based on a wide 
reading in the general literature of foreign policy, have not been left uncriticised, his 
work underlines certain characteristic patterns of behaviour of small states: their focus 
on participation in international organisations and their promotion of international law. 
Rather than relying on the good will of their more powerful neighbours, they prefer to 
exchange hidden dependence for an organised one based on law rather than power 
politics. A statement by Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs confirms this: 
Le role d'un petit pays dans les affaires internationales consiste a suivre une 
ligne de force, dont le point de depart est son existence en tant qu'entite 
souveraine et l'aboutissement, son integration - dans le respect de son 
originalite propre - dans les differentes spheres de solidarite.14 
Luxembourg sought very early to overcome its inherent weaknesses by joining regional 
or global international organisations. It tried to surmount its economic vulnerability by 
joining the 'Zollverein' (German Customs Union) in 1842 and, after that came to an end 
in 1918, helped setting up the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in 1921. 
After the disastrous experience of its neutrality policy during the Second World War, 
Luxembourg became a founding member in many regional and international 
organisations working at economic, political and military level. It tried to overcome its 
security problems by forming an alliance with other states within NATO or Western 
European Union. It gradually increased its international co-operation in technical and 
administrative matters by joining the United Nations and the Council of Europe to name 
only the most important ones. Together with Belgium and the Netherlands it paved the 
way for today's European Union by founding the Benelux organisation in 1944.15 Aware 
of its political and economic vulnerability and voicelessness, Luxembourg's leaders16 
worked consistently for European unification and for the reconciliation of France and 
Germany by contributing their part to the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951, the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom 
in 1957. 
I 3R. P. Barston, 'The External Relations of Small States' in August, Schou; A. O. Brundtland (eds) Small 
States in International Relations (Nobel Symposium 17) (Stockholm, 1971) p. 41; M. Handel, Weak 
States in the International System p. 53. 
l 4Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'La politique etrangere du Gouvernement luxembourgeois' in Bulletin 
de documentation 1/1987 p. 1 
1 5Working as a customs union as of 1 January 1948, Benelux developed into an economic union by 1 
November 1960. 
1 6 In particular long-serving Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Joseph Bech. 
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1.3 Benefits of European Union Membership 
The Luxembourg government defines the European Union as a unique construction 
bringing together sovereign states which have freely transferred certain sovereign 
powers to be exercised within a single institutional framework in accordance with 
common rules and procedures.17 Luxembourg's leaders have a strong conviction that EU 
membership is not an option but a necessity for their country and that there is no viable 
alternative to co-operating in an integrated Europe. In 1989 the then Prime Minister 
Jacques Santer declared during a state visit in Malta: 
In some respect, it is correct to conclude that Luxembourg succeeded by this 
policy [of integration] to strengthen its independence. Integration appeared to 
be a sine qua non for sustained economic growth, itself a necessary condition 
for the political survival of the country.18 
This view and the one that the country's interests can be best defended within European 
institutions are reflected in the high degree of consensus over EU membership and 
deeper political and economic integration among the population and the major political 
parties.19 What are the uncontested advantages of EU membership for a small state? 
Among the most obvious advantages is the EU's legal framework, which is based on the 
principle of equality of states, the principle of supranationality and the acquis 
communautaire. As a result, the European Union as a legal framework provides a strong 
legal back-up, which is in the interest of the small member and which it tries to 
maintain. 
The principle of equality o f states is a principle of international law that 
implies that the international legal system legitimises political units without regard to 
size and strength. It ensures that all member states of an international organisation are 
represented in the decision-making bodies and are equal partners in the organisation's 
decision-making process. The principle of equality of states is an accepted principle in 
the European Union. The EU does however not explicitly state it in its Treaties. It rather 
stresses the solidarity among its member states when it states in Article A of the Treaty 
on European Union: "[The Union's] task shall be to organize, in a manner 
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and 
1 7 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire du Gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la Conference 
Intergouvernementale de 1996' in Bulletin d'information et de documentation 2/1995 p. 167. 
1 8 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'The Economic Integration of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Past 
Experience and Prospects' in Bulletin de documentation 7/1989 p. 33. 
''Although consensus on EU membership has generally been high, it has become less unconditional 
during the debating and ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty, where fears were expressed by some 
political parties (notably by right-wing ADR) that i f integration is taken beyond reasonable limits, 
Luxembourg's identity might be threatened. In an opinion poll conducted in 1997, 71% of the population 
declared themselves in favour of European Union membership. In this opinion poll Luxembourg ranks 
third after Ireland (83%) and the Netherlands (76%) (see European Commission, Eurobarometer 48. 
autumn 1997). 
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between their peoples." The principle of equality makes sure EU member states have 
equal rights but also equal duties to fulf i l in the European integration process. 
Tire principle of supranationality makes the European Union in some 
respects sui generis. Contrary to common practise in intergovernmental organisations, 
the EU's acquis commimautaire is legally binding for all the member states. This is 
most notably true for the Treaties in their entirety, for all legislation enacted to date and 
for legal acts passed by the EU's supranational institutions (European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice) without the explicit consent of the member states. The 
acquis communautaire, which takes pre-eminence over national legislation, is legally 
binding for large and small states alike and thus provides more effective safeguards 
against the aggressive pursuit of national interests than decisions taken by non-
supranational international organisations. Another facet of supranationalism lies in the 
ever growing practice that member states can be bound against their wish. Although 
certain policy fields (e.g. taxation) still require unanimous decision-making, an ever 
growing number of decisions are taken by qualified majority in the Council of Ministers 
where member states have weighted votes. 
EU membership also provides a number of political advantages for the small 
state. Where formerly power politics reigned, Luxembourg gets now guarantees of a 
more or less good behaviour between states and most importantly between its powerful 
neighbours France and Germany. Active participation in the supranational organisation 
implies that member states relinquish parts of their national sovereignty to a higher unit. 
Ironically, it is exactly by relinquishing parts of its sovereignty that Luxembourg sees 
its sovereignty as being increased.20 By having access to the EU's policy and decision-
making structures, Luxembourg has the opportunity to participate in and influence 
collective decision-making. Hence the small state has the opportunity to have a real 
political activity and a voice to express its interests alongside its larger partners on an 
international level. Integration, especially in the form of supranationality, gives the 
small state the opportunity to become an international actor and at the same time it is a 
safeguard against the aggressive pursuit of national interests. By way of integration 
Luxembourg can free itself of its structural weaknesses and obtain an international 
influence which is disproportionate to its small dimension. The increase in international 
status is particularly obvious when the small state is holding the Presidency in the 
Council of Ministers. 
For a small state with an almost complete lack of foreign policy tools (e.g. 
military capacities, access to sensitive information) and missing an extended diplomatic 
apparatus, EU membership provides enhanced access to foreign policy tools and to 
" See the statement of Jacques Santer, former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, on Luxembourg's status in 
the EU: "Je crois meme qu'un petit pays a plus de pouvoirs. On parle parfois ^'abandon de souverainete. 
II n'y a pas d'abandon: on transfere une partie de la souverainete a d'autres organes oil Ton peut codecider 
sur tout avec les partenaires". (Santer Interview 'Premier voyage royal: l'union au Grand-Duche' in La 
Libre Belgique, 17 March 1994). 
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diplomatic information basically via Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Luxembourg takes advantage of a better and more efficient representation when the EU 
(in particular the European Commission) is acting as an external representative and is 
negotiating with other international organisations on behalf of its member states (e.g. 
during the GATT negotiations). In particular the Council Presidency gives Luxembourg 
the opportunity to deal with high politics and provides it with the necessary means (e.g. 
the troika and the support provided by the Council Secretariat) to represent the EU on 
the world stage. Alongside the information gained in the EU's decision-making forum 
(the Council of Ministers), enhanced access to information is obtained, formally and 
informally, as the large member states agree to share often sensitive information with 
their smaller partners. In addition, the small state gains invaluable information due to its 
close co-operation with the Commission and the Council Secretariat, in particular when 
holding the Council Presidency. 
Another advantage for the small state lies in the federal-type decision-making 
system of the EU, which ensures that all states are represented in the decision-making 
bodies while paying special attention to minorities. By taking into account the size and 
the principle of equality of states, small member states can be said to be overrepresented 
in the EU's institutions and exert an influence that is disproportionate to their size. 
Along with the legal and political advantages of European integration, the 
economic payoffs can also be substantial for a small member. EEC membership grants 
Luxembourg access to a market that is many times bigger than its own thus enabling it 
to trade with a larger number of trading partners. With regard to its economic 
dependence, unhindered trading within the EEC as a powerful trading bloc is obviously 
a greater gain for a small state than for a large trading unit. Hence one can say that in 
relative terms, economic pay-offs are usually greater for a small state than for a larger 
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one. In absolute terms, though, the gains are more rewarding for the big states. 
1.4 The Council of Ministers 
It is within the institutional framework of the Council of Ministers20 where a small state 
like Luxembourg seems to feel best placed to pursue what can be considered as the core 
2 1S. Baillie, The Seat of European Institutions: An Example of Small State Influence in European 
Decision-making (European Policy Process Occasional Paper No. 11) (Florence, 1996) p. 2. Luxembourg 
is represented by one Commissioner in the European Commission and one judge in the European Court of 
Justice. The principle of 'degressive proportionality' ensures that Luxembourg gets some minimum 
representation in the European Parliament (6 MEPs). In the Council of Ministers, Luxembourg's two 
weighted votes are disproportionately high compared to Germany's ten weighted votes. The rotating 
Council Presidency is held during six months by large and small states alike. 
2 2R. Vayrynen, 'Small States in the New European Context' in W. Bauwens/A. Clesse/ O.F. Knudsen 
(eds) Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe (Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No 8) 
(London, 1996) p. 113 
2 3 On 8 November 1993, shortly after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the Council decided that it 
should henceforth be known as the 'Council of the European Union' (see OJ No. L281, 16.11.93, p. 18). 
For practical reasons, we use the denomination of'Council of Ministers' or 'Council' in this thesis. 
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of its strategy towards the European Union: battling in realistic terms for the progress of 
European integration while defending those national interests of the state that are 
considered as vital for preserving a certain degree of sovereignty.24 The Council of 
Ministers is the European Union's most important negotiating and decision-making 
institution. It is interesting to note that the Benelux countries - fearing a loss of their 
national sovereignty - demanded the creation of a Council of Ministers where the 
national governments would be represented as a counterweight to the supranational 
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institutions during the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris. 
Being both executive and legislature, the Council can take decisions about the 
development of Community policies as well as agree, amend or reject the Commission's 
proposals for legislation while always acting within the legal framework of the Treaties. 
As the central meeting place of the national governments, it is here where the member 
states' representatives labour to find common solutions and to defend their country's 
national position on Community business (the so-called first pillar of TEU), Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In practice 
and contrary to the general expectations of the founders of the Community, the Council 
evolved to become the most 'powerful' of the EU's three main decision-making 
institutions. The Council and its members, which after all represent the interests of the 
member states, jealously defended, and in some respects extended the Council's 
decision-making power to guarantee that "national governments are centrally placed to 
influence most aspects of EU business".26 
The Council is in some respects the most intergovernmental institution as it has 
the greatest national input. The most important decisions on EU legislation are taken 
here by national representatives delegated by the member states. This national input is 
visible vertically throughout the Council hierarchy. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, 
the working groups and committees, which are responsible for assisting and preparing 
the work of the Council, are attended by national officials of the relevant member states; 
at a higher level, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), composed of 
senior national officials from the member states' Brussels-based Permanent 
Representations, prepare the agenda for the various Council meetings and have 
considerable negotiating and decision-making capacities; at a more senior level, 
national ministers negotiate and take decisions on sector-specific issues in sectoral 
Councils (e.g. Agriculture Council, Ecofin, etc.) or in the General Affairs Council 
(GAC) where the Foreign Ministers ful f i l a general co-ordinating function and take 
decisions regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Virtually all major 
decisions on policy initiation and priorities are taken - unanimously in most cases - by 
" See G. Trausch (et al) Le Luxembourg face a la construction europeenne (Luxembourg, 1996) p. 9; 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Debat sur la CIG de 1996. Chambre des Deputes, 12 July 1995. 
Expose introductif de M. Jacques F. Poos, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. 3. 
2 5 See G. Trausch (et al), Le Luxembourg face a la construction europeenne p. 7. 
2 6 N . Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, (3rd ed.) (London, 1995) p. 123. 
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the Heads of State and Government within the European Council, the most senior forum 
within the Council hierarchy.27 Furthermore the Council Presidency arrangements are 
shared on a six-monthly basis among the member states. Little wonder that the links 
between the Council of Ministers and the member states are considered to be of crucial 
importance and that member states pay a lot of attention to maintaining an effective co-
ordination system between the national capital and the Council of Ministers (see 
Chapter Two). 
The intergovernmental character of the Council is also reflected in its voting 
rules. Some key decisions (including those of a fiscal or constitutional nature) are still 
taken by unanimity. Irrespective of the voting rules and even where qualified majority 
voting is allowed, it has become a habit within the Council to operate by consensus.28 
As a result of the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) some of 
the Council's intergovernmental features were somewhat assuaged: opportunities to 
reach decisions by QMV were extended, making voting much more acceptable; the 
influence of the European Parliament to act as a co-legislator was enhanced by 
introducing the co-operation and assent procedures - both created by the SEA - and by 
the co-decision procedure, which was created by the Maastricht Treaty.29 
1.5 Behavioural Implications of Small-State Status in the Council of 
Ministers 
The inherent weaknesses of a small state actor as described above have hypothetical 
implications for the behaviour of the actor in the Council of Ministers and for the 
behaviour of the other actors in the Council towards him. Some of these behavioural 
implications may provide important opportunities of action, which the small state may 
use to exert influence in the Council of Ministers. Theses behavioural implications will 
be set out below. 
Guardian of a Communautaire Spirit 
Generally speaking, the small state actively supports a proactive development of 
European integration. This means that it may act as a catalyst and propose innovative 
ideas to make European integration advance.30 This also means that it continuously 
works for a strong European institutional framework and for a deepening of the various 
2 7 The European Council (Art. D TEU) is sometimes viewed as not belonging to the Council hierarchy. It 
was not mentioned in the founding Treaties and only came to be institutionalised at the 1974 Paris 
summit. Legal recognition was given for the first time in 1986 via SEA. 
2 8 See F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (London, 1997) p. 18. 
2 9 Under the new Treaty of Amsterdam, opportunities for using QMV as well as the co-decision 
procedure are to be extended to new policy areas. This means that the member states are currently losing 
ever more grip over their national sovereignty to the EU. 
3 0 See Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Die Rolle Luxemburgs in Europa' in Bulletin d'information et de 
documentation 6/1992 p. 61. 
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EU policies and processes on the grounds that the establishment of rules regulating the 
relations between European states is particularly beneficial to the small state and 
preferable to power politics. Aware of its inherent weaknesses, the small state uses its 
position at the centre of EU decision-making to act as a guardian of a communautaire 
spirit, that means it closely observes the application of the rules of the game and the 
preservation of the institutional framework. Specifically, the small state tends to foster 
the development of elements of supranational authority within the EU's institutional 
framework. It does so by supporting the independence and a strong role of the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice and by fostering the respect of the rules 
of vote and procedure. The reason being that the small state fears getting caught in the 
"tricky mechanism of intergovernmental co-operation".31 It distrusts 
intergovernmentalist bargaining and tries to prevent the accumulation of power of larger 
member states known as a directoire.32 Hence the it sees its interests best preserved 
within the supranational sphere of the European Commission that has assumed a 
political responsibility to strive for an overview of the interests of all member states. 
The small state considers the Commission as the main representative of Community 
interests and, unless it strongly defends a vital national interest, often rallies to the 
Commission's view in Council negotiations, considering the Commission as a natural 
ally and a small-state protector. 
Low-profile Approach 
As a result of its inherent weaknesses, the small state has a dedicatedly vital interest in 
only a limited range of policy sectors in EU decision-making. Hence the small state's 
involvement in the Community negotiating and decision-making process is 
. characterised by a more or less restrained participation in a high range of policy fields. 
This means that on many issues discussed in the Council of Ministers, the small state 
•1*1 
takes a 'low-profile approach' . This does, however, not mean that the small state is 
indifferent to most policy issues under discussion. It often finds itself on the same line 
than the Commission or the majority of member states as its interests often merge with 
the ones of the Community as a whole. We can therefore speak of a concordance of 
Community and small state interests. What might appear as a disadvantageous position 
at first sight still provides the small state with important opportunities of action. The 
low-profile approach and the ensuing detachment on many policy issues place the small 
state in a perfect position to assume the roles of neutral co-ordinator and mediator both 
in Council negotiations and - the more so - when holding the Council Presidency. 
j l M . Hirsch, 'Influence Without Power: Small States in European Polities' in The World Today 32:3 
(1976) p. 115 
3 2 Small states fear that part of the agenda of the EU is shaped outside the negotiating fora in Brussels by 
an inner core of large member states (notably France and Germany) striking deals in diplomatic 
negotiations. 
3 3S. Baillie, The Seat of European Institutions p. 3. 
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Non-competitive Relationship 
Small-state status with all the weaknesses it implies does not only condition the small 
state's behaviour towards other actors but also the behaviour of other actors towards the 
small state. Sasha Baillie has described Luxembourg's status in the international system 
as a non-competitive one with regard to other, mostly larger, states. 
Larger states tend to be more tolerant, understanding and even supportive 
towards the behaviour and the interests of a smaller partner. As a result, 
Luxembourg may be able to behave in a self-interested way without provoking 
opposition on the part of its larger and potentially more influential partners. 
The advantages a small state reaps may be substantial from its point of view, 
yet negligible from the point of view of a larger state.34 
Given the limited range of issues in which the small state has an important interest and 
its low level of intervention during the Council negotiations (see low-profile approach), 
a non-competitive relationship between the small state and other states can be said to be 
prevalent in the Council of Ministers. It may provide the small member state with 
important opportunities of action. Thus the small state's attempt to obtain special 
concessions in the Council of Ministers by drawing attention to its special situation may 
be successful because it has a non-competitive relationship with its larger partners. 
1.6 Hypothesis 
With regard to these preliminary clarifications the assumption is made that active 
participation in the Council of Ministers, the EU's central decision-making body, is an 
opportunity for Luxembourg, the smallest EU member state, to turn an apparent 
weakness (small size and its consequences) into an advantage. The hypothesis is put 
forward that the institutional framework of the Council of Ministers confers a 
disproportionately high amount of influence on Luxembourg. This influence is 
disproportionate with regard to its small size and its inherent weaknesses derived from 
smallness. At the same time we maintain that Luxembourg has an absolute political 
weight that is relatively small and not comparable with the political weight of larger 
member states. On the basis of these hypotheses we analyse Luxembourg's influence in 
the Council of Ministers and its consequent behaviour. In this respect influence is to be 
understood as the ability "to have the desired effect on outcomes in issues it 
[Luxembourg] has an interest in" . 3 5 It will be assumed that active participation in the 
EU's major decision-making body provides the smallest EU member state with 
important opportunities of action. Our aim is to identify those opportunities of action 
and the tools Luxembourg applies to make its voice heard and the strategies it uses to 
maintain, strengthen or justify its status quo. 
S. Baillie, The Seat of European Institutions p. 3. 
5 S. Baillie, The Seat of European Institutions p. 1. 
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2 Communicating with the Council of Ministers 
Un petit pays ne vaut essentiellement 
pas les hommes qui le represented. 
Jean-Jacques Kasel 
Formally the Council of Ministers is the Community's principal decision-making body. 
At the same time it is the most obviously intergovernmental of the EU's three main 
institutions.36 It is the institution where the power of the member states has most clearly 
been channelled. For the European Union member states, the importance of the Council 
stage of decision-making in the European Union's legislative process has proven 
undeniable. At the various levels of their domestic politico-administrative hierarchy, EU 
governments are continuously involved in the Community decision-making system. At 
political level, the heads of state and government meet in European Council and the 
ministers in the various sectoral Councils; at administrative level, senior government 
officials meeting at Coreper level, and (more or less) senior officials and experts 
meeting at working party level are involved in the study of new legislative proposals 
and in the preparation and defence of bargaining positions. Governments have become 
increasingly aware of the importance of efficient national co-ordinating mechanisms to 
establish an aggregate national negotiating position that combines the different sectoral 
approaches. This co-ordination chain extends from co-ordination within ministries and 
interministerial co-ordination at domestic level to a co-ordination channel between 
national administrations and Community institutions, a role played by the Brussels-
based Permanent Representation. An efficient co-ordination mechanism and clear lines 
of authority can be considered as the key to a consistent and coherent line in EU 
bargaining. This has become all the more important during the last decade. As a result 
of a greater use of qualified majority voting ever since the Single European Act (1986), 
the decision-making process has been speeded up, which means that more decisions are 
taken more quickly. In addition, a 'Europeanisation' of almost every domestic ministry 
has taken place. Whereas in the past agriculture, trade and finance ministries were the 
only ones to be traditionally affected by EU policy-making, most ministries are now 
confronted with EU affairs at variable degrees. 
With this in mind, it is interesting to see which co-ordination mechanisms the 
smallest EU member state has installed to formulate a consistent and coherent 
bargaining position in the Council of Ministers. This chapter focuses on the main 
aspects of co-ordination: interministerial co-ordination, the central co-ordinating unit 
and the domestic-EU interface, that is the Permanent Representation in Brussels. The 
main focus is on the preparation stage of decisions, involving the national 
The institutions primarily involved in the EU's legislative process are the European Commission, the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
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administrations in the study of new proposals and in the preparation of bargaining 
positions. We highlight the main characteristics of Luxembourg's co-ordination system 
and try to find an answer to the question of how effective it is to achieve a consistent 
and coherent negotiating stance in the Council of Ministers. 
2.1 Special Features of Luxembourg's Co-ordination of European 
Policy Making 
Each government is in some respects sui generis, with its administrative structures 
shaped by the country's historical, cultural and socio-political past. The co-ordination 
system of each member state is a function of its domestic political and governmental 
system and deeply entrenched practice. The experience of member states in this field is 
so idiosyncratic that it cannot easily be transplanted from one national context into 
another one. The most apparent specific features of the Luxembourg government are its 
decentralised as well as highly pragmatic and informal administrative system. These 
idiosyncrasies have a considerable impact on Luxembourg's co-ordination of EU policy-
making and have to be seen within the framework of the following premises: first, a 
general lack of human and financial resources; second, a vested interest in only a 
limited number of EU policy areas and third, a strong national consensus on EU 
membership and policies. 
A Highly Pragmatic and Informal Administrative System 
One central feature of Luxembourg's administrative system is that its lack of human and 
financial resources has forced its actors to adopt a pragmatic and informal approach in 
handling matters. In the early days of the European Communities, Luxembourg was 
faced with the problem of how to adapt a small national administration to an increased 
number of tasks that EC membership conferred on it. De Muyser describes the 
predicament of the time: 
(...) I I a fallu trouver un compromis entre la necessite d'assurer 
l'accomplissement satisfaisant des travaux supplementaires et, d'autre part, 
l'impossibilite de gonfler proportionnellement les effectifs administratifs. C'est 
ainsi que le governement a ete amene a se preoccuper du bon rendement de ses 
services plutot que de l'application stricte des textes repartissant les 
competences (...).37 
Due to the impossibility of increasing the administrative personnel proportionally to the 
increased volume of tasks, Luxembourg was obliged to apply the same pragmatic and 
informal approach that was characteristic of its national administration to its co-
ordination system with the Council of Ministers. Hence Luxembourg has a co-
3 7 G. de Muyser, 'La preparation de la decision communautaire au niveau national luxembourgeois' in P. 
Gerbet/D. Pepy (eds) La decision dans les Communautes europeennes (Bruxelles, 1969) p. 230. 
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ordination mechanism that is pragmatic and informal rather than rigid and highly 
formalised. 
Informal Contacts and Short Communication Ways 
The informal and pragmatic approach that reigns in Luxembourg's national 
administration can be best seen in the short hierarchical distances within its 
administration. Departmental officials who are in charge of an EU dossier have a direct 
reach to their respective minister to discuss any issue of political weight. Consultations 
are done informally either by phone or by direct contact.38 The same is true for 
consultations with the Brussels-based Permanent Representation. In practice, officials in 
the technical departments are in informal contact, mainly by telephone, with the 
Permanent Representation. Jean-Marc Hoscheit, a former Deputy Permanent 
Representative, writes: "L'essentiel des affaires se traite de maniere informelle entre 
agents se connaissant personnellement la plupart du temps, instaurant ainsi un systeme 
de cooperation tres souple entre fonctionnaires et departements."j9 Short 
communication routes, and regular and close personal contacts among officials promote 
a flexible approach to the definition of the national position, which is only possible in a 
small administration. Hitherto close contacts also seemed to have obviated the need for 
an institutionalised system of interministerial co-ordination comparable to the French or 
British co-ordination systems.40 
Polyvalent Officials 
Luxembourg's officials are less specialised than their EU counterparts abroad.41 This 
applies to those officials in the technical departments as well as to those in the 
Permanent Representation (see below). A small administration obliges officials to get 
familiar with a broader field of issues than a large one where specialists are in charge of 
specific technical issues. A small administration thus avoids a certain rigidity that is 
typical of large ones. The organisation of tasks has to be done according to what is 
practically feasible and necessary. "Au sein des autorites gouvernementales, 
l'organisation du travail et la repartition des taches s'est faite en fonction des necessites 
ou possibilites pratiques, plutot que selon une stricte observance des textes 
J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres des Communautes europeennes: Les 
Presidences du G.D. de Luxembourg' in C. O'Nuallain (ed) The Presidency of the European Council of 
Ministers. Impacts and Implications for National Governments (London, 1985) p. 192. 
3 9 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 191. 
4 0 Unlike most EU member states, France and the UK have created special interministerial units to co-
ordinate the national position on EU policies. France established the Secretariat general du Comite 
interministeriel pour les questions de cooperation economique europeenne (SGCI) and the UK created 
the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. Luxembourg's Permanent Representative Kasel expressed, 
however, in a personal interview that the need for an institutionalised system of interministerial co-
ordination is becoming ever more acute. 
4 1 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 192. 
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communautaires". As a result, Luxembourg's representatives in the various Council 
meetings are polyvalent generalists whose general knowledge may prove to be of great 
benefit in practice. They are at home in more than one policy area and may adapt more 
quickly to changing bargaining situations. Generalists are also in an advantageous 
position to seek consensus among differing parties or to broker compromises in 
logjammed negotiations. A disadvantage is that Luxembourg lacks expert knowledge in 
many policy areas. But then again, the question may be raised whether a country with as 
little policy areas in which it has a vested national interest really needs to have specialist 
knowledge across the board. Polyvalence has also another facet in Luxembourg's 
administration. As a result of a lack of senior officials, less senior officials are allowed 
to negotiate important dossiers.4"1 
Great Freedom of Action of Officials 
Luxembourg's co-ordination system allows its representatives to work within a 
relatively loose framework. 
En effet, le fonctionnaire de la carriere superieure qui represente le pays peut 
agir la plupart du temps sur base destructions generates, sans avoir a 
demander constamment des orientations detainees. Tres souvent le 
fonctionnaire n'a pas recu de consigne specifique avant le debut des 
negociations. II connait la raatiere, il s'est entoure de tous les renseignements 
necessaires et sait prendre sa responsabilite. Ce n'est que lors des negociations 
de dossiers 'chauds' que le ministre concerne intervient directement et 
personnellement en dormant des instructions precises.44 
That is to say that Luxembourg's negotiators act on the basis of general instructions 
from the government and are able to negotiate on relatively important matters at all 
levels of the Council machinery. This also means that they are given greater freedom of 
action and responsibility within the Council meetings than their counterparts from other 
member states. It has in fact been stated that Luxembourg's representatives enjoy the 
greatest freedom of action of all member states.45 This pragmatic approach has both 
advantages and disadvantages. An obvious advantage is that a loose negotiating 
framework fosters manoeuvrability and flexibility in the formulation of the national 
position. Luxembourg's negotiators do not have to consult their government each time 
negotiations take a new turn. This serves the smooth functioning of the Council as a 
whole as it prevents awkward issues to be referred up the Council hierarchy. A 
disadvantage is that such a great freedom of action presupposes a great competency of 
negotiators. Much depends on the personality, experience and negotiating skills of 
4 2 G. de Muyser, 'La preparation de la decision communautaire au niveau national luxembourgeois' p. 
230. 
4 j J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 192. 
4 4 S. Merten-Beissel, 'L'administration luxembourgeoise et 1'integration europeenne' in C. Debbasch (ed), 
Administrations nationales et integration europeenne (Paris, 1987) p. 54. 
4 D F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (London, 1997) p. 223. 
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single representatives. According to Nugent a further disadvantage is that "too much 
independence for representatives can lead to the necessity of awkward backtracking at a 
later negotiating stage i f a misjudgement is made".46 
'Unity of Personnel' 
As a result of a lack of personnel, Luxembourg's administration portrays a unique 
phenomenon that can be described as that of'unity of personnel': the same officials are 
involved at the various stages of the preparation, negotiation and implementation of EU 
decisions. 
(...) Le meme fonctionnaire qui participe en tant qu'expert a la phase 
preparatoire, negocie aux divers echelons de la structure du Conseil, redige les 
mesures nationales d'execution, participe le cas echeant a la procedure 
parlementaire, effectue la mise en oeuvre pratique, tout en gardant le contact 
avec le secteur socio-professionnel concerne et controle l'application.47 
This means that one and the same official may be involved in the preparation of the 
national position at national level, in the defence of the country's position within the 
Council hierarchy and in the national implementation procedure of the decision. A 
possible advantage is that officials who are involved in all the stages of the procedure 
are in good knowledge of the respective dossier, which, as a result, may be time-saving 
and promote a better flexibility of the co-ordinating system. 
Autonomy of Technical Departments 
Visible signs of decentralisation of Luxembourg's administrative system are the great 
freedom of action that the single technical departments enjoy in formulating the national 
position and the absence of a formal committee system. Officials of the technical 
departments are responsible for their own policy areas and communicate their position 
to the Foreign Ministry, the leading ministry responsible for the co-ordination of EU 
affairs. Although the Foreign Ministry assures some co-ordination of the positions of 
the respective ministries before sending instructions to the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels, the autonomy that the departments enjoy may lead to inconsistencies in the 
formulation of the national position. 
C'est pourquoi des domaines comme l'agriculture, l'energie ou encore les 
problemes economiques specifiques echappent dans une mesure variable au 
department des Affaires etrangeres. Ce systeme n'est viable que dans la mesure 
ou des contacts etroits sont possibles entre les fonctionnaires des ministeres 
concernes.48 
N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (3 r ed.) (London, 1995) p. 414. 
S. Merten-Beissel, 'L'administration luxembourgeoise et l'integration europeenne' p. 55. 
J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 193. 
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As shown above, close contacts among officials from the various departments, often 
knowing each other personally do exist and the decentralised nature of the system has 
but rarely lead to inconsistencies in the formulation of the national position. 
2.2 Intel-ministerial Co-ordination 
Luxembourg's administration has no institutionalised co-ordination mechanism 
comparable to the French SGCI or the British European Secretariat. An aggregate 
national position is achieved in ad hoc co-ordination mechanisms. The main 
administrative institutions involved in Luxembourg's co-ordination system are the 
technical departments, the Foreign Ministry as the central co-ordinator of EU policy and 
the Brussels-based Permanent Representation that forms the link between the national 
administration and EU institutions (see figure 2.1). 
Council of Ministers 
Coreper/working groups 
Foreign Ministry 
Technical 
Departments 
Perm. Representation 
Fig. 2.1 Luxembourg's co-ordination system of E U policy and decision-making 
Although the technical ministries exert a substantial influence on the formulation of 
policies, the Foreign Ministry has the leading responsibility for the co-ordination of EU 
policy at national level. It co-ordinates a highly decentralised structure and basically 
fulfils three tasks: it acts as a mailbox, it contributes to the formulation of the national 
position and has some reconciliatory function. This triple role needs, however, some 
greater specification. Officially the Foreign Ministry fulfils the role of a mailbox where 
all communications between the technical ministries, the EU institutions and the 
Permanent Representation pass. In practice this rule is not always applied since urgent 
matters are settled in direct contact with departments and the Permanent 
Representation.49 
S. Merten-Beissel, 'L'administration luxembourgeoise et l'integration europeenne' in p. 53; G. de 
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The Foreign Ministry plays an important co-ordinating role in the formulation of 
the national position: the Permanent Representation sends a dossier to be treated to the 
Foreign Ministry, which passes it on to the respective technical department for comment 
and study. Once a position has been formulated in the technical department, it is sent to 
the Foreign Ministry which transmits it with or without any special comments to the 
Permanent Representation.50 In practice, however, the positions adopted in the various 
Council working groups evade the competence of the Foreign Ministry as officials take 
a position along the criteria adopted in their respective departments without consulting 
the Foreign Ministry each time.5 1 It can be said that a kind of symbiosis has been found 
between the Foreign Ministry and the technical departments: whereas the former deals 
with the political aspects of a dossier, the latter concentrate on its technical aspects. 
Due to a lack of vital national interests in many policy fields and the pragmatism 
and close contacts fostered by the smallness of Luxembourg's administration, it has so 
far proved unnecessary to create an institutionalised system of interministerial 
committees. Only matters of vital importance, e.g. the issue of the Luxembourg seat of 
EU institutions, are treated in interministerial committees. Should the formulation of 
the national position give rise to divergences, the pragmatic and informal administrative 
system ensures a quick solution by means of ad hoc negotiation and co-ordination. In 
such a case, it is very often the Foreign Ministry that takes the initiative to convene an 
ad hoc interministerial committee chaired by a Foreign Ministry official, to solve 
potential ministerial clashes and to discuss matters of vital importance for the country. 
I f the conflict cannot be solved in ad hoc meetings or when it touches on a matter of 
vital national interest, it will be discussed in the weekly cabinet meetings of the 
53 
ministers ('Conseil de gouvernement'). 
2.3 The Permanent Representation 
The Permanent Representation is the main link between the national administration and 
the EU institutions. In practice much of Luxembourg's co-ordination of European policy 
making is ensured by the Permanent Representation which enjoys a high status in 
Luxembourg's administration. This can be seen in the great impact that its oral and 
Muyser, 'La preparation de la decision communautaire au niveau national luxembourgeois' p. 234. See 
also the following comment: "The tendency for certain ministries to try to circumvent inter-ministerial co-
ordination by exerting direct pressure on Brussels-based negotiators is a fact of Community life. It 
happens regularly, particularly on the part of the influential minstries (foreign affairs, agriculture and 
economic affairs)" (F. Hayes-Renshaw/C. Lequesne/P.M. Lopez, 'The Permanent Representations of the 
Member States of the European Communities' in JCMS 28:2 (1989) p. 131). 
5 0 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 190. 
3 1 G. de Muyser, 'La preparation de la decision communautaire au niveau national luxembourgeois' p. 
231. 
3 2 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 191. 
5 3 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 190; G. de Muyser 'La preparation de la 
decision communautaire au niveau national luxembourgeois' p. 234. 
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written reports have on the formulation of the national position , in the high degree of 
autonomy that the Permanent Representative and its staff enjoy in defending 
Luxembourg's positions in Coreper and the various working groups they attend, and in 
the enhanced co-ordinating role it plays when the country holds the Presidency (see 
Chapter Five). The post of Permanent Representative is considered as one of the most 
influential, i f not the most influential of Luxembourg's diplomatic service. With this in 
mind, the Permanent Representation can be considered as occupying a key position in 
Luxembourg's co-ordination structure. 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representation distinguishes itself in some respects 
from those of other member states: first, with regard to its small size; second, with 
regard to the status, length of term of office and autonomy of the Permanent 
Representative; third, concerning the high ratio of diplomats to specialists; fourth 
regarding the large margin of manoeuvre that its officials enjoy even in important 
questions at all levels. These idiosyncrasies can be considered as being a function of the 
country's small national administration. 
Size and Staffing of the Permanent Representation 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representation reflects the small size of the national 
administration and is the smallest one in Brussels. With a total of 14 members in 199855, 
there seems to be no direct link between the number of staff employed in Brussels and 
the important tasks the Permanent Representation has to ful f i l . The size of 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representation is, however, not only a function of the small 
national administration but also of the small size of the country, of the short distance 
which separates Luxembourg from Brussels and of the limited range of issues in which 
Luxembourg has a vital interest. 
Luxembourg 1958 1968 1978 1988 1995 1998 
1 3 2 2 7 14 
Table 2.1 Evolution of the staffing of the Luxembourg Permanent Representation from 1958 to 
199856 
The Permanent Representation depends directly upon the Foreign Ministry and all its 
staff stem from here. The post of Permanent Representative is a most prestigious and 
influential position. Long-established habits of national administration and the high 
consensus Luxembourg enjoys with regard to EU membership and policies implies that 
the job is conferred on a career diplomat on the grounds of merit rather than 
partisanship or political reasons. Much depends on the personality of the Permanent 
3 Hoscheit, Jean-Marc, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 195. 
5 5 During the Presidency the staff is increased. Luxembourg relies then on the ad hoc support from 
diplomats in bilateral embassies and from the central administration. During the 1997 Luxembourg 
Presidency, the staff was inflated to 23 members (information provided by PR). 
5 6 Adapted from F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 223. 
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Representative. Hence the Luxembourg government puts a high premium on the 
capabilities, expertise and negotiating skills of the Permanent Representation's prime 
negotiator. This is all the more important since the Permanent Representative has a role 
to play at all stages of the Council decision-making process but above all in Coreper. 
Generally a 'senior generalist' from the Foreign Ministry, the Permanent Representative 
has first-hand EU experience, negotiating skills, insider knowledge and access to 
informal information in order to successfully defend the country's interests during the 
weekly meetings of Coreper I I where the Permanent Representatives meet to discuss 
matters of 'political' weight. It is expected that the Deputy Permanent Representative, 
who negotiates Luxembourg's position with regard to 'technical' matters in Coreper I , 
has similar qualifications. The long terms of office served by these two most senior 
officials show that much importance is attributed to the capabilities and experience of 
Luxembourg's prime negotiators in the preparatory Council machinery (see table 2.2). 
Perm. Rep. Term of office Deputy Perm. Rep. Term-of office 
Lambert Schaus 1958-60 Adrien Meisch 1958-60 
Albert Borschette 1960-70 Jean Dondelinger 1961-70 
Jean Dondelinger 1970-84 Jean Schleich 1970-73 
Paul Peters 1973-76 
Joseph Weyland 1976-79 
Jean Mischo 1979-83 
Joseph Weyland 1984-91 Jean Feyder 1983-87 
Thierry Stoll 1987-91 
Jean-Jacques Kasel 1991-98 Jim Cloos 1991-93 
Jean-Marc Hoscheit 1993-98 
Nicolas Schmit 1998-? Marc Ungeheuer 1998-? 
Table 2.2 Overview of Luxembourg's Permanent Representatives and Deputy Permanent 
Representatives from 1958 to present day (1998)37 
The table shows that Luxembourg's Permanent Representatives serve an average term of 
office of eight years. Only Belgium's Permanent Representatives serve a longer average 
term of office (ten years). Luxembourg's Permanent Representative who served longest 
in this function is Jean Dondelinger (14 years plus 9 years as deputy!). With an average 
term of office of four years, Luxembourg's Deputy Permanent Representatives serve a 
shorter term of office than the Permanent Representatives. Compared with the length of 
term served by other EU Deputy Permanent Representatives, this length of term 
corresponds to the general trend. Among Luxembourg's deputies the one who served 
longest in this function is again Jean Dondelinger (9 years). The long terms of office 
served by Permanent Representatives, who often served as deputies as well (e.g. 
Dondelinger and Weyland), guarantees a great stability of the national co-ordination 
mechanism. Their daily exposure to EU affairs constitutes an accumulation of 
3 Adapted from M . Westlake, The Council of the European Union (London, 1995) p. 306. 
3 8 See Annex X.2.3 on member states' Permanent Representatives and Deputy Permanent Representatives, 
1958 to 1995 in M . Westlake, The Council of the European Union p. 305-7. 
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experience and intimate knowledge that is of fundamental importance for a small 
member state with a small administration. 
In general terms, the member states' Permanent Representatives are serviced by 
national officials on secondment who are both diplomats and technicians in a ratio of 
40:60.59 Here Luxembourg forms again an exception. Whereas most member states' 
Permanent Representations employ a larger number of specialists to deal with the 
increasing number of policy sectors within the Council's working groups, the ratio of 
diplomats to specialists is 71:29 in Luxembourg's Permanent Representation.60 Due to 
the limited number of personnel of its administration, Luxembourg cannot afford to 
release specialists permanently to Brussels. To a lesser degree this paucity of 
technicians may be explained by the relatively few areas of really vital national interests 
touched on in the Council of Ministers. Thus the technical experts remain in 
Luxembourg and attend meetings in Brussels whenever necessary, leaving the day-to-
day work to a small group of less specialised officials (or generalists) in the Permanent 
Representation. 
The Role of Luxembourg's Permanent Representation 
The role of a member state's Permanent Representation is ambivalent and twofold. Its 
overall charge is to represent and defend the member state's views vis-a-vis EU 
institutions in Brussels and at the same time it is a key source of information to keep the 
capital informed of what is happening in Brussels. With regard to the Permanent 
Representation's first task, one can say that representation and defence of a member 
state's views is more effective the more the officials from the Permanent Representation 
are involved in the national co-ordination procedure. Luxembourg is well prepared in 
this respect. Senior officials from Luxembourg's Permanent Representation make a 
crucial contribution to the national co-ordination of EU policy making. They are closely 
associated with the formulation of national positions to the extent that the Permanent 
Representative attends almost weekly co-ordination meetings in the capital.61 According 
to Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne and Lopez this is important for three reasons: 
First, it is an indication of the perceived importance of such officials, whose 
job it is to defend the national position, not only during meetings, but in the 
course of all their contacts with colleagues from other member states. Second, 
it provides them with a much more direct means of influencing governmental 
opinion in the capital than is the case in Brussels. Finally, the greater the 
involvement of the official of the Permanent Representation in the formulation 
F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 220. "It is interesting to note that a greater 
number of officials from the line departments than career diplomats is evident (...) [in the Permanent 
Representations] across the Community as a whole" (F. Hayes-Renshaw/C. Lequesne/P.M. Lopez, 'The 
Permanent Representations of the Member States of the European Communities' pp. 124-5). 
6 0 See table 9.1 on the ratio of diplomats to home civil servants in the Permanent Representations in 1995 
in F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 221. 
6 1 Information provided by Luxembourg's former Permanent Representative Jean-Jacques Kasel during a 
personal interview. 
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of the national position, the easier it will be for him/her to negotiate in 
Brussels, in that they will have a clearer idea of the national problems and the 
margin of manoeuvre granted to them, whether implicitly or explicitly.62 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representative meets the Foreign Minister (or senior officials 
from the Foreign Ministry) and the departmental ministers two to three times per month 
in the so-called 'Union committee' meetings ('Comite de l'Union'). The main purpose of 
these meetings is to provide some information to the Foreign Ministry of what policies 
are under way and to get instructions on what general position to take on certain 
dossiers. Unfortunately the 'Union committee' meetings are not held with the expected 
discipline and have become a victim of material constraints (in particular lack of time) 
of ministers.63 
Furthermore, officials in the Permanent Representation are in regular contact 
with 'European correspondents' ('correspondants europeens') in the technical 
departments. Each technical department has a certain number of 'European 
correspondents', i.e. officials in charge of EU dossiers who are in regular and direct 
contact with the Foreign Ministry and the Permanent Representation, in particular with 
the Deputy Permanent Representative.64 As regards the defence of the national position, 
Luxembourg's co-ordination mechanism grants the Permanent Representative and its 
staff a large margin of manoeuvre even in important questions in the working groups 
and in Coreper. The Luxembourg government allows them to negotiate flexibly and to 
decide on relatively important questions at all levels. 
The considerable autonomy the Luxembourg permanent representatives to the 
EU enjoy means that they are not hampered by hierarchical and cumbersome 
administrative procedures but are able to assess situations on the basis of their 
personal knowledge and experience in a rational, swift and efficient manner. 
Rapid assessment of situations and swift adaptation gives the small state an 
advance on its partners when manoeuvring circumstances to its own 
advantage.65 
Such a flexible approach, which is by far not common among all the member states' 
delegations, promotes speed, manoeuvrability and efficiency. Especially those member 
states that have a lot of interests to defend insist on more rigid guidelines and try to refer 
decisions upwards to the ministerial level. At the same time a flexible approach is much 
more dependent on the capabilities of single negotiators. 
With regard to the Permanent Representations' second task, they inform the 
capital of possible or impending EU legislation. Officials from Luxembourg's 
F. Hayes-Renshaw/C. Lequesne/P.M. Lopez, 'The Permanent Representations of the Member States of 
the European Communities' p. 130. 
6 3 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
6 4 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. According to Kasel, the system of 'European 
correspondents', which was an initiative launched after the Edinburgh European Council in 1992 is 
functioning relatively well. 
6 5 S. Baillie, The Seat of the European Institutions: An Example of Small-State Influence in European 
Decision-making (European Policy Process Occasional Paper No. 11) (Florence, 1996) p. 4. 
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Permanent Representation send Commission proposals and minutes from the various 
Council meetings with added comments to the Foreign Ministry, who then forwards 
copies of it to the responsible departments. In practice, however, the Permanent 
Representation also sends the copies direct to the departments. This information 
gathering requires a good official and informal information network.66 Concerning the 
unofficial co-ordination channels, it is important that the Permanent Representation can 
count on the co-operation of compatriots who staff cabinets and Directorates General of 
the Commission. In this respect, Luxembourg's good access to the cabinet of the 
President of the European Commission is an important source of information that is not 
to be underestimated. The fact that Luxembourg's Permanent Representatives have a 
long term of office also enhances their insider knowledge and first-hand experience. 
Knowing, for instance, about the prospective stance of other member states on a certain 
dossier in Coreper negotiations is an important asset for a member state, especially i f it 
holds the Council Presidency, as it provides it with a deeper understanding of what is 
technically possible in the respective dossier. It must, however, be pointed out that 
Luxembourg's information network is under no circumstances comparable to the one of 
the larger member states. 
2.4 Efficiency of Luxembourg's Co-ordination System 
The formulation of a national position to defend in Council meetings is the result of a 
long debate and co-ordination efforts at national level. Efficient co-ordination 
mechanisms between the national capital and Brussels and between national ministries 
are of prime importance to formulate an aggregate national position. This raises the 
question of how to measure the efficiency of a national co-ordination system. A major 
goal that the national actors pursue with their co-ordination efforts is to achieve a 
consistent and coherent line in EU bargaining. The reason being that: 
Repeated inconsistencies in the national position suggest bad co-ordination and 
fuzzy lines o f authority . Nationals at the receiving end o f inconsistency may 
find they lack credibility among their European colleagues during negotiations 
and, in the worst cases, they may be forced into embarrassing climb-downs 
when their instructions are changed.67 
Hence coherence and consistency in the formulation of the national position may serve 
as a measure for evaluating the efficiency of co-ordination systems. A coherent line in 
EU bargaining may be achieved if at least one of the following prerequisites are 
fulfilled. There need to be: 
• a high degree of domestic consensus on EU issues; 
Official information may be gained from the Commission and in working party and Coreper meetings 
and so on. Informal information may be gained from informal contacts with members of the Commission, 
during lunch time, etc. 
1 1 7 F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 216. 
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• a strong co-ordinating system for reconciling different viewpoints and imposing a 
sense of direction.68 
The first prerequisite seems to be given in Luxembourg's case. Except for the limited 
number of policy areas where Luxembourg has a particular national interest, the 
country's negotiators generally defend positions that lie close to the Commission's 
proposals and/or to where a consensus lies amongst a majority of partners.69 In this 
respect Luxembourg starts with a great advantage against those partners that are in a 
minority position. 
Let us now explore whether the second prerequisite (strong reconciliation and 
direction-giving structure) holds true for Luxembourg's co-ordination system. As we 
have seen above, Luxembourg has a decentralised and highly pragmatic and informal 
co-ordination system. Obvious advantages of this system were shown to be the great 
flexibility with which a national position may be formulated thanks to short 
communication ways and reduced hierarchical procedures. The 'unity of personnel' and 
the great freedom of action that Luxembourg's negotiators enjoy equally fosters 
flexibility and manoeuvrability. In this respect, Luxembourg's representatives have a 
priori a great advantage vis-a-vis their EU counterparts. Most of them are polyvalent 
generalists and have good foreign language skills. 7 0 This grants them a certain 
versatility in negotiations, the capability to adapt quickly to changed situations and to be 
resourceful in negotiation and brokerage. This also provides them with the right 
capabilities to act as consensus seekers and mediators in logjammed negotiations (see 
also Chapter Three and Four). 
But what about the ability of the national government to co-ordinate across the 
Councils? Does a pragmatic co-ordination system allow the national government to take 
a consistent and coherent position horizontally (i.e. across the various sectoral Councils) 
and vertically (i.e. at the various levels of the Council hierarchy)? The worst thing that 
can happen to any government is that negotiators in one policy sphere contradict those 
in another one. In this respect, Luxembourg's decentralised administrative system may 
constitute a weakness. An apparent disadvantage of a decentralised administrative 
system is that "any issue which cuts across established lines of responsibility, or which 
raises the question of overall priorities, may remain unresolved at the national level and 
• 71 
lead to a negative or passive position in the Community negotiations". In particular the 
great autonomy that the technical departments enjoy contributes to the risk of 
contradictory positions. As a matter of fact it happens once in a while that the Ministry 
of Agriculture adopts a different position from the Ministry of Finance and that both 
H. Wallace, 'The Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities; A Comparative 
Perspective' in C. O'Nuallain (ed) The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers. Impacts and 
Implications for National Governments (London, 1985) p. 265. 
6 9 S. Merten-Beissel, 'L'administration luxembourgeoise et l'integration europeenne' p. 54. 
7 0 Representatives are completely fluent in French and German, which are Luxembourg's administrative 
languages, and most of them equally in English. 
7 1 H. Wallace, National Governments and the European Communities (London, 1973) p. 37. 
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ministers take contradictory positions in their respective sectoral Councils. It equally 
happens that the position taken in Coreper I is differing from the one taken at a higher 
level by the ministers.72 This shows that inconsistencies exist both at vertical and at 
horizontal level. This may be a hint that the Foreign Ministry, the main co-ordinating 
body, lacks authority and strength to reconcile different viewpoints and to impose a 
sense of direction. Diverging positions of ministries may well be solved in ad hoc 
meetings. But in a decentralised system based on informal and ad hoc policy and 
reconciliation formulation too much depends on a strong common identity of officials 7 3 
and on their willingness to maintain close contacts. 
Though advantages it may have, another factor that might impede the 
formulation of a coherent line in EU bargaining is the great autonomy that 
Luxembourg's negotiators enjoy in negotiations at every level of EU decision-making. 
This autonomy makes Luxembourg's co-ordination system very actor-dependent. To a 
large extent the formulation and in particular the defence of the national position is 
subject to the capabilities of the actors at Council level. Much depends on the 
personality, negotiating skills, experience and length of experience of the negotiators, 
the more so as Luxembourg's officials receive little training. There may be a risk that 
representatives go too far in their position at a lower level of the Council hierarchy so 
that it needs some backtracking at a higher Council level. 
Hence in a decentralised system such as Luxembourg's, the central co-ordinating 
body needs to provide a strong enough reconciliation capacity and should be able to 
impose an even stronger sense of direction, which does not seem to be given.74 
Officially the Foreign Ministry fulfils these functions but in practice the Permanent 
Representation plays a crucial de facto co-ordinating role: the large margin of 
manoeuvre its negotiators enjoy in Council meetings, the close and almost daily 
informal contacts with the technical departments, its function as a key source of 
information for the Foreign Ministry and the technical departments and the almost 
weekly visits of the Permanent Representative in the capital make the Luxembourg 
Permanent Representation a crucial co-ordinator that assumes the role of a filter in the 
national co-ordination system. According to Permanent Representative Kasel the 
government is acutely aware of the weaknesses of Luxembourg's co-ordinating 
mechanism. First ideas have appeared to install a central co-ordinating system within 
the Prime Minister's Office ('Ministere d'Etat') that would be similar to the French 
SGCI. This office would be 'chapote' by a senior official from the Foreign Ministry and 
would fulf i l a central information-gathering and co-ordination function in the 
formulation of an aggregate national position. 
7 2 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
7 3 Baillie writes in this respect: "Aware of the external dependence and vulnerability of the small state, 
domestic actors cooperate closely, reach compromises and are likely to agree on a common interest when 
dealing with European issues". (S. Baillie, The Seat of the European Institutions p. 4). 
7 4 Jean-Jacques Kasel points out that once the third stage of EMU is entered, a strong co-ordination 
system is of even greater importance both for national and EU policies. 
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In general terms it can be said that although Luxembourg's current co-ordination 
structure fosters a flexible approach to decision-making processes at EU level, it seems 
to lack some strength in the sense that it cannot directly strengthen the country's means 
of influence in the EU decision making process. Weaknesses are inherent in the 
decentralised nature of the national administration. The informality that characterises 
the co-ordination structure and the great autonomy that the involved actors (single 
departments, Permanent Representation and officials) enjoy in formulating the national 
position may lead to inconsistent positions during the decision-making process. This 
makes the co-ordination system to a large extent actor-dependent and incidentally 
transfers major aspects of co-ordination from the Foreign Ministry to the Permanent 
Representation, which also plays the crucial role of a filter. 
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3 Negotiating Status in the Council of Ministers 
Tandis qu'un gros devient maigre, 
un maigre passe de vie a trepas. 
Joseph Bech 
Effective national co-ordination of European policy and decision-making is a crucial 
element in the efficient formulation of negotiating stances (see Chapter Two) but it is 
not the only factor that determines negotiating outcomes in the Council of Ministers. A 
member state's formal voting weight as well as its actual political weight are decisive 
for the outcome of negotiations. The same is true for the personality, experience and 
negotiating skills of government representatives. This chapter wil l analyse what 
influence Luxembourg has on decision-making both with regard to the member state's 
formal voting weight under the different voting modes (unanimity and majority voting) 
and with regard to its actual political weight. We shall make a clear distinction between 
the relative influence Luxembourg has under the current voting system and the actual 
political influence it has in the sense of being able "to have the desired effect on 
outcomes in issues it has an interest in" 7 5 . It is common knowledge that Luxembourg is 
highly overrepresented in the Council of Ministers, but how about its actual political 
influence? Can Luxembourg's 'overrepresentation' in the Council of Ministers induce us 
to presume it has an equally higher political influence? 
3.1 Voting and the Relative Influence of Luxembourg 
Luxembourg's favourable formal position in the Council of Ministers is particularly well 
reflected in the Council's voting system. In theory, Council decisions are taken on the 
basis of either unanimity or majority voting, the latter taking two forms: simple majority 
and qualified majority voting (QMV). Under unanimity and simple majority voting 
Luxembourg enjoys absolute equality with its partners in the Council. In practice, there 
is a continuing preference for consensual decision-making in the Council, even where 
QMV is possible. Many items of legislation are passed without resorting to a formal 
vote. Teasdale provides the figures for the period between December 1993 and March 
1995 where of 283 legislative acts adopted in the Council under QMV only 72 involved 
a formal division and of these, 40 were cases in which votes were cast against, and in 32 
cases abstentions were expressed.76 Since Council voting is 'opaque' there is no reliable 
way of establishing the voting behaviour of the member states. Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace assert there is no evidence whatsoever of small states systematically outvoting 
larger ones. Equally evidence is lacking on which and how many decisions are blocked 
7 5 S. Baillie, The Seat of the European Institutions: An Example of Small State Influence in European 
Decision-making (European Policy Process Occasional Paper No. 11) (Florence, 1996) p. 1. 
7 6 A. Teasdale, 'The Politics of Majority Voting in Europe' in Political Quarterly 67:2 (1996) p. 103. 
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because there is an implicit or explicit blocking group.'7 In this respect it is important to 
note the hypothetical nature of the following outline of Luxembourg's formal voting 
power in the Council of Ministers. 
Unanimity Voting 
Under unanimity voting each member state has one vote, with an abstention not 
preventing the adoption by the Council of legislative acts which require unanimity (Art. 
148(3) EC). Ever since the Single European Act (1985) and later on the Maastricht 
Treaty (1991) extended the use of qualified majority voting to new areas - thus making 
decision-making more supranational - fewer decisions are adopted by unanimity. Still, 
crucial areas of Union competence to some of which Luxembourg is particularly 
sensitive, remain subject to unanimity: amendments to the Treaties (Art. N ( l ) TEU), 
accession of new member states (Art.O TEU), the determination of the seat of 
78 
institutions (Art. 216 EC). Within the sphere of internal market decisions where the 
majority of decisions is subject to QMV, harmonisation of taxation (Art. 99 EC), 
equally a 'hot potato' for Luxembourg, is subject to the unanimity rule as well. The two 
intergovernmental pillars, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA), are also to a great extent subject to unanimity voting. 7 9 Thus 
Luxembourg's vote has the same weight as Germany's or France's concerning the 
adoption of joint actions or the definition of common decisions. Hence the smallest 
member state has a considerable influence on the formulation of the EU's foreign 
O A 
policy. The obverse of the unanimity requirement, the legal veto , gives each member 
state an equal opportunity to block any Commission proposal it disapproves. Thus, 
theoretically, tiny Luxembourg has the possibility to block a decision favoured by all 
the other member states. Whether this is possible in practice for a small state is explored 
in Chapter Four. 
Majority Voting 
Another instance where Luxembourg enjoys absolute equality is when votes are taken 
by simple majority. Article 148(1) of the EC Treaty stipulates that "save otherwise 
provided (...), the Council shall act by a majority of its members." This means that 
F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (London, 1997) pp. 54-5. 
7 8 Areas subject to unanimity are specifically stated in the Treaty. Annex VII.3.1 in M. Westlake, The 
Council of the European Union (London, 1995) pp. 112-3 provides a list of these areas. 
7 9 The new Treaty of Amsterdam stipulates, however, there will be potentially greater use of qualified 
majority voting in CFSP. 
8 0 For matters of clarity a clear distinction is made between the legal veto, applying in those areas (mainly 
taxation, social laws and some international agreements) where members' decisions have to be 
unanimous, and the political veto, that is the Luxembourg Compromise, allowing a member state to block 
any item of legislation provided it can show that a vital national interest is at stake. Concerning the debate 
whether the Luxembourg Compromise is dead or still prevalent see A. Teasdale, 'The Life and Death of 
the Luxembourg Compromise' in JCMS 31:4 (1993) pp. 567-579. 
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where the Treaty makes no express provision to the contrary, a simple majority 
automatically applies. A simple majority is attained when eight of the current fifteen 
member states, each holding one vote, vote in favour. It must however be pointed out 
that in practice, this voting procedure covers relatively few cases and is mainly used for 
procedural questions (e.g. convening an Intergovernmental Conference). 
The absolute equality that Luxembourg enjoys with all the other member states 
under unanimity and simple majority voting does not apply under the most frequently 
used decision-making method in the Council, that is qualified majority voting (QMV). 8 1 
By giving each member state a weighted vote (see table below), QMV is based on the 
principle that "some member states are treated as more equal than others".82 
Table 3.1 History of voting weights, current population, majority and blocking minority 
thresholds83 
Votes Votes Votes Votes 1986- " Votes ~ Pop (mio) 
1958-73 1973-81 1981-86 95 ( E C / E U si in r l')05 (+%) 
(EC 6) (EC 9) (EC 10) 12) (1 1 15) (1995) 
B 2 5 5 5 5 10.1 (2.7%) 
F 4 10 10 10 10 58.0(15.6%) 
D 4 10 10 10 10 81.6(22%) 
I 4 10 10 10 10 57.2(15.4%) 
L 1 2^  " 2- 2 2 0.4 (0.1) 
NL 2 5 5 5 5 15.4(4.1%) 
D K - 3 -> j - i 3 5.2(1.4%) 
I R E - 3 3 3 3 3.6 (0.9%) 
U K - 10 10 10 10 58.3 (15.7%) 
GR - - 5 5 5 10.4 (2.8%) 
P - - - 5 5 9.9 (2.6%) 
SP - - - 8 8 39.1 (10.5%) 
A - - - - 4 8.0 (2.1%) 
F I - - - - 3 5.1 (1.3%) 
SW - - - - 4 8.8 (2.3%) 
Total 17 58 63 76 87 371.1 
QM (+%) 12 
(70.5%) 
41 
(70.5%) 
45 
(71.5%) 
54 (71%) 62 (71%) 
BM (+%) 6 
(35.2%) 
18(31%) 19(30%) 23 (30%) 26 (30%) 
Super QM 4/6 MS 6/9 MS 7/10 MS 8/12 MS 10/15 MS 
Legend: B=Belgium; F=France; D=Gennany; 1= Italy; L=Luxembourg; NL=NetherIands; DK=Denmark; 
ERE=Ireland; UK=United Kingdom; GR=Greece; P=Portugal; SP=Spain; A=Austria; FI=Finland; SW=Sweden. 
QM=qualified majority (currently 62 out of 87 votes); BM=blocking minority (currently 26 out of 87 votes); Super 
QM=Super-qualified majority (currently 62 votes in favour cast by at least 10 MS); MS=member state. 
8 1 There are two types of qualified majority: Article 148(2) EC provides that, where the Treaties require 
the Council to act by a qualified majority, and where the Council is acting on the basis of a Commission 
proposal, Council acts require at least 62 votes in favour. This, at the very minimum, would require the 
agreement of 8 member states. The same article provides that where the Council is not acting on a 
Commission proposal, a Council act requires 62 votes in favour cast by at least ten (that is, two-thirds) of 
the member states (super-qualified majority). 
8 2 A. Teasdale, 'The Politics of Majority Voting in Europe' p. 104. 
8 3 Adapted from M . Westlake, The Council of the European Union p. 96 and F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. 
Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 46. 
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The large member states (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) currently have ten 
weighted votes, Spain, a medium large member state, has eight votes. Within the 
category of medium-sized member states, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Portugal have five votes. Within the category of small member states, the largest ones, 
Austria and Sweden have been given four weighted votes, Denmark, Ireland and 
Finland three votes each and Luxembourg, the smallest member state, has been 
allocated two votes. Although not stated in the EC Treaty, the votes are roughly 
weighted in ranking order - but not in proportion - of population size so that the larger 
member states exert a greater voting influence. Hosli notes that next to population size, 
factors such as economic power and 'historical precedent' also seem to influence the 
84 
allocation of weighted votes. These factors are well reflected in the considerations the 
representatives of the member states had in 1951 and 1957 when they allocated 
Luxembourg's weighted votes: 
(...) Tiny Luxembourg, which had initially been created as a buffer state 
between France and Germany, had been occupied during the Second World 
War, was on the side of the victorious Allies, was itself a significant coal and 
steel producer, was a founder member of the Benelux organization, and was, 
despite its small scale, a sovereign state. Luxembourg could not be denied 
some place in the scheme of things, and so was awarded the absolute rninimum 
possible - one point, on the base of which all other calculations were made.85 
For Luxembourg the economic factor seemed to have played a crucial role in the 
allocation of weighted Council votes. Being an important coal and steel producer 
Luxembourg was lucky that European integration started with economic co-operation in 
the coal and steel sector. This secured the country equal representation in the Council 
of Ministers including minimum representation for weighted votes. 
Over-representation of Luxembourg 
The calculations made at that time introduced one contradictory yet central feature of 
EC decision-making that has become an increasingly political issue during the last 
0*7 
years : overrepresentation of Luxembourg and other small member states. The 
founding member states made sure that Luxembourg's weighted vote had no influence 
88 
on the outcome of decisions , and yet, like other small member states, Luxembourg has 
M. O. Hosli, 'Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: 
Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers' in International Organization 
47:4 (1993) pp. 633-4; Teasdale expresses a similar idea when he writes that "from the start, the 
weighting extended to small states has always been greater than that justified on strict population 
grounds" (A. Teasdale, 'The Politics of Majority Voting in Europe' p. 102). 
8 5 M. Westlake, The Council of the European Union pp. 90-1. 
8 6 G. Trausch (et al), Le Luxembourg face a la construction europeenne (Luxembourg, 1996) p. 7. 
8 7 Especially within the context of institutional reform that is currently discussed (see Chapter Six). 
8 8 See Trausch stating that during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome, a note was added 
stipulating that Luxembourg's weighted vote should by no means have any effect on decision-making 
(Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire: Quelles perspectives pour le 
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been highly overrepresented as regards its voting share in the Council ever since the 
introduction of weighted votes. This means that there is an imbalance between voting 
weight and population. Although Luxembourg has been given the lowest weighting 
(currently two votes) this is disproportionately high with respect to its population 
(approximately 420,000 inhabitants). Luxembourg thus has one vote per 210,000 
inhabitants. To take the other extreme, Germany, the largest member state with a 
population of 81.6 million inhabitants, is approximately 200 times bigger than its tiny 
neighbour but has been given a weighting (10 votes) that is not proportionately higher 
when taking the relation population - weighted vote as a calculation basis: Germany has 
one vote per 8.1 million inhabitants. 
To comprehend the overrepresentation of small states we need to understand why 
weighted votes have been introduced after all? During the negotiations for the Treaties 
of Paris and Rome, the original six member states calculated and negotiated 
arrangements that provided a system of checks and balances between small and large 
member states but which slightly favoured the smaller members. The considerations of 
the founding fathers consisted in introducing a system whereby the small member states' 
weighted vote was low enough so that they could not block all together a decision, and 
where the larger member states' weighted vote was twice as high as the one of Belgium 
or the Netherlands but still low enough, so that a single large state could not 
automatically obtain a binding majority and thus dominate decision-making. A 
peculiarity of the system is that it guarantees the right to pre-eminence to the large 
member states while preventing them from bullying the smaller members. Hence small 
member states would be protected from 'big-country bullying'. At the same time a 
certain equality between the largest member states had to be guaranteed by giving them 
the same number of weighted votes (four votes). With the blocking minority threshold 
set at six votes, the three small member states could not block a decision against the will 
of the three large ones, and the big three would all have to act together to achieve the 
qualified majority threshold (12 votes). 
Today, with the threshold for qualified majority set at 62 out of a total of 87 votes, 
'large-state bullying' is even less possible. The five largest states (although representing 
two-third of the EU's population) cannot achieve QMV by their own efforts but need to 
seek the support of smaller member states to make a legislative act pass. At the same 
time the smallest member states (that is Luxembourg and the three-vote and four-vote 
states) still cannot block a proposal89 without the help of two medium-sized or one 
larger member state. Hence the system of weighted votes which, on the surface, seems 
to foster inequality with respect to the differing weighted votes does indeed contribute 
to the equality of member states when giving it a closer look: 
Luxembourg?' in Bulletin de Liaison des Anciens de l'Athenee No 13 (1998) pp. 9-10). 
8 9 In order to block a proposal to be taken under QMV, a coalition of member states needs to form a 
blocking minority currently consisting of at least 26 out of the total of 87 weighted votes. 
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The importance of majority voting lies not so much in the fact that it prevents 
small States from blocking important decisions, as such members could as a 
rule be brought into line by political pressure. What the majority principle does 
is make it possible to outvote large Member States that would withstand 
political pressure. This principle thus contributes to the equality o f Member 
States and must therefore be regarded as the cornerstone of the Community 
on 
constitution. 
This possibility to "outvote large Member States that would withstand political 
pressure" has become easier for small states ever since the 1995 enlargement tipped the 
balance to their advantage. Although it is still true that a coalition of the smallest 
member states cannot block a decision without any help of medium-sized and larger 
ones, a clear imbalance in favour of small states and the falling trend of the blocking 
minority9 1 make it easier for small and medium-sized states to block a decision. The 
fear of an increased weight of a larger number of small states became most visible 
during the 1995 enlargement negotiations. In particular Spain and the UK feared a 
decrease in their potential veto power and argued for maintaining the blocking minority 
threshold at 23 votes in an expanded Union. Luxembourg and its Benelux partners 
argued strongly in favour of an increased blocking minority on the grounds that an 
unchanged blocking minority would have increased the voting power of the large 
member states. The ensuing Ioannina Compromise was intended to reassure Spain and 
the UK that the decrease in their relative voting power caused by an increase in EU 
members would be taken into account, even i f informally. 
Voting Permutations Between 1958 and Today 
Under the current majority voting system, a variety of permutations exist for 
Luxembourg to vote in favour or against a Commission proposal. Since the 1995 
enlargement, Luxembourg's voting position has considerably improved due to the range 
of coalitions it can join after new small members (Austria, Finland and Sweden) joined 
the EU. I f Luxembourg wants to block a proposal in a coalition consisting of other 
small states, it needs to rally the support of Austria, Sweden (4 votes each), Finland, 
Ireland and Denmark (3 votes each) and either two of the five-vote states or Spain or 
93 
one ten-vote state. A blocking minority can be achieved by the smallest states 
representing only around 13 % of the Union's population. I f Luxembourg wants to block 
a proposal in a coalition with its Benelux partners, it needs to rally the support of at 
9 0 K. Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law (4 l h ed) (Luxembourg, 1994) p. 24. 
9 1 Table 3.1 shows that the percentage of votes needed to block a proposal dropped from 35.2 % between 
1958 and 1973 to around 30 % after 1973. 
9 2 See Council Decision of 29 March 1994, OJ C 105/1, 13 April 1994. The Ioannina Compromise states 
that the Council would continue for a time to seek a wider basis of agreement on issues where members 
representing 23 or more, but no less than 26 votes, indicated sustained opposition. The text, which is a 
Council decision, does not amend the Treaties. 
9 3 This theoretic perception should, however, not give a wrong impression of a reality in which it is 
almost unheard of that small states outvote large ones in a systematic way. 
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least two more, preferably large states. Luxembourg could become a pivotal coalition 
partner for the formation o f a blocking minority where none o f the five larger members 
could be persuaded to jo in and either Ireland, Denmark or Finland could not be won 
over either. In this case an alliance of at least six member states, including at least two 
of the four five-vote states (Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands or Portugal) needs to be 
formed where Luxembourg's two votes could be decisive to block the respective 
proposal. Another instance where Luxembourg's vote could become pivotal is when two 
large member states try to block a proposal and need the support of two small members. 
Similarly, a multitude of voting formations exist where Luxembourg is needed to make 
a decision pass. 
Luxembourg did not always have as wide a range possibilities to form alliances. 
Especially between 1958 and 1973, that is until the first enlargement, the country was a 
powerless country with regard to majority voting. The idea finalised in the Treaty o f 
Rome was to grant Belgium and the Netherlands (2 votes each) twice the number o f 
votes of Luxembourg (1 vote) and Germany, France and Italy, the three larger member 
states (4 votes each), i.e. twice the number o f votes o f Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Luxembourg could only block a measure i f it managed to recruit the votes o f one larger 
member state plus those o f either Belgium or the Netherlands. Wi th only one (odd) vote 
and the qualified majority set at 12 out of 17 votes, Luxembourg had no formal impact 
on voting. Hence f rom 1958 until the first enlargement in 1973, Luxembourg was a 
'dummy country' 9 4. Luxembourg's one vote was not pivotal for the formation of a 
qualified majority, which could be attained by the votes o f two large member states plus 
Belgium and the Netherlands or by the three larger member states alone. Nor was it 
needed for forming a blocking minority. This was set at six votes and consisted of the 
votes of two larger member states or one larger member state and those of either 
Belgium or the Netherlands. The reason why Luxembourg was a 'dummy country' was 
because all the other member states had an even number o f votes so that Luxembourg 
with its odd one vote was never pivotal for a voting coalition to be successful. 
In the 1973 enlargement, Luxembourg's weighted votes were increased to two 
votes. Ever since 1973 there have been no changes o f voting weights for any of the 
member states. With the qualified majority set at 41 out of 58 votes between 1973 and 
1981, Luxembourg's higher share in weighted votes gave the small member state's vote 
some impact on the voting outcome. In this new Community o f Nine, Luxembourg's 
assistance was needed i f the other four small members wanted to block the four large 
ones (blocking minority required 18 votes). Luxembourg's support was not needed as 
soon as one large member state was part of the blocking minority. 
When Greece became a member o f the European Community in 1981, the 
qualified majority was set at 45 out of 63 votes; the blocking minority now required 19 
Term coined by P. Affuso/S. Brams, 'New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers' 
in Electoral Studies 4:2 (1985) pp. 135-9. 
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votes. In this Community of Ten, Luxembourg's vote was less crucial than in the 
previous Community o f Nine. In order to block the four large member states, 
Luxembourg had no crucial impact on the formation o f a blocking coalition o f small 
member states. It could jo in a blocking coalition o f small states consisting o f the three 
five-vote states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece) and one three-vote member state 
(Denmark or Ireland) but the five-vote states were not reliant on Luxembourg's vote to 
stand against the large member states. Yet again this enlargement offered new 
opportunities for forming voting coalitions. 
From 1986 until 1995, Luxembourg's vote could be important in a number o f 
different voting constellations though it was not absolutely crucial for the formation o f 
voting coalitions. In the Community of Twelve, the qualified majority was set at 54 out 
of 76 votes and a blocking minority required 23 votes. I f Luxembourg wanted to block a 
decision in a coalition o f small states, it needed the support o f three five-vote states plus 
Denmark's and Ireland's. However it must be pointed out that Luxembourg's vote was 
not crucial i f the small states wanted to form a block against the large member states. I f 
two large member states wanted to block a decision, Luxembourg's support was not 
enough and another (small) member state's support had to be found to form a blocking 
minority. However, in a blocking minority consisting o f Spain (8 votes), two five-vote 
member states and one three-vote member state, Luxembourg's vote could be crucial to 
block a decision. 
L u x e m b o u r g ' s Re la t ive Vot ing Power 
Majority voting, which has almost become the norm in Council decision-making since 
the SEA, is closely linked with the issue of imbalance between small and large member 
states. Successive enlargements, and especially the 1995 enlargement strengthened the 
position of small members and reduced the voting power, especially o f large member 
states. This overrepresentation o f small states and the relative voting power they possess 
has become an increasingly political issue. Quantitative measures have been applied to 
assess the relative voting power of states. The various techniques used, in particular the 
Shapley-Shubik power index and the Banzhaf power index, produce similar results: 
whereas the relative voting power of large member states declines, the relative voting 
power of smaller ones increases. 
50 
Table 3.2 Current weighted votes, population, and relative voting power under QMV 
Number, of 
votes 
Share of votes 
l" -(%) " 
, Population 
(mio) in 1995 
Relative voting, 
power (%)" 
B 5 5.7 10.1 (2.7%) 5.52 
F 10 11.5 58.0(15.6%) 11.67 
D 10 11.5 81.6(22%) 11.67 
I 10 11.5 57.2(15.4%) 11.67 
L 2 2.3 0.4 « U % ) 2.07 
NL 5 5.7 15.4(4.1%) 5.52 
DK 3 3.4 5.2(1.4%) 3.53 
ERE 3 3.4 3.6 (0.9%) 3.53 
U K 10 11 . 5 58.3 (15.7%) 11.67 
GR 5 5.7 10.4(2.8%) 5.52 
P 5 5.7 9.9 (2.6%) 5.52 
SP 8 9.1 39.1 (10.5%) 9.55 
A 4 4.5 8.0(2.1%) 4.45 
F I 3 3.4 5.1 (1.3%) 3.53 
SW 4 4.5 8.8 (2.3%) 4.54 
Total 87 99.4 371.1 100 
Legend: B=Belgium; F=France; D=Germany; 1= Italy; L=Luxembourg; NL=Netherlands; DK=Denmark; 
IRE=Ireland; UK= United Kingdom; GR=Greece; P=Portugal; SP=Spain; A=Austria; FI=Finland; 
SW=Sweden 
* Based on the Shapley-Shubik power index96 
The five largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U K ) with a total 
population of 294.2 mil l ion inhabitants have a share of 55.1 % in the votes. The four 
smallest member states (Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg) have a population 
of 14.3 mil l ion inhabitants but a share of 12.5 % in the Council votes. This means that 
the four smallest member states have a population that is about 20 times smaller than 
the one o f the five largest member states, and yet they have a share in one eighth of the 
Council votes. The case of Luxembourg with 0 .1% in the share of E U population and 
2.3% in the share o f Council votes exemplifies overrepresentation at its best. 
Luxembourg also enjoys an advantageous position wi th regard to its relative voting 
power. In general, the share in the vote total and the relative voting power of countries 
has decreased each time new members joined the Community. 9 7 It seems to be quite 
Adapted from M. Westlake, The Council of the European Union p. 97, F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, 
The Council of Ministers p. 46 and M.O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority 
Voting in the Council of the European Union' in JCMS 34:2 (1996) p. 265. 
9 6 For a general discussion of the effects of majority voting on the voting power of EU member states on 
the basis of the Shapley-Shubik voting power index see M . O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power' (1996). The 
Shapley-Shubik power index is a traditional measure of voting power. "It essentially calculates the 
proportion of cases in which a member can be pivotal within a coalition of members, that is, turn the 
voting coalition from a winning one into a losing one and vice versa" (M. O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power' 
p. 261). For a critique on power indices on the grounds that they ignore the policy preferences of member 
states in the Council see G. Garrett/G. Tsebelis. 'An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism' in 
International Organization 50:2 (1996) pp. 269-99. 
9 7 This holds only true under QMV. For decisions requiring unanimity, there is not much variation in 
voting power between the members since all of them hold a veto. 
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logical that "in relative terms, the shares o f individual members in the vote total 
decreased with an increase in the number o f members" and that a loss in voting power 
goes with it. Hence it seems to be completely illogical that a member state experiences 
an increase in voting power when new members jo in the Community. This is exactly 
what happened to Luxembourg in the 1973, 1981 and 1995 enlargements. Although its 
share in the vote total decreased as new members joined, Luxembourg witnessed a gain 
in voting power even though all the other member states experienced the contrary. 
Affuso and Brams call this phenomenon the 'paradox of new members'." 
» 1958-73 1973-81 1981-85 1986-95 Since 1995 
Luxembourg 0 0.95 3.02 1.18 2.07 
Table 3.3 Voting power (%) for QMV in the Council of Ministers calculated on the basis of the 
Shapley-Shubik power index1 0 0 
As table 3.3 shows, Luxembourg witnessed an increase in voting power o f 0.95 % in the 
1973 enlargement, 2.07 % in the 1981 enlargement and 0.89 % in the 1995 
enlargement. One reason being that in all of these enlargements, the new members that 
joined were small and medium-sized member states (except the U K and Spain) offering 
a wider range of opportunities for small states to participate in winning coalitions and to 
make a crucial contribution under the new constellation. 1 0 ' Affuso and Brams give a 
specific explanation for the increase in voting power Luxembourg experienced in 1973. 
As we have seen above, Luxembourg was a 'dummy country' between 1958 and 1973, 
that is Luxembourg had no voting power at all during that period. Luxembourg's one 
(odd) vote could not be pivotal for a voting coalition as all the other member states had 
an even number o f votes and qualified majority was set at 12. Affuso and Brams 
describe the 'paradox of new members' that occured in the 1973 enlargement as follows: 
Despite the fact that the new Council now included three new members, with a 
combined total of 16 votes (England, 10; Denmark and Ireland, 3 each), and 
Luxembourg's proportion of votes fell horn 1/17 =0.059 in the old Council to 
2/58=0.034 in the new Council, it had greater voting power in the new 
Council. (...) It seemed to us an anomalous change, because one would expect 
that when new members are added to a weighted voting body like the Council, 
and the proportion of votes of each of the old members therefore decreases, the 
voting power of the old members should also decrease. Yet, this did not occur 
in the case of Luxembourg.102 
M.O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power' p. 263. 
9 9 See 'New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers' (1985). 
1 0 0 Adapted from M.O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power' p. 265. 
1 0 1 M.O. Hosli, 'Coalitions and Power' p. 265 and 'Admission of European Free Trade Association States 
to the European Community' p. 640. 
1 0 2 P. Affuso/S. Brams, 'New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of Ministers' p. 135. 
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Affuso and Brams point out that this increase in voting power is all the more 
extraordinary since Luxembourg's weighted votes only doubled whereas the other 
original member states' voting weights were increased by a factor of 2.5 % (from 4 
votes to 10 for the large member states and f rom 2 to 5 for Belgium and the 
Netherlands). Still it was Luxembourg's relative voting power that increased whereas 
the voting power of the other original member states decreased. 
3.2 A Role Without Any Influence? 
Does Luxembourg play a role in the Council o f Ministers and i f so, what role does it 
play? The very fact of being a member o f the European Union with all the rights and 
duties EU membership confers, gives Luxembourg the right to play a role in the Council 
of Ministers, be it through its right to vote, be it through its right to sit around the 
negotiating table and to voice its interests or be it when taking the chair during the 
Council Presidency. Jim Cloos, head of the Santer cabinet, remarks: "(...) Nous pouvons 
jouer un role a l'interieur de l'Union quand i l s'agit de nos interets ou quand i l s'agit de 
definir ou de modeler, p.ex., le fonctionnement de la politique exterieure, meme si cela 
s'avere de plus en plus d i f f i c i l e " . 1 0 3 It seems to be more diff icul t for a member state, the 
more so for a small one, to make its voice heard in a Community o f Fifteen than in a 
Community of, say, Nine or Six. Hence it is very important for Luxembourg to be well 
represented at all levels of the Council hierarchy, to stand out wi th expertise on 
Community dossiers and Council procedures and to inspire confidence in the Council. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the role Luxembourg plays in the Council is 
determined by the Council level (preparatory level, Council o f Ministers or European 
Council level), by the type of sectoral Council and by the items on the agenda.1 0 4 Well 
aware of its lack o f tools and resources to play a leading role at most senior level and 
having a vested national interest in only a limited range of policy fields, Luxembourg 
adopts a low-profile approach (see Chapter One) in the European Council where the 
heads o f state and government take 'general political guidelines' (Art, D TEU) as well as 
in the General Affairs Council (GAC), the most senior Council, where foreign ministers 
perform an important co-ordinating role. 
T h e E u r o p e a n C o u n c i l 
At European Council level, Luxembourg takes a rather passive approach, keeping out of 
the limelight, letting the other (mostly larger) partners define policy orientations or fight 
out unresolved conflicts. Only matters o f vital national importance induce the country's 
representative (in this case the Prime Minister) to intervene and to draw attention to a 
Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 12. 
1 0 4 The following description is based on information provided during a personal interview with Jean-
Jacques Kasel, former Luxembourg Permanent Representative with the EU. 
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particular problem. At this level the personality and length o f experience of the 
representative play an important role. Most o f Luxembourg's post-war Prime Ministers 
have been members o f the government for at least ten years, holding other portfolios 
before or after they became Prime Minister. Unlike his predecessors105 who did not 
intervene a lot, the current Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, a tough negotiator of 
straightforward argument, has certain fields of interest that arouse him personally on 
which he makes brief but sharp interventions. Due to his wealth of contacts, his 
widespread respect and his gift for building consensus, Juncker cajoled more than once 
a compromise at European Council level, especially between Luxembourg's larger 
neighbours France and Germany of whose developments he is a close observer and 
whose languages he speaks f luent ly . 1 0 6 This neutral mediating role that the Prime 
Minister may assume at European Council level is based on Luxembourg's non-
competitive relationship with its larger partners, its central position in the interaction 
process at the source of information, and its general low-profile approach. 
T h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s 
A t Council of Ministers' level, the role Luxembourg plays can no longer be defined as 
passive. At this level of the Council hierarchy, we need to distinguish between the 
General Affairs Council (GAC), the most senior Council, and the sectoral Councils (e.g. 
Agriculture Council, Environment Council, etc.). The lack o f information of a small 
diplomatic service places Luxembourg in a weaker position to deal convincingly with 
the GAC's steadily increasing burden o f primary work associated with CFSP. This, 
however, has the advantage o f presenting Luxembourg as a useful provider of 'good 
offices' for other members. Luxembourg therefore assumes the role o f neutral co-
ordinator, brokering compromises and making procedural as well as textual suggestions. 
A detailed expert knowledge o f European dossiers and its place at the centre of the 
decision-making process make the country's representatives interlocutors on many a 
diff icult dossier and precedural matters. The fact that Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's 
Foreign Minister, is the doyen o f the GAC gives Luxembourg's voice often, though not 
always, greater weight. 
In sectoral Councils, the role Luxembourg plays is largely a function of the item 
on the agenda. On dossiers in which the country has no vested national interest, the 
representatives take, again, a more detached stance and are more reluctant to intervene. 
Luxembourg plays for example a lesser role in the formulation o f nuclear energy policy 
but its activity in the camp of protectors against nuclear energy is all the more intense. 
Since only a limited number o f issues have high-priority status in terms defence of 
national interests, Luxembourg's level o f intervention is generally low (low-profile 
E.g. Jacques Santer or Pierre Werner. 
1 0 6 See the mediating role that Prime Minister Juncker assumed at the 1996 Dublin European Council 
(below). 
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approach). There seems to be a fear o f being a nuisance and a general reluctance among 
Luxembourg's Council representatives to intervene unless a vital interest is at stake as a 
statement by former Prime Minister Jacques Santer exemplifies: 
It remains true that it is sometimes more difficult for a smaller country to 
invoke a national interest, especially i f such interests collide or are thought to 
collide with those of more powerful countries. A small state is therefore well 
advised to be careful not to become a permanent source of irritation to its 
partners. It has to remember that it is often important not to be important, 
especially i f no vital interests are at stake.'07 
As soon as matters are on the agenda whose passing would threaten Luxembourg's 
sovereignty, ministers get very active and interventions increase. This is for example the 
case in Ecofin Councils when matters o f crucial importance for the country's thriving 
financial centre are being discussed. Jean-Jacques Kasel asserts that in such a case 
Luxembourg enjoys a priori the same right to defend its interests as any other member 
state. 
C o r e p e r and W o r k i n g G r o u p s 
At preparatory level, i.e. at Coreper and working party level, member states voice for 
the first time the relative importance o f a dossier and formulate their objections to 
particular issues. It is at this level where the size o f a member state does not play an 
important role anymore. Member states' representatives enjoy the same status, 
Permanent Representatives in Coreper being senior government officials and 
representatives in working parties being national experts, often officials themselves. 
Here the Realpolitik 'equality' (in the vein o f ' a l l members are equal but some are more 
equal') prevailing at senior Council level turns out to be a ful ly guaranteed equality 
where members enjoy equal status. Members o f working parties are often close 
acquaintances and share a certain intimacy through their common knowledge in their 
i no 
specialised field. The same is true for Permanent Representatives who, in perfect 
inside knowledge o f European affairs, may act with greater informality than their 
respective ministers and whose daily working life is often marked by personal 
friendships.109 This more sincerely felt equality and Coreper's informal atmosphere 
encourage Luxembourg's delegates to act more spontaneously than at superior Council 
level and to play a truly active role. Luxembourg thus adopts a high-profile approach 
which consists in active participation on almost every dossier. The general reluctance to 
intervene in dossiers of little national interest that prevails at formal ministerial level is 
Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'The Economic Integration of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: Past 
Experience and Prospects' in Bulletin de documentation 7/1989 p. 37. 
1 0 8 M. Westlake, The Council of the European Union p. 318. 
m Consider Jean-Jacques Kasel's description of the Permanent Represenatives' life in Brussels: "We live 
together in Brussels, we drive the same cars, sit every week around the same negotiating table, meet the 
same people." 
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absent at preparatory level. Luxembourg voices its position on almost every dossier and 
takes advantage o f its role o f neutral co-ordinator and small partner to sometimes "say 
what others refrain from saying or cannot say" (Kasel). Active participation in Coreper 
can also take the form of providing 'good offices', o f offering constructive support to the 
chair in helping to reach agreement. Since virtually all items on the Council agenda 
have to pass the Coreper filter, one could argue that Luxembourg, though adopting a 
low-profile approach at ministerial level, exerts a covert influence on most European 
dossiers through its high-profile approach in Coreper. 
L u x e m b o u r g ' s A c t u a l Po l i t i ca l Weight 
A question that is equally interesting and which nuances the previous one is whether 
Luxembourg has a substantial influence on policy outcomes in the Council. When 
reading through government speeches and interviews given by government members, 
there seems to be common awareness and general consensus that Luxembourg is 
theoretically and legally on an equal footing with its partners but that this does not mean 
that its actual influence in decision-making does equal those o f other member states. 
Prime Minister Juncker's statement illustrates this view when he asserts that one of the 
founding principles o f post-war Europe is that Luxembourg has the same rights but that 
as a small state "we can't make fu l l use of these rights. We could use the veto maybe 
once every 10 years; everyone knows that Britain, France and Germany w i l l always 
have greater r ights". 1 1 0 Luxembourg simply cannot impose decisions on other member 
states the way its larger partners can. 1 1 1 Nor can it block decision-making or be a 
nuisance the way a large partner can. Luxembourg's representatives seem to be well 
aware o f their place in these "observable hierarchies o f political influence and economic 
112 • ' 
weight". With regard to the weighting o f votes, Foreign Mmister Jacques Poos 
asserts: 
Cette ponderation a ete introduite, a juste titre me semble-t-il, pour tenir 
compte de realites politiques indeniables. Les envergures geographiques et 
demographiques des pays, la qualite et le volume de leurs economies, leurs 
richesses naturelles, leurs puissances militaires font que chaque souverainete 
nationale pese d'un poids different dans la balance internationale. C'est un fait. 
On ne peut guere etre un nain economique et un geant politique, meme si 
certains soutiennent que l'inverse est possible."3 
A general view therefore prevails that nothing substantial can be done in EU policy and 
decision-making against the w i l l o f one of the large member states, especially o f France 
1 1 0 D. Gardner, 'Survey of Luxembourg (2): Firm Ideas on the Duchy's EU Role. Political Profile of Jean-
Claude Juncker' in Financial Times. 19 October 1994. 
" ' G. Trausch in Anciens de 1'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 12. 
1 1 2 H. Wallace quoted in P. De Schoutheete, 'The European Community and its Sub-systems' in W. 
Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990) p. 114. 
1 1 3 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Le role des petits pays dans la Communaute' in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 2/1992 p. 22. 
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and Germany," 4 This is because, as Jacques Poos rightly observes, not only different 
weightings o f votes but also political and economic weight play an important part in the 
making of Community decisions. Philippe de Schoutheete, Belgium's Permanent 
Representative, perceptively describes the underdog position o f small states when he 
observes: 
Quite apart from the weighting of votes, it is clear that the political and 
economic clout of Member States plays a part when it comes to the making of 
Community decisions. It is easier to set aside the opposition of a small country 
than that of a large one. This is self-evident and a matter of Realpolitik; it 
applies to any multilateral organization and perhaps even to human society as a 
whole. One cannot deduce from it the existence of a privileged decision-
making mechanism."5 
A further question then imposes itself: well aware o f its Realpolitik place in the Council 
hierarchy of states, what strategies does Luxembourg apply to strengthen its position in 
the Council, to enhance its opportunities o f action, to give weight to its voice and to 
defend its interests? 
1 1 4 Hosli even speaks of an 'informal veto power' of France and Germany (M.O. Hosli 'Coalitions and 
Power' p. 259); see also P. de Schoutheete, 'The European Community and its Sub-systems' p. 114. 
1 1 5 P. De Schoutheete, 'The European Community and its Sub-systems' p. 114. 
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4 Negotiating Strategies and Tactics 
Entre le faible et le fort, c'est la loi 
qui libere et la liberte qui opprime. 
Condorcet 
In view of its small size, its voting weight and political influence, what behaviour does 
Luxembourg adopt during Council negotiations? Do Luxembourg's representatives 
develop specific strategies in the Council o f Ministers to make their voice heard and to 
provide them with opportunities o f action? Is there a visible change in Luxembourg's 
behaviour depending on whether it has or has no specific national interest in a certain 
policy field? Depending on its interests at stake, Luxembourg seems to walk a tightrope 
between supranational and intergovernmental spheres. Luxembourg takes a dedicatedly 
communautaire approach to European integration, favouring strong supranational 
institutions and the communautarisation o f the intergovernmental Treaty pillars (CFSP 
and JHA). Its limited resources, its structural weaknesses and its low-profile approach 
caused by its smallness urge Luxembourg together wi th its two Benelux partners to 
consider itself as the 'guardian of a communautaire spirit'. It can therefore be generally 
argued that Luxembourg's participation in EU decision-making is f i rmly set within the 
supranational sphere and many of the steps it takes happen within it. 
It would, however, give a wrong impression to consider Luxembourg as giving 
itself unconditionally to the cause of deeper integration. No state would do so. 
Luxembourg's attitude to European integration is marked by an inherent ambiguity 
which is best visible in the strategies it takes in the Council. It may therefore be argued 
that Luxembourg moves within the supranational sphere when it adopts its general low-
profile approach (that is when matters of no vital importance are on the agenda) or when 
it acts as a neutral co-ordinator. But as soon as E U policy outputs are likely to threaten 
its vital national interests or its very status within E U institutions, then the government 
may fal l into the intergovernmental sphere, making use o f the mechanisms of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Luxembourg's attitude to voting in the Council is 
symptomatic for this ambiguous attitude. The government is basically in favour of 
qualified majority voting for the sake of a more efficient decision-making. During the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Luxembourg strongly favoured the 
extension of Q M V to new domains (see Chapter Six). And yet in policy fields o f vital 
national interest it treasures unanimity voting as former Prime Minister Jacques Santer 
asserts: 
Specific interests of small countries are best taken into account by a Council of 
Ministers deciding by unanimity. The trouble is that by this kind of procedure 
many decisions will never be taken. And small countries are of course strongly 
interested in a Community which is able to work efficiently and to take quick 
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decisions.1 
The behaviour and strategies Luxembourg adopts to strengthen its position in the 
Council, to make its voice heard or to defend its national interests are set out below. 
4.1 Strategies of Neutrality 
Luxembourg primarily uses strategies of neutrality when it acts within the sphere of 
supranationality, when there is no vital national interest at stake and when it may work 
for the general benefit of deeper integration. The strategies range f rom taking the 
Commission as an ally to acting as a neutral coordinator and mediator. 
T h e C o m m i s s i o n - A n A l l y 
Generally speaking, whether or not direct national interests are at stake, Luxembourg 
(like other small partners) professes a visible fear against the formation of a directoire 
of large member states, i.e. an 'operational alliance regularly composed o f the large 
Member States'1 1 7, and sees its position best secured by viewing the Commission as a 
natural ally. Being the guardian of the Community treaties and interests, small states 
regard the Commission as a safeguard for their interests and strongly oppose the 
diminution of its authority in favour o f intergovernmental institutions any time it is 
threatened. Note the words o f Foreign Minister Jacques Poos formulated in a speech on 
the role o f small states in the EC: "(...) L'emergence d'un directoire des 'Grands' serait 
• • M R 
un retour en arriere contraire a l'esprit meme des Traites successifs". And further 
down: "Garant de l'avantage commun, la Commission est appelee aussi a etre le 
defenseur des droits des Etats membres de moindre envergure". A recent example where 
Luxembourg opposed the weakening o f the Commission in favour of 
intergovernmentalism was an initiative undertaken by Kohl and Chirac in June 1998. 
The ideas on decentralisation and subsidiarity professed in a common letter sent to the 
British Presidency were considered by the European Commission and many small 
states, including Luxembourg, as a measure intended to weaken the EU's supranational 
institutions and to strengthen intergovernmentalism in favour of large member states.1 1 9 
A strong convergence of interests between Luxembourg and the Commission 
consisting in a definite respect for the Treaties and a determined federal-mindedness, 
makes Luxembourg often side with the proposals o f the Commission, in particular when 
it has no national interest in a particular policy field. 
l l 6Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'The Role of Small Countries in the Emerging European House' in 
Bulletin de documentation 6/1990 p. 42. 
1 1 7 P. De Schoutheete, 'The European Community and its Sub-systems' in W. Wallace, The Dynamics of 
European Integration (London, 1990) p. 114. 
1 1 8 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Le role des petits pays dans la Communaute1 in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 2/1992 p. 23. 
1 1 9 See f. i . R. Hilgert, 'Machtanspriiche' in Letzebuerger Land 45:25 (19.6.1998) and M. Hirsch, 'Sur-
Place' in Letzebuerger Land 44:26 (26.6.98). 
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En general, le Luxembourg prend dans les negociations communautaires le 
point de vue d'une stricte orthodoxie communautaire, respectant et la lettre et 
l'esprit des actes juridiques europeens et soutenant bien souvent une position de 
conciliation moyenne, plutot favorable aux propositions de la Commission.120 
This general like-mindedness between Luxembourg and the Commission may constitute 
an important asset when the country is defending a specific national interest as it hopes 
to get some reciprocal solidarity f rom the Commission for its general support. 
Coal i t i ons and Al l i ances 
To make its voice better heard, to promote Community interests as well as its own ones 
more efficiently, Luxembourg forms coalitions or alliances wi th like-minded partners in 
particular policy domains. According to Helen Wallace, coalitions are "the deliberate 
concerting of positions among partners as distinct f rom chance alignments or 
121 
compatible but uncoordinated positions". In practice, alliances o f member states vary 
according to sectoral interests. This is because member states hold similar policy 
preferences or have compatible objectives in some areas but not in others. Helen 
Wallace states three objectives for joining forces in a coalition: maximizing pay-offs on 
individual issues; maximizing pay-offs on a range of linked issues; and conditioning the 
122 
milieu o f negotiations. De Schoutheete distinguishes between temporary alliances "in 
the quest for short-term interests" and long-term alliances o f a "more durable nature, 
one that is deeper and more highly organized" to which he also refers as 'sub-
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systems'. Depending on the policy field Luxembourg's interests coincide wi th those 
of the member states to which it feels close for geographical, historical, economic or 
cultural reasons. 
The Bene lux U n i o n 
Luxembourg has the privilege to belong to one o f the few long-term alliances which 
exist within the EU, that is Benelux Union between Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. De Schoutheete calls this union - established in 1948 as a customs union -
'the sub-system par excellence1. Benelux co-operation is unique for several reasons: 
• it is the oldest long-term coalition within the EU; 
• it played a vanguard role during the early days o f the European Communities; 
» it is one of the motors of European integration; 
" J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres des Communautes europeennes: Les 
Presidences du G.D. de Luxembourg' in C. O'Nuallain, The Presidency of the European Council of 
Ministers. Impacts and Implications for National Governments (London. 1985) p. 188. 
1 2 1 H. Wallace, 'Negotiations and Coalition Formation in the European Community' in Government and 
Opposition 20:4 (1985) p. 459. 
1 2 2 H. Wallace, 'Negotiations and Coalition Formation in the European Community' p. 463. 
1 2 3 P. De Schoutheete, 'The European Community and its Sub-systems' p. 106. 
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• it is the object o f a special article in the Treaty of Rome that explicitly allows such a 
union to exist within the broader Treaty framework. 1 2 4 
Co-operation between the Benelux countries and co-ordination o f their policies serves 
several objectives: 
• it maximises their influence within EU institutions and decision-making; 1 2 5 
• it gives them added weight in constitutional talks (e.g. on institutional reform); 
• it allows them to act as a spokesperson for small member states in general;' 2 0 
• Benelux also plays the role of mediator between conflicting interests. 
Benelux co-operation takes place at various levels both formally and informally. Issues 
on the E U agenda are often discussed at formal Benelux meetings. In addition, the 
heads o f government consult each other informally before each European Council, and 
ministers contact each other before important Council meetings. Informal contacts at 
various administrative levels are regular. 
Depending on the interests at stake, the Benelux trio fu l f i l s both a conservative role, 
trying to defend or preserve a status quo (e.g. during the recent debate on institutional 
reform), and the role of a catalyst, trying to achieve progress on certain policies other 
member states are not yet ready for (e.g. the Schengen Agreement). It is, however, 
important to note that the three countries do not always share the same views and may 
advocate different attitudes towards different policy issues. According to Prime 
Minister Jean-Claude Juncker it is much more important to concentrate efforts on a 
strong co-operation and not on differences o f opinion: 
Aujourd'hui les prises de position nationales evitent les sujets qui pourraient 
nous diviser. Nous voulons maintenant approfondir nos accords et aplanir nos 
desaccords. Du reste, ce n'est pas une catastrophe de voir trois pays a ce point 
lies prendre des positions divergentes.128 
This statement, however, shows that Benelux co-operation was not always as strong as 
it is today. Although the Benelux trio had played an active role e.g. in setting up the 
" Art. 233 EC specifies that "the provision of this Treaty shall not preclude the existence or completion 
of regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands (...)." 
1 2 5 De Schoutheete remarks: "At the milestones in the life of the Community (the empty chair in 1965, the 
crises of British membership, the budgetary quarrel, the enlargements, the negotiations for the Single Act, 
or the Delors package) we regularly find the Benelux countries acting together to defend common 
positions" (The European Community and its Sub-systems' p. 117). 
1 2 6 Benelux has become so popular in its function as a 'small-state spokesperson' that Prime Minister 
Juncker saw himself faced with informal demands, one by Austria, another by Portugal, to join Benelux 
consultations (see Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'L'Europe a l'aube du 21e siecle' in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 4/1995 p. 244). 
1 2 7 Different views exist f . i . concerning defense matters within CFSP where Luxembourg and Belgium 
rather share the French views and the Netherlands rather those of the UK (see interview with J. Poos 'Un 
entretien avec le Ministre des affaires etrangeres' in Le Monde. 9 December 1992). 
1 2 8 Interview Juncker 'Sur l'avenir de l'Union europeenne: Jean-Claude Juncker' in Le Soir. 20 September 
1995. 
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Schengen system and as mediator in the negotiations for SEA and TEU, many a scholar 
deplored that Benelux co-operation was limited to simple rituals and that there were 
• 129 
rarely recognised common interests before 1995. After Maastricht, the Benelux 
partners recognised the importance o f co-operating more closely on major European 
debates and it came to a rapprochement of views. Since 1995, or rather since the three 
countries have new Prime Ministers, Benelux co-operation has been given new life. 
Jean-Luc Dehaene, Jean-Claude Juncker and W i m Kok can be seen as the motor o f 
Benelux co-operation, which has also an effect on the co-operation among Benelux 
foreign ministers. The Benelux partners now consider themselves as one o f the motors 
of European integration and as the Union's mediators, roles they fulf i l led in the early 
days o f the Communities: 
Nous pouvons jouer un role intermediate entre le nord et le sud, entre les 
grands et les petits, entre le couple franco-allemand et le reste de l'Union. Le 
Benelux peut meme animer le couple franco-allemand dont je ne sais s'il est 
suffisamment fort pour etre le moteur d'une Union a Quinze. L'Europe est un 
bi-moteur! On ne peut pas laisser aux seuls Francais et Allemands le soin de la 
construire.130 
Benelux co-operation can be said to have been revitalised at the 1995 Cannes European 
Council where the Benelux states strongly influenced the negotiations on Europol. As a 
consequence, there has been regular consultation regarding the negotiations for Agenda 
2000 and for the 1996 IGC in order to establish a common position. A revitalised, 
strong Benelux co-operation is of particular interest for Luxembourg at a time where the 
• 131 
Union faces major reforms. 
Tempora ry C o a l i t i o n s 
The second type o f coalitions are temporary coalitions between governments, which 
Helen Wallace prefers to call 'caucus groups' l j 2 , especially i f they are limited only to 
one single issue. They may be considered as one form o f what Reinhard Rummel rightly 
termed 'multiple bilateralism' 1 3 3, i.e. 'the constant f low of contacts and meetings which 
precede and accompany Commission consultations and Council sessions'. Such caucus 
E.g. J.L. Brinkhorst, 'Quarante ans apres Messine. Une nouvelle chance pour les Etats du Benelux?' in 
Cahiers de Droit Europeen Nos 3-4 (1995) p. 260; A. Gillissen, 'The Benefits of European Community 
Membership' in Dunleavy/Stanyer (eds) Contemporary Political Studies 1994 (vol. II) (Belfast, 1994) p. 
848. 
1 3 0 Jean-Claude Juncker on the role Benelux should play during the 1996 IGC in an interview ('Sur 
l'avenir de l'Union europeenne: Jean-Claude Juncker' in Le Soir. 20 September 1995). 
I j l Foreign Minister Jacques Poos therefore asserted in the government's 1996 Declaration on Foreign 
Policy: "Nous avons pleinement soutenu la revitalisation du Benelux a travers lequel nous exercons une 
influence multiplied sur le devenir de l'Union" (Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Declaration de politique 
etrangere' in Bulletin d'information et de documentation 1/1996 p. 128). 
1 3 2 H. Wallace, 'Negotiations and Coalition Formation in the European Community' p. 461. 
1 3 3 The three forms of 'multiple bilateralism' are discussed in H. Wallace, 'Negotiations and Coalition 
Formation in the European Community' p. 461 and include consultation between the Commission and 
individual governments, caucus groups, and more durable coalitions. 
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groups are in the interest of individual governments. The range of new subjects the 
ministers have to handle in Council require more informal consultation between pairs or 
sometimes larger groupings of governments (in capitals or by telephone). The aim is to 
define common objectives, to explore issues or to define a line to take vis-a-vis the 
Commission or other members in the Council. Luxembourg has particularly strong 
contacts with its large neighbours, France and Germany, and its two Benelux partners. 
Being largely in favour of deeper integration, all of these countries seem to be bound by 
a common attitude to European integration and their common status as EC founding 
members. 
A n example o f regular bilateral ad hoc consultation are the contacts that existed 
between the Luxembourg and German Ministers responsible for post and 
telecommunications. 1 3 4 Another instance o f bilateral contacts, which according to 
former Permanent Representative Kasel is a completely new phenomenon, are the 
regular (almost weekly) phone calls Jean-Claude Juncker has with his French and 
German homologues in his capacity as Prime Minister and Finance Minister. For a 
small state like Luxembourg that suffers f rom a constant lack o f diplomatic information, 
these phone calls are an invaluable source o f information, which is immeasurably more 
precise than any information that Luxembourg's diplomats could ever obtain. Another 
short-term alliance existed in the run-up to the 1996 IGC among those member states 
that showed a true willingness to make the integration process advance, an alliance that 
could be informally called the 'Six minus one'. These meetings were held on the level of 
the advisers to the heads o f government o f the founding member states, except I t a ly . 1 3 5 
They were important for Luxembourg to get acquainted with the positions of other 
member states on the IGC and in particular on institutional reform. Social policy is 
another domain where Luxembourg sporadically meets the Labour Ministers of 
Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands to discuss large orientations o f social 
policy within what is called 'Maastricht Group'. Prime Minister Juncker, who is also 
Labour Minister, considers these ad hoc meetings as a sound box for testing ideas, his 
own as well as those o f his homologues. In the field o f agriculture, Luxembourg meets 
its Benelux partners as well as Germany, Austria and Denmark in a circle called 
'enlarged Benelux' or 'Aachen Circle' in order to explore informally the agricultural 
interests of these member states. Informal meetings such as these came into being to 
either establish common positions or to exchange opinions, depending on the issue 
under discussion. 1 3 6 
Another form of 'multiple bilateralism' are ad hoc consultations between the 
Commission and individual governments before propositions are tabled and while they 
1 3 4 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. These contacts between Mady Delvaux-Stehres 
(Luxembourg) and Wolfgang Botsch (Germany) do not exist any longer since postal services have been 
privatised in both countries. 
3 5 Jean-Jacques Kasel regrets that Italy did not participate in these meetings, all the more so since on 
many issues Italy has the same integrationist views as Luxembourg, sometimes even stronger ones. 
1 3 6 Information provided by Frank Schmit during a personal interview. 
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are being negotiated. The fact that the current President o f the European Commission is 
a Luxembourg national gives Luxembourg's officials and politicians 'privileged access' 
to the President's cabinet and is an invaluable source o f information. Luxembourg 
currently also enjoys 'privileged access' to Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert 
due to close contacts with Luxembourg's Minister o f Economic Affairs, Robert 
Goebbels, contacts which had some impact on the distribution of financial aids for 
Luxembourg and on the implantation o f services in Luxembourg. 1 3 7 
N e u t r a l C o - o r d i n a t o r and M e d i a t o r 
Based on a strong conviction that a small state should not be a nuisance in international 
relations but needs to justify its presence in international institutions, Luxembourg's 
representatives consider their primary role as one o f neutral co-ordinator and 'provider 
138 
of good services'. Luxembourg's basic ambition consists in being a reliable and 
trustworthy partner for other member states and for the Union as a whole. There is a 
general feeling that the lack o f political and economic weight needs to be compensated 
by the personal reliability o f its representatives. Luxembourg pays great attention to 
maintaining a good reputation based on the experience, competency and sincerity o f its 
Council delegates. In this respect the personality o f each of its Council representatives 
is o f great importance. 
When Luxembourg has no vested interest at stake, its non-competitive 
relationship wi th other member states places it in an ideal situation to f u l f i l the role of 
mediator and neutral co-ordinator between the conflicting interests o f other, often larger 
member states. By tradition a mediator between its powerful neighbours France and 
Germany, Luxembourg keeps fu l f i l l ing this function within the Council of Ministers. 
Though Luxembourg seems to play the role of mediator ('honest broker') out o f a strong 
interest to make Community business progress, it would however be wrong to assume it 
does it without pursuing any personal gain. Sasha Baillie writes: "Enjoying a central 
position in the interaction process, at the source o f information, the small state is able to 
assess the situation objectively and steer the process in a way the outcome w i l l be 
favourable to itself, or at least w i l l not harm its interests". 1 3 9 
Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, for instance, played a key role at the 1996 
Dublin European Council in the settling of a Franco-German dispute that threatened to 
derail E M U . The conflict was nurtured by deep cultural differences between France and 
Germany, France arguing that the European Central Bank (ECB) must be countered by 
a political body to steer economic policy, Germany insisting ECB should be 
independent. Along with it came France's refusal at the beginning o f the summit to 
1 3 7 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
1 3 8 See f . i . G. Thorn, 'Le role du Luxembourg dans la politique internationale' in A. Ries et al (eds) 
Lambert Schaus. Luxembourg, Belgique, Europe (Luxembourg. 1977) pp. 106-114. 
1 3 9 S. Baillie, The Seat of the European Institutions: An Example of Small State Influence in European 
Decision-making (European Policy Process Occasional Paper No. 11) (Florence, 1996) p. 3. 
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accept Germany's plan for the so-called stability pact. Juncker stepped in as a mediator, 
working closely with the Irish Presidency and the Belgian Finance Minister, and 
managed to broker a compromise that was acceptable to both conflicting parties. 
Juncker's mediating efforts could be successful for several reasons. Being from a 
country situated at the cultural border between France and Germany, Juncker has a 
profound understanding of both states' culture and language; in his dual capacity as 
Prime Minister and Finance Minister and because of his long-term Council experience, 
he has an expert knowledge of European affairs and the Maastricht Treaty to whose 
drafting he contributed during the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency; he could also speak 
with authority as Luxembourg was the only member state at the time to fulf i l the 
convergence criteria for EMU. The example shows that with regard to these mediating 
advantages vis-a-vis other member states and a strong, natural interest in a stable 
relationship between its large neighbours, Luxembourg's mediating role was fully 
accepted by its Council partners.140 
4.2 Defence of Vital National Interests 
As soon as matters touching Luxembourg's few vital national interests are tabled, the 
country's representatives abandon their low-profile approach and get very active both at 
preparatory and at ministerial level. Only for matters touching the very heart of 
Luxembourg's sovereignty does the country adopt a primarily intergovernmental 
attitude during the meetings. Dossiers of particular national interest include the 
harmonisation of fiscal legislation, banking legislation, company law, Common 
Agricultural Policy and steel industry, free movement and immigration. Another issue 
of vital national interest is the seat of the European institutions in Luxembourg.141 This 
European presence is estimated to have an important economic impact. A further 
dossier to which Luxembourg is very sensitive is the one concerning institutional 
reform, in particular Luxembourg's representation in EU institutions (see Chapter Six). 
The strategies and tactics used to defend Luxembourg's vital national interests in 
the Council are multiple and varied and happen, at various stages of Council decision-
making. They may start with a well-argued negotiating strategy and range from close 
co-operation with the European Commission, alliances with other member states, vetoes 
and the threat of vetoing, to the search for derogations. Like most other member states, 
1 4 0 For a description on how Luxembourg plays the role of mediator when holding the Council Presidency 
see Chapter Five. 
1 4 1 Luxembourg is home to a number of European institutions and hosts Council meetings during the 
months of April, June and October. It currently hosts the European Court of Justice, the Court of 
Auditors, the European Investment Bank, some Directorates-General of the Commission, the Secretariat 
of the European Parliament, the Office for Official Publications, Eurostat and the European Translation 
Centre. A good account on the seat of European institutions in Luxembourg and small-state influence is 
given by S. Baillie, The Seat of the European Institutions. Baillie writes: "Ever since the High Authority 
of the ECSC came to be located in Luxembourg in August 1952 successive Luxembourg governments 
have followed a consistent policy of defending the location of certain European institutions in the Grand 
Duchy" (p. 11). 
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Luxembourg prefers to cooperate strongly with the Commission on those issues where 
it has a particularly keen interest, both before propositions are tabled and while they are 
being negotiated. Close contacts are of particular importance in the pre-negotiating 
phase to make clear what interests are at stake for Luxembourg, and to make the 
Commission aware of the risks and problems that the member state might incur in 
practice. Close consultation is important for both sides: for the Commission to assess 
the limits of feasibility of the proposal under discussion (a proposal that meets too 
strong an opposition may already die in the pre-negotiating phase); for Luxembourg to 
draw attention to the risks that the respective proposal might involve for the country's 
economy or sovereignty. 
Small states equally tend to seek coalition partners on issues that are perceived 
as directly affecting their national interests. For Luxembourg it is important not to stand 
alone on such an issue in order to prevent being outvoted. In such a case, the country's 
delegates discreetly seek to form an alliance with one or more member states in order to 
have increased leverage. The strategy consists in seeking an alliance with other states, 
preferably with those with which Luxembourg has common economic and political 
interests or historical and cultural links. There seems to be no evidence that 
Luxembourg is strategically looking for alliances with small states as it is indeed rare 
that small states share common interests.142 As we have shown above, one very 
important alliance is Benelux. During the 1996 IGC, Benelux meetings were held at the 
level of the Personal Representatives of the member states in order to consult each other 
on issues to which the Benelux states attach a high priority and to define common 
positions regarding institutional reform, etc.1 4 3 The same Benelux alliance exists to 
defend common views with regard to Agenda 2000, the Commission programme that 
envisages a reform of CAP, EU financing and structural funds. An instance where 
Luxembourg entered an alliance with a close neighbour is when it joined efforts with 
Belgium during the negotiations of the Treaty of Amsterdam to make sure that not only 
the seat of institutions but also the seat of agencies and services was to be mentioned in 
the revised Treaty. 
Vetoes or the Threat of Vetoing 
As a last resort, Luxembourg's delegates may use the veto or threaten with the use of it. 
The veto or the threat of vetoing a legislative act is a strategy Luxembourg's 
representatives in the Council may only resort to when a vital national interest is most 
likely to be threatened. Luxembourg's attitude to the use of vetoes is a mirror of its 
general attitude to Council decision-making and another instance where it walks the 
tightrope between supranational and intergovernmental spheres. Generally there seems 
The only instance where small states seem to have a combined interest is their presence in the EU's 
institutional and decision-making setup. 
1 4 3 This and the following information was provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
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to be a great reluctance to blocking decision-making, but as soon as it comes to the very 
heart of a national interest and when there is a legal possibility to use the veto (that is 
under unanimity voting), Luxembourg feels urged to make use of its right of veto in the 
name of its vital interest. The following statement by Foreign Minister Jacques Poos 
does well reflect the government's attitude to the veto, which considers it as a 
'dissuasive weapon': 
Le droit de dire non, confine a des domaines importants, clairement et 
limitativement enumeres dans le Traite, est une arme dissuasive aux mains des 
gouvernments et des parlements nationaux. Comme toute arme dissuasive, il 
est destine a n'etre qu'utilise qu'en dernier ressort. Mais, comme toute arme 
dissuasive, il modifie les rapports de force lors d'une negotiation.144 
According to Jean-Jacques Kasel, the last and only time Luxembourg blocked a 
decision to be taken by unanimity (legal veto) was at the Ecofin Council of December 
1989 where the Finance Ministers had to decide over the principles of a withholding 
tax. 
Concerning matters to be decided by QMV, Luxembourg shows a great 
reluctance to invoke the Luxembourg Compromise, that is the political veto, or to 
threaten to do so. Although strongly opposed to passing the Lawyers Directive 1 4 5 in the 
Council in December 1997, Luxembourg refrained from using the political veto but 
stood alone and got overruled. Former Permanent Representative Kasel points out that 
Luxembourg did not invoke the Luxembourg Compromise on that occasion which, 
according to him, is always somewhere prevalent. "We'd better be careful not to do 
invoke it. Our philosophy is to always find arrangements beforehand, with the 
Commission or with certain partners in case we have a real problem". This statement by 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representative raises two issues: Is the Luxembourg 
Compromise still alive? And i f so, does a small member state have enough leverage 
after all to resort to the veto, be it the political or legal one? Or in other words, how 
much solidarity and understanding do member states show towards the vital national 
interest of a small member state? In this context it is important to note that the SEA 
involved a change in the 'veto culture' as it extended majority voting in a substantive 
way to new areas. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace write: "(...) The language and practice 
of veto power have altered. The notion of explicit veto has declining plausibility, except 
when unanimity is the technical rule". 1 4 6 Teasdale even goes as far as to declare the 
Luxembourg Compromise dead.147 Whether all practitioners and researchers would go 
as far is another question. But an article published in 1995 in The Economist reveals that 
Ministere des Affaires Etrane eres, Dcbat sur la CIG de 1996. Chambrc des Deputes, 12 juillet 1995. p. 
6. 
1 4 5 Directive 98/5/EC of the EP and of the Council of 16 Febuary 1998 to facilitate practice of the 
profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a member state other than that in which the qualification 
was obtained (OJ L 077, 14 March 1998, pp.36-43). 
1 4 6 F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (London, 1997) p. 262. 
1 4 7 A. Teasdale, 'The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise' in JCMS 31:4 (1993). 
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the Luxembourg Compromise was last wielded by Germany in 1986 to prevent a 
modest cut in farm prices though, once in a while, member states threaten to use it. 
France, for instance, threatened to do so during the GATT ratification process.148 This 
incidence shows that a large member state that has political leverage can still 
successfully use the political veto as weapon. How about a small member state like 
Luxembourg? There is no evidence that Luxembourg ever used or threatened to use the 
Luxembourg Compromise. There is, however, some awareness among Luxembourg's 
experts in EU decision-making that, no matter what voting mode any item of legislation 
is subject to, a small member state does not have sufficient political leverage to block it 
repeatedly or for a longer time. Consider the following statement by Gilbert Trausch 
concerning the Commission proposal on withholding tax harmonisation which 
Luxembourg vetoed on 18 December 1989: 
Qu'en serait-il de notre influence si les 14 Etats membres insistaient sur 
l'harmonisation contre la volonte du Luxembourg? Je ne pense pas qu'un petit 
pays comme le notre pourrait bloquer durablement les projets importants de la 
Commission.149 
Joseph Weyland, a former Luxembourg Permanent Representative, agrees with Trausch 
when he asserts: "Je doute que nous puissions opposer un tel veto une deuxieme fois. 
Mais avant cette ultime action, i l y a toujours des moyens de negocier et de trouver des 
compromis".150 These statements show that Luxembourg is more than reluctant to play 
power politics. Rather than finding themselves cornered and subsequently overruled by 
taking too extreme a position, Luxembourg's representatives prefer to work with other 
means to attain a solution they can live with. 
One long-term strategy is to show a maximum of understanding for other member 
states' problems and hoping to get a similar treatment from other partners i f 
Luxembourg itself faces problems.15' This strategy is based on some reciprocal 
treatment Luxembourg hopes to get due to its general low-profile approach (derived 
from its reluctance to intervene in matters of no vital interest). Gaining some solidarity 
from EU partners is all the more important since many items of legislation are passed 
without resorting to a formal vote. Even where decisions are taken by QMV, the 
chairman always aims at the highest degree of consensus. Consider the statement by Jim 
Cloos, the head of cabinet of the President of the European Commission: 
C'est le jeu des negotiations: on ne cherche pas a acculer un Etat au pied du 
mur mais a trouver une solution acceptable pour tous les partenaires. (...) II est 
'Vetomania' in The Economist, 18 February 1995. 
1 4 9 Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 16. 
1 5 0 Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 17. 
1 5 1 Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel: "What we aim at is obtaining as much understanding as 
possible from other member states by not criticising everything and by showing a lot of interest for other 
member states' problems." 
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toujours etonnant de voir comment des petits pays reussissent a defendre leurs 
interets au sein de 1'Union et que l'on essaie d'autre part, par tous les moyens 
possibles, de trouver une solution. 1 5" 
Jean-Jacques Kasel therefore considers the recourse to majority voting as a 'dissuasive 
weapon' to be used against member states that are unwilling to give in on some item of 
legislation. He considers it important to keep the discussion going, to give in on some 
item of lesser interest in order to save some other item of greater importance. If, 
however, the position of a member state is too extreme, the chairperson will proceed to 
the vote and the respective member state will be overruled. This is exactly what 
happened to Luxembourg in December 1997 concerning the Lawyers' Directive where 
Luxembourg stood alone and got overruled. 
Another such strategy consists in giving high priority to having a well-argued 
negotiating strategy. Luxembourg's Council representatives are convinced that well 
presented and convincing arguments that forcefully describe the interests at stake will 
meet the understanding and solidarity of other members.153 On the basis of such forceful 
arguments the deviant member state may try to obtain special arrangements or 
derogations. Good arguments were for example advanced - unsuccessfully though -
concerning Luxembourg's claim to the seat of the European Central Bank (ECB). On 
the basis of the provisions of financial institutions annexed to the Merger Treaty of 
1965, Luxembourg argued it had a legal claim to the seat of the ECB, which it 
correspondingly invoked. 
Another quite smart strategy consists in ensuring that those areas affecting vital 
national interests be decided by unanimity rather than majority voting. QMV has been 
extended to new areas each time the Treaty has been revised, that is under SEA, TEU 
and under the Treaty of Amsterdam. During all these Treaty revisions, Luxembourg 
could make sure with the support of other member states that those domains in which it 
has vital national interests remain subject to unanimity. The 1995 Luxembourg 
government memorandum for the 1996 IGC mirrors Luxembourg's half-hearted position 
regarding the extension of QMV to new areas: 
A u niveau du Conseil une extension du vote a la majorite qualifiee s'impose en 
principe. L'unanimite doit cependant rester d'application pour tous les 
domaines touchant intimement a la souverainete des Etats et done a celle des 
Parlements nationaux tels que les revisions des traites, la citoyennete 
europeenne, les nouvelles adhesions, la fiscalite et les ressources propres. 1 5 4 
Luxembourg does not stand alone with this strategy. Along with Luxembourg, a number 
of EU partners (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden) are in favour of maintaining 
1 5 2 Anciens de i'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 19. 
1 3 3 Consider the statement of Joseph Weyland: "(...) L'exposition des difficultes reelles soutenue par une 
argumentation valable trouve la comprehension sur une base consensuelle des autres Etats membres" 
(Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire p. 20). 
1 5 4 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire du Gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la Conference 
Intergouvernementale de 1996' in Bulletin d'information et de documentation 2/1995 p. 169. 
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unanimity voting in, for instance, the field of taxation, a fact ensuring Luxembourg is 
not isolated in this position.1 5 5 
Fiscal Harmonisation and Citizenship - Two Cases in Point 
A long-term high-priority subject of vital national interest is the dossier on tax 
harmonisation. Any changes in this domain could affect the functioning or the very 
existence of Luxembourg's financial centre, a major pillar of its less diversified 
economy. Luxembourg, which has become a thriving financial centre on the basis of a 
liberal tax regime1 5 6 and tight banking secrecy, is particularly sensitive to any plans of 
the European Commission to ensure a minimum of effective taxation of savings within 
the Community and to any attempts to abolish banking secrecy.157 Attempts made by 
the Commission to introduce a minimum withholding tax on interest payments to savers 
and investors were successfully withstood at the Ecofin Council of 18 December 1989 
by the Luxembourg government which made use of its legal veto. 1 5 8 The dossier was 
frozen until Commissioner Monti presented, ironically enough during the 1997 
Luxembourg Presidency, a new fiscal strategy at the informal Ecofin Council of 
September at Mondorf-les-Bains. At the Ecofin Council of 1 December 1997, member 
states adopted a code of conduct for business taxation and invited the Commission to 
"bring forward a proposal on the taxation of savings".159 
Fiscal harmonisation is a most interesting policy field to analyse the nature and 
the range of strategies applied by Luxembourg to defend a vital national interest. It is a 
policy field where Luxembourg applied a whole range of the above named strategies. 
But it is primarily a matter where Luxembourg was for a long time in the blocking field, 
where it vetoed a Commission proposal in 1989 or threatened to veto further legislative 
acts. It is, however, important to note that Luxembourg changed its negotiating strategy 
during the negotiations for the code of conduct for business taxation being no longer in 
the blocking field but intending to play a constructive role. Although the government is 
no longer an obstacle to the introduction of a harmonised withholding tax, its position 
remains basically the same: it does not accept the introduction of a withholding tax 
unconditionally. 
A first and most important strategy consists in presenting a forceful negotiating 
strategy, in particular concerning the ongoing discussion on the introduction of a 
1 5 5 See Juncker interview 'Sur l'avenir de l'Union europeenne'. 
1 5 6 Non-resident investors do not pay income tax, capital gains tax, inheritance tax or withholding tax. 
Contrary to most other EU member states, Luxembourg's resident investors do not pay withholding tax 
either. 
' 5 7 A good overview on the issue of withholding tax and banking secrecy in Luxembourg is given in the 
following article: Schaffner, Jean, 'Faut-il introduire une retenue a la source sur interets a Luxembourg?' 
in Luxemburger Wort, 15 December 1997. 
1 5 8 See Anciens de l'Athenee, 'L'Europe a l'aube du troisieme millenaire' p. 17. Tax harmonisation, 
whether under Article 99 or 100 EC Treaty requires the unanimous action of the Council. 
1 5 9 European Commission, 'Council Conclusions on Taxation Policy' in Bull. EU 12-1997. 
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minimum withholding tax across the EU. To prevent being isolated in this dossier, the 
current Juncker I government is willing to show greater flexibility, quite unlike previous 
governments. This new flexibility is pragmatic and shrewd but not unconditional.160 
First, the withholding tax debate should not be limited to the EU but extended to OECD 
level, so that tax havens like Liechtenstein and Switzerland would be covered as well. 
The reason being that Luxembourg's government fears the introduction of a withholding 
tax at EU level would provoke an outflow of capital to off-shore tax havens. Second, all 
tax havens in all EU member states need to be involved, which implies that the fiscal 
territory and the geographical territory correspond (aimed at Channel islands, Monaco 
and the Dutch Antilles). Third, banking secrecy, a domain closely linked with 
withholding tax, needs to be preserved. Fourth and most importantly, Luxembourg aims 
at a global fiscal harmonisation (including business taxation, etc.). This last condition is 
primarily aimed at Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands where corporate-tax rates are 
more advantageous than in Luxembourg. Luxembourg's negotiating strategy is quite 
shrewd: knowing quite well that it is impossible to fu l f i l these conditions in the near 
future, the government's new 'flexibility' leaves it no longer isolated. This implies that 
those member states that were hiding behind Luxembourg's blocking position need to 
show their hand. 
Another recent tactical move was made by Luxembourg's Foreign Minister at 
the GAC of 13 July 1998. Due to a lack of figures and studies, Jacques Poos suggested 
that before the start of any harmonisation within this field, the Commission should 
launch an impact study to assess the consequences of capital outflow to third countries 
that the introduction of a withholding tax at EU level would cause.161 
Fiscal harmonisation is also a policy field on which the Luxembourg 
government maintains close contacts with the Commission, in particular with 
Commissioner Mario Monti, responsible for financial affairs. A recent example where 
Luxembourg consulted the Commission on a regular basis was before the code of 
conduct for business taxation was agreed upon at the Ecofm Council of 1 December 
1997. The debate centred on a package of measures of which withholding tax was of 
primary importance for Luxembourg's financial centre. Both the Justice and Budget 
Minister, Marc Fischbach, and the Finance Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, co-operated 
closely with Mario Monti in order to explain Luxembourg's position, to make clear 
where no concessions could be made and to give the right messages. Co-operation on 
this issue was all the more close since Luxembourg had to chair the meeting as it held 
the Council Presidency during the second semester of 1997. 
This new readiness for discussion can be seen as a tactic to make those member states state their 
position that had been hitherto hiding behind Luxembourg's blocking position. Note Prime Minister 
Juncker's statement: "(...) meme si le Luxembourg, pour un quart d'heure ou pour un semestre, avait pris 
conge de l'Union Europeenne les autres ne seraient pas arrives a une conclusion" (Ministere d'Etat du 
Luxembourg, 'L'Europe a l'aube du 21e siecle' p. 247). 
1 6 1 R. Hilgert, 'Impaktstudie' in Letzebuerger Land 45:29 (17 July 1998). 
1 6 2 This and the following information was provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
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A further strategy consisted in seeking an alliance with other member states, 
including preferably a large member state, in order to increase its leverage. This was the 
case in 1989 when Luxembourg joined forces with the UK to oppose the introduction of 
a withholding tax 1 6 3, which allowed Luxembourg to successfully veto this proposal at 
the December 1989 Ecofm Council. 
Luxembourg's government is also particularly sensitive to matters directly touching 
home affairs. One such issue is the right of EU nationals to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in local government and EP elections i f they are living in an EU member state 
of which they do not have the nationality. Stipulated by Article 8 B of TEU, the Council 
was requested to pass a directive concerning EP elections before 31 December 1993 and 
for local government elections before 31 December 1994. What hardly caused a 
problem for any other member state, went to the heart of Luxembourg's sovereignty. 
With a one third of the population and half of the workforce being foreign, Luxembourg 
would theoretically have run the risk of no longer being represented by its own 
nationals in EP or that its local authorities were governed by a majority of non-
Luxembourgers. In this matter Luxembourg consulted the Commission on a regular 
basis during the negotiations for the directives. The country's representatives could 
make it clear to the Commission that it insisted on a derogation in this matter taking into 
account its specific situation. The government managed to win such a derogation 
requiring five years' residence before eligibility to vote and ten years' before eligibility 
for office. It could obtain the derogation because its negotiating strategy was based on 
convincing arguments, which aroused the solidarity of its partners. 
These strategies show that small states do have opportunities of action even though their 
political and economic weight is low. Many of these strategies may be successful 
because of Luxembourg's general low-profile approach in the Council, its reputation as 
a provider of good offices and the solidarity it generally shows towards other members. 
Still a small member state cannot rely solely on these attributes. It needs to present the 
same forceful arguments than a larger partner to convince the Commission and the other 
member states. The above mentioned strategies also show that even a deeply federally-
minded member state like Luxembourg is prepared to defend its vital interests most 
vehemently, though the tools it uses may be more subtle and covert than those of larger 
member states. 
Germany and the Netherlands were equally opposed though for different reasons. 
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5 The Council Presidency 
...the Luxembourg Presidency has all the signs of 
being driven by a sedate couple who only take to 
the road on Sundays and then infuriate other 
motorists by respecting the speed limit. 
The European 28/30 December 1990 
The Council Presidency is an important instance where - during six months - a small 
member state can exert an influence that is unrelated to its size, and its political and 
economic weight. Promoted in the 1960s by defenders of intergovernmentalism 
(especially by de Gaulle), the Presidency has gradually become one of the most 
important mechanisms in EU decision-making. The following chapter explores the 
advantages and disadvantages of small-state Presidencies before describing the secret of 
success of the Luxembourg Council Presidencies. Why is it so important for a small 
member state to steer the European boat for six months? What are the risks into which it 
may run? 
Article 146 of the EC Treaty stipulates a rotating system according to which the 
Council Presidency rotates every six months among the member states.164 Being based 
on the principle of equality of states, the Presidency compensates the smaller member 
states for possible tendencies towards domination which large EU partners might 
occasionally feel inclined to exercise. Table 5.1 shows that the Presidency's rotating 
system ensures that member states of every size hold the Presidency regularly. 
Rotation Year MS (1st sem./2nd sem.) 
Alphabetical 1991 L/NL 
(- 1992) 1992 P/UK 
Alternating 1993 DK/B 
(1993-June 1998) 1994 GR/D 
1995 F/SP 
1996 I/IRE 
1997 NL/L 
1st sem. 1998 UK 
Balanced rotation 2nd sem. 1998 A 
(as of July 1998) 1999 D/FI 
2000 P/F 
2001 SW/B 
Table 5.1 Council Presidency rotations 1991-2001 
1 Until the end of 1992 the sequence of member states holding the Presidency corresponded to the 
country names in alphabetical order in their native tongue. From 1993 to 1998 the 'alternating' rotation 
alternated the pairs of countries holding the Presidency in one year to ensure that the different workloads 
of the two semesters were taken into account. Due to considerations relating to CFSP, the 'balanced' 
rotation was worked out to make sure that the troika would always consist of at least one larger member 
state. It has taken effect as of M y 1998. 
'"Adapted from M. Westlake, The Council of the European Union (London, 1995) pp. 50-1 and F. 
Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace. The Council of Ministers (London. 1997) p. 138. 
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Legend: A=Austria; B=Belgium; D=Germany; DK=Denmark; F=France; FI=Finland; GR=Greece; 
I=Italy; IRE=Ireland; L=Luxembourg; NL=Netherlands; P=Portugal; UK=United Kingdom; 
sem.=semester; SP=Spain; SW=Sweden. 
Whereas at normal times the influence of the small member on Community affairs is 
limited, the Presidency places it at the very centre of EU decision-making. First, the 
small country has the opportunity to influence the rolling EU agenda to a certain extent 
by setting priorities in its six-monthly programme. Second, it has the 'power of the chair' 
and as such the opportunity to steer and influence the outcomes of debate and decision-
making (e.g. influence on the timing of voting). Being at the crossroads of national and 
Community interests, the Council Presidency has a lot of influence on the way national 
interests will be defended and Community targets achieved. Third, the Presidency is 
visible on the international stage when handling external relations (CFSP) and hosting 
European Council meetings, thus adding prestige and media attention to the small 
country. In addition it is a rare occasion where the small state is in a position to take 
decisions in the name of larger states. As a founding member of the EC, Luxembourg 
assumed the Presidency role ten times in between 1958 and 1998 as table 5.2 shows: 
Year 1 s t sera. 2nd sem. 
1960 + 
1963 + 
1966 + 
1969 + 
1972 + 
1976 + 
1980 + 
1985 + 
1991 + 
1997 + 
Table 5.2 Luxembourg's Council Presidencies from 1958 to 1998 
The Council Presidency is not only a function that is most visible to the outside world 
but it is also involved at all levels of the Council hierarchy. At European Council level, 
the head of state or government acts as a host and chairs one or more summits. At 
Council of Ministers level, it is the foreign minister of the country holding the 
Presidency who plays a leading role. At Coreper level, senior national officials chair the 
meetings, and at working group level, chairmanship is assumed by more or less senior 
civil servants. Hence the national attitude towards the Presidency is an important 
prerequisite to guarantee a successful outcome of the presidential tasks. 
5.1 National Position Towards the Presidency 
Luxembourg considers the Presidency as an inherent right that the principle of equality 
confers on small and large members alike. Hence Luxembourg's leaders relied on this 
principle during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference as they strongly defended the 
right of small states to retain the rotating Council Presidency. Unlike some larger 
74 
member states, small states do not usually consider the Presidency as a cumbersome 
routine job and therefore want to perform the job as best as possible. The Luxembourg 
government's 1998 Foreign Policy Speech gives a good insight into the national position 
towards the Council Presidency. 
Pour notre pays, la Presidence ne s'est jamais reduite a une execution de 
routine d'une lourde charge qui incombe periodiquement a tous les Etats 
membres de l'Union. Pour nous, elle est toujours un test qui nous permet de 
demontrer notre capacite d'assumer pleinement et activement une des taches 
les plus importantes dans la conduite des affaires de l'Union. Elle est surtout 
une chance qui nous permet de faire avancer cette construction europeenne a 
laquelle le destin de notre nation est intimement lie. 1 6 6 
For Luxembourg the Presidency has a threefold meaning. First, its leaders consider the 
Presidency as a confirmation of the country's national sovereignty.167 Luxembourg 
considers the task as an opportunity to confirm its existence as a European and 
international actor. In this respect, its leaders intend to give their best during the six-
monthly Presidency and provide a good record of achievements. Second, the country's 
leaders consider the Presidency as a test and as a means of self-justification. For the 
small member, each Presidency constitutes a new test that needs to be passed to prove 
that a small member is able to successfully fu l f i l the uphill task. At the same time, the 
Presidency is a means to justify Luxembourg's presence in the European Union by 
showing that small states are not a quantite negligeable but that they can indeed render 
useful services to the Union. This is why Luxembourg considers the Presidency 
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primarily as a service rendered to the Community. Third, as a guardian of a 
communautaire spirit Luxembourg considers the Presidency as a chance to make 
European integration advance. This is most visible when the balance within the EU 
seems to tip in favour of intergovernmentalism and/or when the status of the small state 
seems to be threatened. The growing intergovernmental tendencies and the small 
state/large state debate instigated during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (see 
Chapter Six) induced the 1997 Luxembourg Presidency to take a more assertive 
attitude. Luxembourg's leaders consider the Presidency not only as the administration of 
EU business but they increasingly show ambitions to take initiatives and to provide a 
Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Declaration de politique etrangere, le 5 mars 1998' in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 2/1998 p. 2. 
1 6 7 Consider the statement of Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos: "Gerer, et bien gerer, la 
presidence n'est pas seulement un devoir. C'est essentiellement l'affirmation de notre existence nationale" 
(Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, Declaration de politique etrangere, le 23 octobre 1991' in Bulletin de 
documentation 5/1991 p. 10). 
1 6 8 See the statement of Jacques Poos: "(...) La Presidence represente un service que les Etats membres 
rendent a tour de role a l'Union. C'est d'abord et avant tout la gestion sereine et methodique d'un 
calendrier et d'echeances imposes avec l'objectif de fournir une contribution concrete a notre processus 
d'integration" ('Discburs de fin de Presidence du President du Conseil de l'Union europeenne, M . Jacques 
F. Poos, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Luxembourg devant la session pleniere du Parlement 
Europeen, Strasbourg, le 17 decembre 1997' 
[http://www.uepres.etat.ki/uepres/textes/discours/17dec001.htm] 29 May 1998. 
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certain policy direction.1 6 9 The predominant feeling of having to justify Luxembourg's 
presence in the European Union when holding the Presidency places those involved 
under a double pressure: the physical and nervous pressure of managing the workload; 
the psychological pressure of showing its fellow members and the world that 
Luxembourg is up to this uphill task, and that its small status does not diminish its 
ability to manage the EU programme. Finally, perhaps more than any other EU member 
state is Luxembourg fully aware of its own limits and of the necessity to come up with a 
good record of achievements when holding the Presidency. Being the smallest member 
state, it knows quite well that any blunder would be interpreted in an adverse way. 
5.2 National Co-ordination during the Presidency 
The administrative role a member state has to fulf i l when holding the Presidency carries 
an enormous workload for any member state but is a particular burden for a small 
country with a small administration (see Chapter Two). The administrative task, which 
is the Presidency's most important one, consists basically in managing the every-day 
business of the Council of Ministers and requires a high amount of responsibility, good 
co-ordination and effective staffing. In particular Luxembourg struggles with the 
problem of lacking personnel when holding the Presidency. The country is especially 
vulnerable to the heavy administrative burden when it comes to the running of everyday 
European business. During the 1997 Council Presidency, the Luxembourg government 
chaired around 40 sectoral Council meetings, six informal Council meetings, two 
European Councils, weekly Coreper sessions and around 230 working groups within 
Coreper and CFSP. This puts a high pressure on everyone involved in the running of the 
Presidency. Unforeseen incidents may develop into a major administrative problem. 
How does Luxembourg's administration try to overcome administrative constraints 
derived from its smallness? 
The largely decentralised system of Luxembourg's interministerial co-ordination 
may add to the vulnerability of a small administration. It is obvious that a decentralised 
system may present a risk during the Presidency due to a lack of co-ordination in the 
Presidency's position. In this respect, Luxembourg's Brussels-based Permanent 
Representation assumes an important co-ordinating role that is crucial for the smooth 
running of the Presidency.170 
"En 1997, la presidence luxembourgeoise n'a pas seulement voulu gerer. Nous avions l'ambition 
d'inspirer, d'orienter, voire de piloter. Nous avons utilise autant la force de la persuasion que la recherche 
du compromis" (Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Declaration de politique etrangere, le 5 mars 1998' in 
Bulletin d'information et de documentation 2/1998 p. 2). 
1 7 0 " I I est certain que ce dispositif tres decentralise comporte certains risques et quelques cas de positions 
tres contradictoires ont pu exister. Neanmoins ce danger a pu etre limite grace au role de filtre que joue le 
representant permanent presidant le Coreper" (J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres des 
Communautes europeennes: les Presidences du G.D. de Luxembourg' in C. O'Nuallain (ed) The 
Presidency of the European Council of Ministers . Impacts and Implications for National Governments 
(London, 1985) p. 191). 
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It is worth noting that interministerial co-ordination does not undergo major changes in 
view of an upcoming Presidency. At normal times the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
the leading responsibility for the co-ordination of EU policies at national level and for 
EU affairs. When Luxembourg is holding the Presidency, the Permanent Representation 
in Brussels assumes a central role. Before and during this six-monthly period, 
organisational matters are administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in close 
collaboration with the Permanent Representation in Brussels. Much of the 
organisational work, including the staffing for the chair, is assumed by the Permanent 
Representation with the help of the Foreign Ministry. The Permanent Representation 
has a strong input in the provisional organisation which is discussed between the 
Foreign Ministry, responsible for the logistical co-ordination, and the technical 
ministries. In the event of these negotiations the provisional schedule is finalised and 
communicated to the officials who will chair the working groups. Generally one single 
co-ordination meeting will be held in the capital a few months before the Presidency 
starts. Additional ad hoc preparatory meetings may be held at the Permanent 
Representation.171 Preparations for the 1997 Luxembourg Presidency started in early 
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1996. ^ They included one ad hoc meeting in February 1997 where procedural matters 
were discussed between the Permanent Representative and the Deputy Permanent 
Representative on the one hand, and senior officials from the Foreign Ministry and 
other departments on the other hand. The Presidency programme was finalised in a co-
ordination meeting held in June. The Permanent Representation can therefore be said 
to act as a motor during Presidency times. It contributes to the organisational plan, to 
the calendar of meetings and to the Presidency programme. It also organises ad hoc 
preparatory meetings and maintains especially close contacts with the Council 
Secretariat and less stronger ones with the Commission and the European Parliament. 
The Permanent Representation also has a certain influence on the designation of the 
working groups' chairpersons. 
Inherent weaknesses of the Luxembourg administrative system (like the lack of 
personnel and the decentralised co-ordination system) are partly counterbalanced by the 
following measures. First, experience has proved that small member states do rely on an 
active partnership with the Council Secretariat. Whereas large states are often more 
reluctant to involve the Council Secretariat as they fear that it could undermine their 
prestige, status and policy aims 1 7 4, the small number of personnel makes the Council 
1 7 1 J.M. Hoscheit, 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 191. 
1 7 2 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Conference de presse sur le dispositif de la Presidence 
luxembourgeoise' in Bulletin d'information et de documentation 1/1996 p. 105. 
1 7 3 Information provided by former Permanent Representative Jean-Jacques Kasel during a personal 
interview. 
1 7 4 E. J. Kirchner/A. Tsagkari, 'Reforming the EC Council Presidency' in E. J. Kirchner/A. Tsagkari (eds) 
The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies (UACES Proceedings 9, 1993) p. 
54. 
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Secretariat a helpful tool for the small member state, not only for carrying out logistical 
and administrative tasks but also for giving advice. The close relations between 
Luxembourg and the Council Secretariat are largely conducted through the Brussels-
based Permanent Representation, where personal relations and linguistic ability of 
Luxembourg's officials become of paramount importance. Luxembourg sees the 
strength of the Council Secretariat in its discreet role. It considers it as a very efficient 
instrument of the Presidency whose tasks consist in following the instructions and the 
political input given by the Presidency.175 The relation between the Luxembourg 
Presidency and the Council Secretariat is so close that some have used the term 
'symbiosis' to describe i t . 1 7 6 Especially for Luxembourg, the technical, legal and 
organisational assistance provided by the Council Secretariat is of invaluable help. 
More than a year ahead of the Presidency, the Permanent Representative, in close 
collaboration with the Council Secretariat, establishes a list of the meetings to chair and 
estimates the approximate need in personnel. Hoscheit describes to what extent the 
Luxembourg Presidency relies on the Council Secretariat: 
Dans une tres large mesure, le Luxembourg utilise les services du Secretariat 
pour preparer les negotiations. Des echanges reguliers ont lieu entre le 
secretaire general et le representant permanent pour preparer les discussions du 
Coreper. De meme, tous les presidents des groupes de travail sont vivement 
encourages a prendre contact avec les fonctionnaires du Secretariat.'77 
Hoscheit goes on to confirm that Luxembourg is the member state that uses the services 
of the Council Secretariat most effectively and in a way they were meant for. 
Luxembourg takes advantage of services like the drafting of reports, compromise papers 
for chairpersons and answers to parliamentary questions, the briefing of ministers, etc. 
Second, in order to alleviate the problem of lacking personnel and chairpersons, 
Belgium and the Netherlands have competency to chair some of the working groups, 
especially those dealing with matters in which Luxembourg has no direct competence 
(e.g. textile, fisheries, sea law, commodities). It is a Community rule that in case a 
member state does not chair a working group, the country being next to hold the 
Presidency chairs it. The Luxembourg Presidency forms, however, an exception to this 
rule. Given the close links with Belgium and the Netherlands (in Benelux and BLEU), 
the latter two are exceptionally competent to represent Luxembourg in such a case.178 It 
has become common practise that Belgian officials chair some working groups dealing 
with economic matters, whereas Dutch officials chair those dealing with political 
See J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency' in E. J. Kirchner/A. 
Tsagkari (eds) The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies (UACES 
Proceedings 9, 1993) p. 20. 
1 7 6 J. M. Hoscheit 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 198. 
1 7 7 J. M. Hoscheit 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 197. 
1 7 8 The treaty on Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) gives Belgium the mandate to represent 
Luxembourg in certain domains and an agreement between Luxembourg and the Netherlands gives the 
latter the mandate to represent Luxembourg in those states where it has no embassy of its own. 
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matters. It is, however, important to note that out of a range of about 230 working 
groups and committees, Belgian and Dutch officials only chaired six or seven during the 
1997 Luxembourg Presidency. Another measure consists in resorting to the help of 
ambassadors and retired officials for chairing Council meetings. In addition, 
administrative support is provided by university graduates who are employed for a 
limited time. 1 7 9 Altogether the 1997 Presidency personnel has doubled when compared 
with the 1991 Presidency.180 
Third, small size does, however, not only provide disadvantages. As described in 
Chapter Two, Luxembourg's small public administration is characterised by informal 
contacts and short lines of communication. As the working methods within 
Luxembourg's administration stay more or less the same during the Presidency, rapid 
and informal management allows for a more effective handling of the Presidency. A 
statement by Ambassador Joseph Weyland, who played a decisive role during the 1991 
Luxembourg Presidency, confirms this: 
I f your communication lines are very short and individuals know that they are 
responsible for a particular dossier and have general guidance on what to do it 
is much easier to manage. When you have larger teams, you have problems o f 
management. This is normally a difficulty 'bigger' Presidencies have 
experienced. They have too many people. Therefore, the best solution is to 
have a small team, o f high quality, which ensures that messages are being 
distributed effectively and where individuals bear personal responsibility for 
their dossier.'81 
A small Presidency team implies, however, that the effective running of the task is very 
actor-related. 
5.3 Disadvantages of Small-State Presidencies 
Representat ional Problems 
Along with the administration of EC affairs, the Presidency also covers administrative 
and representational tasks within the framework of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). This includes the organisation and chairing of meetings with third 
countries but also the representation of the EU to the outside world. This 
representational function in CFSP matters can be a very glamorous task for a small 
member state speaking abroad on behalf of the European Union and preparing and 
implementing CFSP decisions. This is particularly true when the small member state 
holds the Presidency during the second semester and it represents the EU at the UN 
1 7 9 During the 1997 Luxembourg Presidency around 50 university graduates were employed half of which 
were assigned to the Foreign Ministry. Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
1 8 0 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Conference de presse sur le dispositif de la Presidence 
luxembourgeoise'p. 105. 
1 8 1 J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency' p. 20. 
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General Assembly. At the same time CFSP matters can impose severe limits on the 
small member state, especially on Luxembourg. Here again, an obvious drawback is the 
fact that Luxembourg lacks human and logistic resources. It is confronted with staffing 
problems at its embassies abroad and lacks diplomatic representation in many 
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countries. Hoscheit distinguishes the following problems: "L'absence d'ambassades 
propres est un facteur negatif, d'une part en raison de la carence d'information de 
premiere main disponible, d'autre part en raison de la confusion de positions 
communautaires dans un pays tiers".1 8 3 But he goes on to state that it is only due to the 
support given by the Commission, Belgium and the Netherlands as well as some other 
member states that Luxembourg's Presidency actors can successfully handle CFSP and 
representational matters.184 During the 1997 Luxembourg Presidency, the staff of 
Luxembourg's major representations with international organisations in Geneva (UN), 
New York (UN) and Vienna (OSCE) was increased. For the small member state the 
troika186 also provides some help in managing the heavy workload in external relations 
and in implementing common actions. At the time of the EFTA enlargement it had been 
agreed that a smaller member state holding the Presidency is backed by at least one 
larger troika member, a safeguard to assuage the worries of some regarding the 
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representational role of small countries in CFSP matters. 
The Time Factor 
With only six months available, the Presidency puts a high pressure on Luxembourg's 
ministers and officials who are particularly exposed to a high physical and nervous 
pressure. It is well important for small countries to cooperate closely with the Council 
Secretariat and to start planning well in advance but there will always be incidents like 
international crises or unforeseen additional tasks, which the Presidency cannot expect. 
During the first semester of 1991, the Luxembourg Presidency had to deal with the Gulf 
war, the beginnings of the civil war in Yugoslavia and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. Ahead of its 1997 Presidency, Europe's heads of state and government decided 
at the June 1997 Amsterdam Council - on demand of the newly elected French Socialist 
A bilateral treaty of Dutch-Luxembourg co-operation for diplomatic representation concluded on 24 
March 1964 stipulates that the Netherlands ensure the diplomatic and political representation of 
Luxembourg where the country has no representation of its own. 
1 8 3 J. M. Hoscheit 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres' p. 199. 
1 8 4 A major advantage in this context is the fact that Luxembourg's officials have outstanding foreign 
language skills. 
1 8 5 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Conference de presse sur le dispositif de la Presidence 
luxembourgeoise' p. 105. 
1 8 6 The troika consists of the preceding, the incumbent and the succeding presidencies, which share out 
tasks in conducting external relations. Itwas first introduced with regard to EPC matters in 1981 in the so 
called London Report. 
1 8 7 Since the onset of EPC in 1970, four troikas have not included one of the largest member states: 1972-
73: Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium; 1973-73: Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark; 1991-92: 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal; 1993-94: Denmark, Belgium, Greece. 
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government - to organise a special European Council on Employment, the organisation 
of which had to be assumed by the succeeding Luxembourg Presidency. 
Another important factor for the small member state is whether it holds the 
Presidency office during the first or the second half of the year. Agricultural prices have 
to be agreed in the first semester and the budget in the second half of the year, both 
being time consuming occupations. August, however, has always been considered a 
holiday month in Brussels, thus "a 'second semester' Presidency does not have six 
months. It has about four and a half months, missing the month of August, and 
normally, i f you run things well you close the shop around 13 December".188 This 
formerly caused the problem that wherever an even number of member states occurred, 
the same member states always held the Presidency during the same half of the year. 
The irony is that between 1958 and 1976 Luxembourg and Belgium each held the 
Presidency in the first half of the year whereas Italy and Germany, both larger member 
states, held the office during the second half of the year during the same period. 1 8 9 
Suggestions to extend the presidential mandate to one year are heavily contested among 
small and large member states alike. Joseph Weyland states the reasons from a small 
state's angle: 
Six months is the maximum and it is a physically very demanding time, twelve 
hours a day, weekends included and I cannot imagine an individual lasting 
more than a year doing the job. This is not feasible and would not necessarily 
be wise because it would give one member-state too much power for too long a 
time. Think of the bigger member-states which are more authoritarian than the 
smaller ones. They are normally more determined to push their own interests 
than the smaller countries are. There is also a consideration that Presidencies of 
a longer period prolong antagonisms and create blockages which cannot easily 
be removed subsequently. Hence I feel that six month duration Presidency is 
sufficient.190 
This statement shows that Luxembourg is not only opposed to a one-year Presidency for 
physical reasons but also because it fears a more aggressive pursuit of national interests 
by larger member states. 
The I n i t i a t i v e Funct ion 
A six-monthly Presidency is just a phase in the preparation and implementation of the 
EU's longer term goals. The selection of policy priorities by a single Presidency is 
therefore largely influenced by the EU timetable. In addition the small member state is 
heavily constrained in launching initiatives. Each incoming Presidency submits a six-
monthly programme with targets it hopes to achieve, usually including regular agenda 
C. R. Van Beuge, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Dutch Presidency' in E. J. Kirchner/A. Tsagkari 
(eds) The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies (UACES Proceedings 9, 
1993) p. 23 
1 8 9 M . Westlake, The Council of the European Union (London, 1995) p. 47-8. 
1 9 0 J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency' pp. 19-20. 
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items as well as some new ideas. Presidency initiatives will have to go through the 
official stage of Commission proposals before they can be dealt with in the Council of 
Ministers. In practice, the initiative function - a traditional function of the Commission -
involves a great amount of collaboration between the Presidency and the Commission. 
However, real opportunity to promote initiatives is heavily constrained191, the more so 
for small-state governments. Without the backing of at least one larger member state, a 
small state's ability to promote initiatives is highly limited. It rather executes initiatives 
that were the ideas of larger member states, especially of France or Germany. One Le 
Monde journalist put it very shrewdly: 
Les louanges adresses aux petites nations pour une presidence 'reussie' d'une 
instance communautaire le sont en fonction du zele mis par les 'petits' a mettre 
en oeuvre les idees des 'grands', et non pas pour avoir fait passer a l'echelle 
europeenne des preoccupations qui leur sont specifiques.192 
Such was the case when Luxembourg implemented the initiative of the newly elected 
French Socialist government to hold a special Employment Summit during its 1997 
Presidency, a condition set by France for accepting the 'Stability Pact' during the 
Amsterdam European Council. 
5.4 Determinants of Luxembourg Presidencies' Effectiveness 
Notwithstanding the disadvantages that small-state status confers on Luxembourg, the. 
smallest member state hitherto performed its Council Presidencies with great 
commitment, mediatory skills and effectiveness. Ever since 1985, the Luxembourg 
Presidencies coincided with crucial moments in European integration: the preparation of 
the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985, the preparation of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) in 1991 and the preparation of the eastern enlargement process and the 
third phase of EMU in 1997. Although most of the preparations both for SEA and TEU 
were done under a Luxembourg Presidency, the smallest member state never had the 
opportunity to conclude the negotiations, which was done during the following Dutch 
Presidency in each case. 
One of the major tasks of the 1985 Presidency was to launch the internal market 
project for 1992 and to prepare the institutional reforms needed to adapt the EC 
institutions to the new challenge. The pragmatism of Luxembourg's government made it 
opt for a reform limited to specific areas instead of a change of the Treaties, making it 
thus possible to respect the time schedule.193 Among the major achievements of the 
1985 Luxembourg European Council (2 and 3 December) are the reform and 
strengthening of EC institutions and powers (especially those of the EP by introducing 
1 9 1 F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 146. 
1 9 2 Luc Rosenzweig, 'Les avanies des petits pays dans la grande Europe' in Le Monde. 25 March 1997. 
1 9 3 M. Heintz/M. Hirsch, 'L'Union europeenne et la presidence luxembourgeoise' in Courrier 
hebdomadaire No 1588-1589, CRISP (1998) p. 7. 
82 
the co-operation procedure), an extension of QMV to new areas and an extension of the 
policy competence of the monetary, technological and environmental domains. To 
honour the efforts made by the Luxembourg Presidency, the SEA was signed in 
Luxembourg on 17 February 1986, shortly after the end of the Luxembourg Presidency. 
One of the big successes of the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency consisted in its ability to 
press ahead with the two Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union (PU) and 
on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) although it had to respond to the Gulf crisis, 
the civil war in Yugoslavia and the collapse of the USSR. A shrewd strategy of the 
Luxembourg Presidency, consisting in pressing ahead with the two most urgent 
dossiers, i.e. the two IGCs and the completion of the internal market, enabled the 
Presidency to present in a very short time (17 April 1991) a compromise paper on the 
IGCs, the so-called Luxembourg non-paper, which was a synthesis of the previous 
months. At the end of the Luxembourg Presidency, the two IGCs had reached a similar 
stage and Luxembourg had been able to fulf i l the uphill task of submitting a negotiating 
basis with which every delegation could l ive. 1 9 4 
The 1997 Luxembourg Presidency, which fell into a transition phase, did not bring 
historic results. Still, it was a successful Presidency as it contributed in a crucial way to 
the integration process. Important progress had been achieved in the field of 
employment, enlargement and taxation. One of the big successes consisted in the 
quantifiable employment goals achieved at the November Employment Summit despite 
the diverging national employment situations and the different ideological approaches 
in employment matters. One of the credits of the 1997 Presidency is also that precisely 
Luxembourg, a member state notorious for blocking legislation on taxation, unblocked 
the dossier on tax harmonisation by achieving consensus on a 'Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation'. Important compromises were achieved in the enlargement process 
where Luxembourg had to find a method and a methodology as to how prospective 
members can join the Union. 
Considering the weaknesses that are often associated with small-state Presidencies we 
have to ask what factors contribute to the success of Luxembourg's Presidencies. Helen 
Wallace gives the following explanation: 
I am not sure, however, that one should expect all small countries in the chair, 
to be able to perform as successfully as Luxembourg Presidencies have done. 
This has something to do with Luxembourg's history, geography, and its 
relationship with neighbouring states, which enabled Luxembourg to play this 
Consider the following statement by Joseph Weyland: "Looking back on it, by April 80% of the 
Maastricht outcome was already on the table" (J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the 
Luxembourg Presidency' p. 17). 
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particular role.1 
Much also depends on the rolling Community programme. A member state holding the 
Presidency at crucial moments in European integration is charged with a challenging 
Presidency programme, which it needs to face with success. Unless this challenge is 
given, the Presidency cannot do any more but offering its services and administering the 
rolling programme. 
The Presidency's Stance Towards Integration 
The stance a member state has towards the goals of integration may affect the way it 
handles the Presidency. By tradition, Luxembourg has a less ideological and a more 
pragmatic approach to European integration, which also affects the way it runs the 
Presidency.196 A strong concordance of national and Community interests places 
Luxembourg in the ideal position to act as a neutral co-ordinator and mediator. Having 
only a few national interests to defend and knowing about the importance of a strong 
and integrated Europe, Luxembourg's leaders consider the Presidency as an opportunity 
to achieve important progress. In this sense, it can be said that Luxembourg is the 
member state that holds the most 'European' Presidency. Jacques Delors, former 
President of the European Commission, says: 
Qu'il preside le Conseil ou qu'il preside le Conseil europeen, le Luxembourg a 
montre les memes qualites: un solide professionnalisme, une grande 
impartialite, une volonte resolue de faire progresser la Communaute. De par sa 
situation geographique comme en raison de la structure de son economie, les 
interets du Luxembourg se confondent largement avec ceux de la 
Communaute. I I est rare qu'il ait eu des demandes ou des exigences specifiques 
a faire valoir. La presidence luxembourgeoise est done - et a toujours ete - une 
presidence veritablement europeenne.197 
Luxembourg can fully dedicate itself to the Presidency, which is an advantage even over 
other smaller member states. It has no difficult issues to face on the whole (unlike 
Ireland being confronted with the Northern Ireland conflict or Belgium facing language 
issues); it has a high degree of consensus on Community affairs unlike Greece or 
Denmark, and it has a very stable coalition government unlike Ireland. 
Leadership Abilities, Experience and Political Clout 
Leadership abilities, experience and political clout influence the effectiveness of the 
Presidency. The success or failure of a Presidency depends to a large extent on its office 
1 9 5 H. Wallace, 'A Critical Assessment of the Styles, Strategies and Achievements of the Two 
Presidencies' in E. J. Kirchner/A. Tsagkari (eds) The EC Council Presidency. The Dutch and Luxembourg 
Presidencies (UACES Proceedings 9, 1993) p. 48. 
1 9 6 M. Heintz/M. Hirsch, 'L'Union europeenne et la presidence luxembourgeoise' p. 6. 
1 9 7 J. Delors, 'Le Luxembourg et ses presidences du Conseil europeen' in R. Kirt, A. Meisch (eds) 
Innovation-Integration, Melanges pour Pierre Werner (Luxembourg, 1993) p. 327. 
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holders, their experience, their chairmanship, their brokerage skills and their personal 
commitment. Leadership qualities have to be given at every level of the Council 
machinery. There seems to be a close link between leadership qualities and experience: 
"Leadership qualities require a great deal of understanding of the partner's positions, 
tact in the handling of conflictual issues, and, as far as possible, a minimum of personal 
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likes and dislikes". To understand the motives and bargaining positions of other 
member states, the Presidency cannot only rely on the knowledge of the Council 
Secretariat which basically provides advise on procedural questions. It is necessary for 
the Presidency team to gain subtle intuition of how the different member states 'operate', 
which can be acquired as a result of a long Council experience. 
As a founding member Luxembourg has gained a long Council experience as 
well as a long experience in the chair. The 1997 Presidency was Luxembourg's tenth. 
The length of office served by Luxembourg's officials and Permanent Representatives 
and the ensuing experience they acquire provides them with important assets when they 
chair Council meetings, e.g. finesse about when to call for a vote, about the timing and 
framing of compromise solutions, and in handling critical issues. In addition, the 
dedicated commitment to European integration of the Luxembourg government, the 
long term of office and multiple office holding of many ministers are important factors 
for providing leadership and chairmanship abilities.1 9 9 The length of experience and the 
multiple office holding of some ministers - e.g. Jean-Claude Juncker is Prime Minister, 
Labour and Finance Minister - provides the Presidency's main actors with a continuity 
of experience, a wealth of contacts and information, respect and personal friendships 
that is crucial for providing effective chairmanship. Another factor that contributes to an 
effective chairmanship are the linguistic skills of Luxembourg's delegates most of 
whom speak German, English and French next to their mother tongue, and have a good 
knowledge of both French and German culture. The advantage is that the respective 
chairperson can communicate directly, both formally and informally, with 
representatives from other member states, thus making communication and consensus 
easier. In addition, the consensual approach or 'low controversy model' that 
characterises Luxembourg's government and society2 0 0 places the government in an 
ideal situation to assume one of the most important tasks of chairmanship, that is 
brokering compromises and finding consensus. 
E. J. Kirchner, Decision-making in the European Community. The Council Presidency and European 
Integration (Manchester, 1992) p. 110. 
1 9 9 This continuity of experience is exemplified by both the careers of Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime 
Minister and a member of the government since 1982, and Jacques Poos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
a member of the government since 1977. 
2 0 0 For a description of Luxembourg's consensual domestic environment see P. L. Lorenz, 'Luxembourg. 
New Commitments, New Assertiveness' in C. Hill (ed) The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy (London, 
1996) p. 230-3. 
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Extent of Co-operation With Other Institutions 
For a Presidency to be successful, there is a need to communicate effectively with other 
EU institutions and bodies, especially with the Council Secretariat but also with the 
Commission and the European Parliament. We have already shown that Luxembourg 
co-operates particularly closely with the Council Secretariat when it holds the 
Presidency. One instance of close co-operation during the 1991 Presidency was the 
setting up of a drafting team, responsible for the IGC on Political Union, composed of 
officials of the Council Secretariat and of the Luxembourg Permanent Representation. 
Concerning the Commission, it can be generally assumed that it co-operates more 
closely with a Presidency that is strongly committed to European integration. 
Luxembourg has an outright positive attitude to the Commission in general so that 
contacts are intensified when the country holds the Presidency. Hoscheit states, 
however, that contacts with the Commission are less frequent and less dense than those 
with the Council Secretariat.201 Co-operation with the Commission is indeed not always 
as close as the Luxembourg Presidency would have liked. During its 1991 Presidency, 
Luxembourg would have preferred a closer co-operation with the Commission 
concerning the two Intergovernmental Conferences. But compared with the 1985 IGC 
the role of the Commission in the 1991 IGCs has changed: 
In 1985 we had a system where the Commission was associated with working 
groups, preparing the texts. We would have liked this formula to continue but 
it did not. The Commission probably wanted to be distanced from this process 
because they wanted to introduce proposals of their own. As a consequence, 
the Commission did not play the role in the IGCs which it could have done.202 
Co-operation between the Commission and the Luxembourg Presidency is however 
particularly beneficial since both the former and the latter generally assume an 
important mediating and co-ordinating role. Although the Commission is considered as 
a more impartial mediator than any Presidency, Luxembourg's limited number of vested 
national interests place the country in a better position to act as a mediator. Hence it can 
act more often in partnership with the Commission in this respect. The 1997 
Luxembourg Presidency benefited from the fact that the current President of the 
European Commission, Jacques Santer, is a former colleague of most members of the 
incumbent government in its former capacity as Prime Minister of Luxembourg. Close 
contacts with the Commission were helpful for the finalisation of compromises, in 
particular in the wake of the November Employment Council. 
" "La reunion du ministre des Affaires etrangeres, futur president du Conseil, et des membres de la 
Commission se situe largement a un niveau protocolaire, meme si un certain nombre de points concernant 
le programme de la presidence y sont discutes" (J. M. Hoscheit 'La Presidence du Conseil des Ministres 
des Communautes europeennes' p. 198). 
2 0 2 J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency' p. 21. 
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By tradition Luxembourg's Presidencies maintain close relations with the European 
Parliament. The Stuttgart European Council of 1983 decided that the Presidency should 
report to the EP on the outcome of each European Council. It has become common 
practice that the Foreign Minister presents the Presidency programme to the EP at the 
beginning of the Presidency's term and reports on what has been achieved at the end of 
it. Ministers also meet parliamentary committees. It is equally customary for 
Presidencies to liaise with MEPs from their own countries in particular. The 1991 
Presidency co-operated closely with the European Parliament, especially with regard to 
the two IGCs. Interinstitutional conferences were held throughout the negotiating period 
composed of delegations from the EP but also from the Commission and the member 
states' Personal Representatives. 
5.5 Neutral Co-ordinator and 'Honest Broker' 
At the various levels at which the Presidency is engaged, it is a daily co-ordinator 
among the member states on a wide range of issues. This co-ordination function, which 
the Presidency often assumes together with the Council Secretariat or the Commission, 
consists in promoting compromise and consensus among the diverging views of the 
member states at the various levels of the Council meetings to ensure that Community 
business runs smoothly. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace assert that "this task is always in 
tension with the fact that the presidency (whatever the member state) suffers from a 
structural bias in favour of its own government's position". 2 0 4 We would, however, 
argue that Luxembourg is less tempted to do so as it has fewer pressing national 
interests. Common practice has shown that Luxembourg is particularly well placed to 
act as a neutral co-ordinator and mediator as a strong interest in consensus and a 
detached stance place it in a position to find objective compromises. Large member 
states may well have a greater political and economic weight to force a compromise. 
Their distinct interest in almost every issue makes it more difficult for them to take a 
neutral stance when acting as mediators. Regarding the two important IGCs that were to 
be handled during the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency , Helen Wallace writes: 
It has become customary for the head of state or government to do so. 
F. Hayes-Renshaw/H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers p. 146. This was the case during the 1991 
Dutch Presidency where some ministers looked for opportunities to argue substantive national concerns 
(see H. Wallace, 'A Critical Assessment of the Styles, Strategies and Achievements of the Two 
Presidencies' p. 48). 
2 0 5 Kirchner shows that the mediating role is not satisfactorily fulfilled by every small member state as 
exemplified by the 1987 Belgian and Danish Presidencies (see E. J. Kirchner, Decision-making in the 
European Community p. 110). 
2 0 6 During the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency two important phases can be distinguished. From January 
until April 1991 the IGC treated all the various issues, which thus permitted the Luxembourg Presidency 
to submit a first draft for further negotiations (non-paper of April 17). From April until June 1991, the 
IGC revised article by article of the non-paper which thus served as a negotiating basis. The outcome of 
this exercise was the reference document of 18 June, the so-called 'Draft Treaty on European Union' 
which reflected the positions backed by a majority of member states during the preceding weeks. At the 
Luxembourg European Council of 28 and 29 June 1991 it was decided that the text presented by the 
87 
We have been lucky in the Community that the Luxembourg Presidencies have 
come at important moments, because it is quite clear that there would have 
been a problem had we had a UK Presidency, for example, at that point in the 
IGC process. The same would have been the case for Germany too. What was 
needed was a country that could be detached and balanced; this is essentially 
what the Luxembourg government was able to be.207 
Among the many factors that contribute to the failure or the success of a 
Presidency, a Presidency should be able to broker compromises or present convincing 
concepts with which every delegation can live. One of the big successes of the 1991 
Luxembourg Presidency consisted in its ability to present in a very short time (17 April 
1991) a compromise paper, the so-called 'non-paper', which was a synthesis of the 
previous months' work. In this non-paper the Luxembourg Presidency succeeded in 
presenting positions backed by a majority of member states during the previous months 
of the IGC. To attain this goal was all the more difficult since the preparations on 
Political Union were lagging far behind those on E M U 2 0 8 , and the principle of 
parallelism between the two IGCs had been confirmed in a note by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs at the opening of the IGC on PU in Rome on 15 December 1990. This 
imposed a very tight calendar on the works of the Presidency regarding the IGC on 
Political Union. In order to perceive how the Luxembourg Presidency was able to 
achieve compromises and to submit the non-paper and later on the draft treaty, we need 
to understand its working methods. Cloos et al accurately describe the way the weekly 
meetings of the Group of Personal Representatives evolved: 
Au rythme d'une reunion hebdomadaire et parfois plus, les representants 
personnels parcoururent l'ensemble des themes identifies prealablement en les 
discutant un par un. Leurs debats s'appuyaient en general sur des documents 
prepares par la Presidence, mais aussi sur des contributions de differentes 
delegations. La oil c'etait possible, on essayait de travailler directement sur la 
base de textes de nature juridique, sous forme d'articles de traite.209 
Often, however, the positions of member states were not clear enough to permit the 
drafting of treaty articles. In this case the Presidency proceeded to the quite innovative 
and productive method of questionnaires, which were prepared by the 'Friends of the 
Presidency'210 and to which each delegation had to respond. What were the advantages 
of these questionnaires? 
Luxembourg Presidency was to serve as the basis for future negotiations which were to be completed at 
the Maastricht European Council. 
2 0 7 H. Wallace, 'A Critical Assessment of the Styles, Strategies and Achievements of the Two 
Presidencies' p 47. 
2 0 8 The preparations on EMU had started two years earlier (the decision to hold and IGC on EMU had 
been taken at the 1989 Madrid European Council) and had already entered drafting stage at this stage. 
2 0 9 J. Cloos et al, Le Traite de Maastricht: genese, analyse, commentaires (2 n d ed) (Brussels, 1994) p.77. 
2 1 0 Two groups of representatives played a major role in the negotiations for Political Union during the 
Luxembourg Presidency: the Group of Personal Representatives, chaired by Luxembourg Ambassador 
loseph Weyland and the informal working group called 'Friends of the Presidency' which was composed 
of the assistants of the personal representatives and chaired by l im Cloos, 
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La technique presentait l'avantage de mettre en jeu les administrations des 
Etats membres en les associant directement a la negotiation. La reaction de 
celles-ci fut tres constructive et les apports fournis furent substantiels. Les 
reponses etant le plus souvent orales et presentees par les representants 
personnels, les Etats membres purent s'exprimer avec beaucoup de liberte, ce 
qui permit a la Presidence de bien sentir les sensibilites et les idees des 
differentes capitales et de rediger ensuite des textes de nature juridique sous 
forme d'articles de traite."" 
By means o f these questionnaires the Presidency managed not only to integrate the 
national administrations into the negotiations but also induced the delegations to openly 
express their position. 
Although subject to criticism by some for being too minimalist and because of 
the 'pillar approach'212 the Presidency's methods had been largely acclaimed. The 
Presidency had opted for a realistic and pragmatic approach which consisted in fostering 
some basis for negotiation which would bring about consensus sooner or later.2 l j A 
comparison with the final treaty version shows that the Luxembourg Presidency had 
made a wise choice. 
Along with the consensus reached in the field of tax harmonisation and on the EU's 
enlargement policy, one of the major achievements of the 1997 Presidency lies in the 
consensus gained at the November 1997 Employment Summit. 2 1 4 The secret of success 
lay in Luxembourg's ability to communicate its aims and to canvass the views of other 
governments, EU institutions and European social partners on these. Ever since the first 
days of the Presidency Prime Minister Juncker, President of the European Council, 
worked without interruption to make a success of the Employment Summit. Juncker 
made a tournee des capitales in order to gain the support of other governments, to 
canvass their views on employment strategies and to reconcile the diverging views 
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between and often within the different governments. To foster an exchange of 
experience, he summoned his European counterparts to submit successful national 
examples o f 'good practice' regarding their employment policies before the start of the 
extraordinary Employment Council. Achieving consensus was all the more difficult 
regarding the diverging national employment situations and the different ideological 
2 1 1 J. Cloos et al, Le Traite de Maastricht: genese. analyse, commentaires p. 77. 
. 2 1 2 The pillar structure of the future Treaty did not include CFSP and JHA into the Community structure 
and would thus strengthen intergovernmentalism. 
2 1 3 This approach had been all the more confirmed when the overwhelming majority decided to work on 
the basis of the Luxembourg draft after the Dutch Presidency had restructured it in the second half of the 
year. 
2 1 4 Upon a request made by the newly elected French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin at the Amsterdam 
European Council, an extraordinary Employment Council was held in November 1997. The criterion for 
success as set by the Luxembourg Presidency was to gain consensus on concrete and quantifiable results. 
For a detailed description of the Employment Summit and the efforts made by the Luxembourg 
Presidency see M. Heintz/M. Hirsch, 'L'Union europeenne et la presidence luxembourgeoise' pp. 11-28. 
2 , 5 The divergence of opinions even within certain governments made Juncker say that he had the 
impression of not talking to 14 but 28 governments. 
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approaches in employment matters. A factor that crucially contributed to the success of 
the Employment Summit was the structure of Luxembourg's government. In his 
capacity as Labour and Finance Minister, Prime Minister Juncker's presence at the 
respective Councils made it possible to orchestrate the diverging views and to present a 
compromise inspired from the convergence criteria for EMU. 
Luxembourg also proved to be a honest broker in the field of CFSP during its 1997 
Presidency. Tense relations between the EU and Iran, followed by the withdrawal of EU 
ambassadors from Iran at the beginning of 1997, was a conflict inherited from the 
previous Dutch Presidency. The conflict had been triggered off in the wake of the Berlin 
Mykonos case where Iran was suspected of terrorist acts. Most EU member states urged 
the return of their ambassadors to Iran but the latter insisted the German ambassador 
was to enter the country last. Al l EU member states opposed such unequal treatment. It 
was the detached and objective stance of a small member like Luxembourg that made 
possible a solution to the conflict. Diplomatic mediating efforts could be successful 
because Luxembourg is primarily considered as a neutral partner and a promoter of 
international law on the international stage. Luxembourg has no colonial past and is 
devoid of hegemonic aspirations. Unlike mediating efforts made by large-state 
Presidencies the small state's mediation is considered as a neutral move and does not 
raise hegemonic suspicions. 
5.6 The Small-State Presidency and Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
There are instances where the small state's capacities for brokering compromises may 
be limited. Such is the case when the small-state Presidency has to handle unexpected 
international crises within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy. This 
is what happened during the 1991 Luxembourg Presidency. It was pure coincidence that 
the smallest member state held the Presidency at a time when the EU faced a host of 
international crises including the Gulf War, the inception of the civil war in Yugoslavia, 
the collapse of the USSR and tensions in the Baltic states. At the time of the Gulf crisis 
in December 1990 and in January 1991, the EC had been unable to take a coherent 
position vis-a-vis the Iraqi government nor did it act effectively as a mediator.216 The 
Luxembourg Presidency therefore had to undergo diplomatic activities of a rare 
intensity. 
Unexpected situations are difficult to handle for any country but their handling 
develops into a real adventure when a small member state with a limited range of 
diplomatic tools and a lack of political and diplomatic weight is holding the Presidency. 
2 1 6 For an excellent analysis of the Luxembourg Presidency handling of the Gulf Crisis, see P. Junker, 'Un 
miroir des Douze. Un exemple de politique etrangere luxembourgeoise: les efforts de mediation de la 
presidence luxembourgeoise de 1991 dans la crise du Golfe' in Letzebuerger Land 43:23 (7 June 1996). 
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Although the Luxembourg Presidency could rely on the support of the troika it had 
problems in responding to these international crises. The essence of the problem lies 
both within the nature of the EU's CFSP and Luxembourg's small-state status. Part of 
the problem is the fact that the EU is still a political and military dwarf. It lacks the legal 
basis to assume political and military competencies that would strengthen its position in 
international conflict solution.2 1 7 This implies that the EU is still unable to resolve 
international conflicts without the help of a political heavyweight like the United States. 
Another problem lies with the prestige and leverage of the Presidency itself, which is 
equally limited on the international stage. Those states directly involved in an 
international crisis prefer to call on the mediating skills of traditional diplomatic powers 
like France, the UK or the US rather than on a troika composed of three interlocutors 
and headed by a medium-sized or a small member state. In addition the member states 
were unable to find a coherent position and speak with one voice. Efforts made by the 
Luxembourg Presidency to mediate during the Gulf crisis were largely unsuccessful, 
partly due to the divisions among EU member states themselves. The same is true for 
the Yugoslav crisis where there was equally undecidedness about who is competent for 
mediating, the Presidency, the troika or the world powers like France or the United 
Kingdom. 
The weaknesses that small-state status confers on Luxembourg weakens its 
position in international conflict solution. Not only is it a political and economic dwarf 
on the international stage but it also lacks a long diplomatic tradition and adequate 
diplomatic tools of which access to information is particularly important. In this respect 
we fully agree with Pascale Junker when she confirms: "Le Luxembourg souffre done 
de deux defaillances. L'une est institutionnelle - le manque de statut diplomatique du 
mandat qu'il occupe -, l'autre est politico-strategique - le manque de statut diplomatique 
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du pays lui-meme". It can therefore be argued that there was a limited degree of 
acceptance at international level of the Luxembourg Presidency, in particular with 
regard to the Gulf war. This limited acceptance became both visible in the isolated 
actions taken by some large EU member states and in the way other international 
negotiators reacted towards a small-state interlocutor representing the EU. 2 1 9 The fact 
that politically and economically more influential states have to deal with diplomatic 
lightweights like Luxembourg seems to influence their sensitivity for 'diplomatic 
2 1 7 Ambassador Joseph Weyland of Luxembourg says: "(...) all the efforts we made were of a political 
nature and it would be unfair to judge the Presidency by these events, knowing perfectly well that the 
legal basis upon which we achieved what we did was a very limited one. This was especially true for the 
Gulf and Yugoslavian Crises" (J. Weyland, 'Strategies and Perspectives of the Luxembourg Presidency' p. 
18). It must, however, be pointed out that the Treaty of Amsterdam will strengthen CFSP. 
2 1 8 P. Junker, 'Un miroir des Douze' p. 2. 
2 1 9 During the Gulf war, France submitted a draft declaration before the UN Security Council without 
consulting its EU partners and without informing the Luxembourg Presidency; by the same token, 
President Gorbatchev only informed the four large EU members about its peace plan (see P. Junker, 'Un 
miroir des Douze' p. 2). 
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correctness'. Consider Pascale Junker's statement regarding Luxembourg's Presidency 
during the Gulf war: 
Le fait que ce soit le Luxembourg qui preside semble avoir baisse le seuil de 
gene des interlocuteurs de l'Europe. En ignorant le Grand-Duche, on ne pietine 
pas de grands interets en matiere d'affaires etrangeres. De plus, le Luxembourg 
est moins susceptible de tirer la sonnette d'alarme, puisque sa rjolitique 
etrangere est dictee par la volonte de preserver l'unite communautaire."0 
A French or a British Presidency seems to meet greater international acceptance since 
the EU is represented by traditional diplomatic powers on the international stage in such 
a case. This shows that the behaviour of international negotiators changes towards the 
Presidency depending on whether it is headed by a small or a large state and raises the 
issue of whether a small state would receive greater recognition by international 
negotiators i f CFSP would have greater formal competencies. One thing is for sure: a 
small state has no elaborate strategy for conflict settlement at hand and cannot invent it 
impromptu, whether acting within the current CFSP framework or in a Union with a 
strong Common Foreign and Security Policy. The country's leaders were simply not 
able to surpass Luxembourg's traditional role of mediator and honest broker in 
international conflict settlement. 
Although the Presidency offers undeniably an opportunity for a small state to yield a 
disproportionate amount of influence both at EU and at international level, it also 
unveils the small state's latent limitations, which were shown to be most obvious in the 
Presidency's initiative function and in international conflict settlement. But even i f 
Luxembourg's activities within the current CFSP are limited to playing the role of 
honest broker the small state can fully identify itself with the Presidency and always 
acts in the name of the European Union. A large-state Presidency may have better 
diplomatic tools at its disposal when acting in the name of the EU on international stage 
but a large state may feel tempted to pursue its own goals rather than those of the EU. 
The Luxembourg government, knowing about its own limitations, rather adopts a 
pragmatic approach to the Presidency's work. Although burdened with administrative 
overload and limited in its initiative function, the Luxembourg Presidency is always 
committed to achieving great administrative and organisational work while assuming its 
traditional role of mediator and 'honest broker'. One of the big achievements of the 
Luxembourg Presidencies is that the smallest member state has always been able to 
make the big projects of European integration advance although the smallness of the 
country presents disadvantages. In this respect Luxembourg's Presidency is always a 
truly 'European' one. 
' P. Junker, 'Un miroir des Douze' p. 2. 
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6 What Future for Luxembourg in the Council of Ministers? 
L'Unite europeenne sera une operation 
qui n'ira ni sans douleur ni sans choc. 
Joseph Bech 
Until now we dealt with Luxembourg's present status in the Council of Ministers. But 
what will be its status in a Council comprising 25 or 27 member states? Enlargement 
negotiations with ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and Cyprus 
have been launched on 30 March 1998 and it is optimistically envisaged that the first 
new members wil l join the Union at the beginning of the next decade. Some express 
fears that the European Union's institutional mechanisms, originally designed for a 
Community of Six, cannot cope any longer with more members and will be paralysed 
after the next enlargement unless reformed. Others fear that the accession of new, 
mostly small states will tip the balance more strongly in favour of the smaller members 
and lead to a loss of influence of the larger ones. 
Reflections such as these started to be made when the EFTA states, all of them small 
states, applied for Union membership. Still at the 1992 Lisbon European Council, small 
states could successfully defend their institutional status quo: the Heads of State and 
Government decided that the EFTA enlargement would be done without any revision of 
the principles of majority voting and any institutional reform. 2 2 1 It was decided that only 
the six-monthly rotating Council Presidency would undergo a change as of July 1998 
with the troika always consisting of one of the larger member states. 
6.1 The 1996 IGC and Institutional Reform 
After the last enlargement round institutional reform came to be seen as most urgent in 
case the efficiency of decision-making should not be harmed. Criticisms concerned all 
EU institutions but targeted above all the Council of Ministers, in particular the 
disproportionate weight of small member states in Council decision-making and rigid 
and inefficient decision-making caused by unanimity voting. Also subject to criticism 
were the Council's lengthy and sophisticated voting procedures, the cumbersome 
rotating Council Presidency, the proliferation of language combinations, and the lack of 
transparency. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2 2 2 , which was originally 
2 2 1 Hitherto there had been a linear extrapolation of voting weights at every enlargement. 
2 2 2 The IGC opened on 29 March 1996 in Turin under Italian Presidency and was concluded at 
Amsterdam under Dutch Presidency. Luxembourg was represented at the IGC by Permanent 
Representative Jean-Jacques Kasel. The Turin European Council of 29 March 1996 identified the 
following three themes for the IGC agenda: a Union closer to its citizens; more democratic and efficient 
institutions in an enlarged Europe; strengthening the EU's capacity for external action. See European 
Commission, The European Councils - Conclusions of the Presidency - 1996 (Luxembourg, OOPEC, 
1997). 
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intended for revising the Maastricht Treaty , turned out into a major debate about 
institutional reform. This was considered as urgent to prepare for further enlargement, 
but also to tackle the democratic deficit and to refine the decision-making process. The 
IGC was asked to examine simplifying decision-making procedures in general and 
widening the scope of the co-decision procedure between the Council and EP. It was 
equally asked to extend the scope of QMV, to redefine the threshold for QMV and 
member states' weighted votes, and to reform the Council Presidency. In view of the 
IGC reform proposals we will analyse those concerning Council decision-making and 
explore how they would affect Luxembourg's position within the EU's major decision-
making institution in the future. 
Reform proposals concerning the Council of Ministers can, however, not be 
viewed in isolation. Of equal importance are reform proposals concerning the 
composition and representativeness of the Commission, a stronger role for the EP and 
the question of'enhanced co-operation' between a certain number of members states that 
are willing to forge ahead with integration in specific policy areas. The real challenge 
for reforming the institutions consists in a balance to be struck between the need for a 
more efficient institutional structure and an adequate representation of all states, both 
small and large. In the event of the IGC many institutional problems, in particular those 
concerning the Council, drove a wedge between the conceptions of large and small 
states, but also between federalist-minded states - among them Luxembourg - and those 
members who struggle to retain a larger degree of national sovereignty. What attitude 
did Luxembourg take during the IGC negotiations, which reform proposals does it 
favour, which oppose, and what package solutions or linkages would have been or will 
be acceptable from Luxembourg's point of view? 2 2 4 
Luxembourg 's Attitude During I G C 
Luxembourg's overall attitude to the topics of the IGC is set out in two government 
225 
memoranda one of which states the common position of the Benelux partners. It can 
226 • 
generally be defined as 'positive and co-operative'. The government took a double-
track bottom line for the talks: securing realistic progress towards European integration 
while safeguarding the country's vital interests.227 This guideline recalls Luxembourg's 
general behaviour in the Council of Ministers: on the one hand, Luxembourg follows 
2 2 3 A formal review procedure of the Maastricht Treaty was stipulated in Article N of TEU. 
2 2 4 Many of the items on the IGC agenda remained unsolved and are therefore still topical, in particular 
the reform of the Commission and the reform of the Council voting system. 
2 2 5 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire du Gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la Conference 
Intergouvemementale de 1996, Luxembourg, le 30 juin 1995' in Bulletin d'information et de 
documentation 2/1995, pp. 165-9 ('Aide-memoire'); Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Memorandum de la 
Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la CIG, le 7 mars 1996' in Bulletin d'information et 
de documentation 1/1996, pp. 194-7 ('Benelux Memorandum'). 
2 2 6 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Declaration de politique etrangere, le 8 fevrier 1996' in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 1/1996 p. 126. 
2 2 7 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire' p. 166, 
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the supranational track while fostering deeper integration, on the other hand, it is 
vigilant to defend and preserve areas of national sovereignty. 
Institutional reform touches on two aspects of particular importance for 
Luxembourg: its representation in EU institutions and the weighting of votes in the 
Council. Hence Luxembourg's major preoccupation is to stand up for its right to 
participate in EU institutions as a sovereign state with equal rights. Still, the government 
is well aware that too defensive a stance would be detrimental. And although each 
member state has a veto concerning the revision of the Treaties, it is not in the interest 
of small states to categorically oppose any reform proposals. Luxembourg's proposals 
228 
were therefore innovative and offensive rather than defensive. The government takes 
the same active, solidarity-based approach it generally adopts in the Council whenever 
it has to defend its status quo: being prudent but actively involved in the negotiations, 
paying attention and understanding to other member states' problems, and hoping for a 
similar treatment in return according to the motto: ' I f you want to gain something, you 
need to give signs you are willing to give something in the first place'. 
Except for a few diverging points of view, Luxembourg's ideas and proposals 
can be considered as compatible with the more middle-of-the-road position of the 
Commission and the more progressive one of the EP Bourlanges-Martin Report.229 
Contrary to what was actually done during the IGC, the Luxembourg government 
strongly advocates a debate on the constitutional future of Europe before taking any 
decisions on institutional reforms." Luxembourg thus considered the IGC in the first 
place as a forum for discussing whether the EU should become a federation of 
interdependent states or otherwise a loose association of sovereign and independent 
states based on intergovernmental co-operation. 
The government considers it important to consult and co-operate with other 
states in bilateral talks to discuss proposals for reform. Institutional reform is one of the 
rare issues where small member states share a common interest: the defence of their 
status and representation in the EU's institutional set-up. Small members therefore 
recognised the need to co-operate and to find common positions.A In this respect, the 
Benelux trio played a particular role in co-ordinating the positions of small states and 
can be considered as the small-states' 'spokesperson' during the IGC. 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Debat sur la CIG de 1996 (Chambre des deputes, 12 July 1995). 
Expose introductif de M . Jacques F. Poos. Ministre des Affaires Btrangeres p. 5. Innovative proposals 
consisted in giving the EU legal competence or the principle of 'unanimity minus one' for common 
actions and positions within CFSP. 
2 2 9 See European Commission, Intergovernmental Conference 1996. Commission Opinion - Reinforcing 
Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement (Luxembourg, OOPEC, 1996); European Parliament, 
Resolution on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and Development of the Union (17 May 1995). 
2 : 1 0 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Debat sur la CIG de 1996 p. 2. 
2 3 1 In his 1995 declaration on foreign policy, Foreign Minister Poos asserted that small member states 
share almost identical views on the topics of the IGC. This does, however, not mean that there is a 
complete identity of views, as there were, for instance, different views among Benelux countries with 
regard to voting modes on taxation or on amendment of the Treaties. 
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Principles of Importance for Luxembourg 
Luxembourg clearly thinks that the principles and the balance-of-power on which the 
EU is founded need to be preserved. Hence the government is not willing to accept any 
institutional reform unless the following general principles can be met. 
The Principle of Equality of States 
The Luxembourg government asserts that first and foremost the principle of equality of 
states, an underlying feature of the Community process, needs to be further guaranteed. 
It is important to make sure that small states remain on an equal footing with large 
member states as far as their participation in the EU's institutions and decision-making 
process is concerned. Luxembourg therefore strongly opposes any proposals that would 
lead to a marginalisation of small states and deprive them of symbolical political 
elements like their right to a Commissioner and to hold the Council Presidency.232 
Consider the following statement by Jean-Jacques Kasel: 
(...) Tout amenagement institutionnel doit preserver le principe de la pleine 
participation de tous evitant la constitution de directoires, de majorites 
automatiques ou de minorites de blocage systematiques, qui toutes represented 
des derives destructrices.233 
This statement by Luxembourg's former Permanent Representative shows that small 
states do not only request equal representation but that they also strongly oppose any 
proposals that would lead to the formation of a directoire fostering eventually their 
marginalisation. Such would be the effects of the introduction of a one-year Council 
Presidency system excluding the smaller members or one where a large member would 
act as President and small members as Vice-Presidents. Equal effects would have any 
reform of the Commission that would introduce a system of junior and senior 
Commissioners or one where not every member state will be represented. Similar 
effects would follow from the denial of the smaller states' right to a judge at the 
European Court of Justice. 
Ful l Inst i tut ional Representation 
A second principle arises from the principle of equality of states: all member states 
should be represented in all institutions irrespective of their size. Full institutional 
representation should continue to guarantee the effective participation of small states in 
the Union's governance structures. Luxembourg does not accept any proposals that 
would reduce its status to passive representation. The country insists on its right of 
active participation, which also includes the right to voice its opinion whenever vital 
2 3 2 European Commission, Note de dossier. Rencontre entre le Premier Ministre luxembourgeois, M. 
Juncker, et M. Oreja, le 4 avril a Luxembourg (Brussels, 7 avril 1995). 
2 3 3 J.J. Kasel, 'L'Europe est en realite l'affaire d'un chacun. Rentree au Centre universitaire de 
Luxembourg - le discours du representant du Luxembourg aupres de l'Union europeenne' in Die 
Warte/Luxemburger Wort 47:30 (10 November 1994) p. 2. 
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interests are at stake.2j4 The government considers full institutional representation not 
least as a right derived from Luxembourg's status as a founding member of the 
European Communities: "U est inconcevable, et inconcevant meme, d'enlever a un pays 
fondateur de la Comrnunaute le droit au chapitre, le droit par exemple d'avoir un 
commissaire ou un juge a la cour de justice des Communautes europeennes".2:0 Full 
institutional representation is considered as a prerequisite for the very functioning and 
deepening of the future Union, as made clear by Luxembourg's Prime Minister: "Si nous 
voulons, en Europe, avoir un amalgame intelligent entre le supranational et le national, 
il faut prendre conscience du fait qu'on ne peut pas, via traites, eliminer la 
representation individuelle des Etats-membres au sein des institutions 
communautaires".2j6 
Federal-type Overrepresentation 
A third principle to which Luxembourg adheres is the retention of a certain degree of 
overrepresentation in favour of small states, a principle which was part of the founding 
bargain between the original six members. A distribution of votes and seats on a strict 
proportional basis would effectively wipe out the influence of small states altogether. I f 
the principle of absolute proportionality would, for instance, be applied in a European 
Parliament in an enlarged Union, Luxembourg's 420,000 inhabitants would be 
represented by no more than one MEP. Consequently the spectrum of Luxembourg's 
major political parties could no longer be represented.237 It is therefore important to 
insist on a certain degree of overrepresentation and battle for the principle of degressive 
proportionality. 
Preventing a Small State/Large State Debate 
A fourth principle consists in preventing the negotiations to develop into a small 
state/large state debate. The Luxembourg government (in particular Prime Minister 
Juncker) is against leading the debate on institutional reform along the prevailing view 
that a bloc or a coalition of less populated states consistently outvotes larger ones: 
2 3 4 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Le role des petits pays dans la Communaute' in Bulletin 
d'information et de documentation 2/1992 p. 23. 
2 j 3 Interview with Foreign Minister J. Poos 'Un entretien avec le ministre des affaires etrangeres' in Le 
Monde (9 December 1992). This view is taken as far as to deny Cyprus and Malta the institutional status 
Luxembourg holds. Prime Minister Juncker confirmed in a newspaper interview that he can imagine that 
acceding small states like Malta and Cyprus may have a different status within Community institutions 
than Luxembourg who, as a founding member of the Communities, has a right of seniority ('droit 
d'ainesse') (see Juncker interview 'Sur 1'avenir de l'Union europeenne: Jean-Claude Juncker' in Le Soir. 20 
September 1995). 
2 3 6 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'L'Europe a l'aube du 21 e siecle' in Bulletin d'information et de 
documentation 4/1995 p. 248. 
2 j 7 The Luxembourg government therefore states in its 1995 IGC memorandum: "(...) toutes les forces 
politiques majeures d'un Etat membre doivent etre dument representees au niveau des institutions 
europeennes directement elues. A defaut, le processus de l'integration conduira a des reactions de rejet" 
(Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire' p. 169). 
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Je n'accepte pas cette opposition, dictee par des raisons interieures, entre 
grands et petits Etats. C'est invente de toutes pieces. Je suis membre du Conseil 
des ministres depuis 1982 et je n'ai pas souvenir d'un debat qui aurait montre 
une opposition entre les quatre grands et tous les autres petits. C'est une 
->3S 
invention." 
As a matter of fact, as has been hinted in Chapter Three and Four, the divisions in the 
Council of Ministers are not systematically between large and small member states but 
vary according to the subject being negotiated. There can be splits between net 
contributors and net beneficiaries, neutrals and non-neutrals, supporters of free trade 
and supporters of protective measures, etc. Logjams in decision-making are often 
caused by large states with big national interests and not because a bloc of small states 
is blocking legislation. 
Between Intergovernmental and Supranational Spheres 
Institutional reform cannot be seen in isolation from other reform proposals on the IGC 
agenda. Institutional issues have become intrinsically linked with the issue of greater 
political integration. With regard to reform proposals, Luxembourg adopts the same 
ambiguous attitude to supranationalism that characterises its general behaviour in the 
Council. In general terms, the government considers the IGC as an opportunity to take 
further steps towards political integration, to deepen many policy fields and to 
strengthen the EU's supranational institutions. This integrationist attitude is, however, 
again not the product of a blind dedication to federal European goals but a way of self-
preservation consisting in forming a rampart against too intergovernmental an 
institutional and decision-making framework. Any wish for more European integration 
can be seen as an attempt to prevent a watering down of the acquis communautaire in 
favour of power politics dictated by the larger partners. This proactive and anxious 
attitude of Luxembourg vis-a-vis the IGC is expressed in its concern for deepening the 
Union, for 'enhanced co-operation', and for the democratisation and greater efficiency of 
the decision-making process. It goes along with the assertion that at the current stage of 
integration, the small state is unwilling to lose its representation in the EU's 
supranational institutions, unwilling to lose its grip on those intergovernmental tools 
that are necessary to preserve some important areas of national sovereignty (that is 
unanimity) and very reluctant to lose influence in the Council of Ministers by means of 
a population-based voting system. 
Deepening Before Enlarging 
Luxembourg's wish for deepening the Union before enlarging it can be seen in the light 
of some form of equivocal supranationalism.239 Small and federalist-minded states 
2 j 8 Juncker interview 'Sur l'avenir de l'Union europeenne', 20 September 1995. 
2 j 9 "(...) L'objet central de la Conference Intergouvernementale est bien l'approfondissement de l'Union, 
qui doit preceder son l'elargissement et qui va redonner tout son sens a celui-ci" (Ministere d'Etat du 
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consider the deepening process as a consolidating measure for European integration. 
They think that deepening the integration process by way of stronger and better 
functioning institutions and by closer co-operation in more policy sectors constitutes an 
indispensable rampart against the forthcoming difficulties of enlargement. Although the 
Luxembourg government has a basically positive attitude to enlarging the Union, it 
fears enlargement would water down the acquis of European integration to a mere free-
trade area or would gradually strengthen intergovernmentalism. Hence Luxembourg can 
be situated in the camp of those member states that see the IGC as an opportunity for 
deeper political integration, favouring the progressive communautarisation of domains 
of JHA and CFSP.240 This is not only because Luxembourg feels that CFSP has 
weaknesses when it comes to its formulation, decision-making and implementation but 
because it fears that CFSP would otherwise remain too intergovernmental, which as a 
consequence would be detrimental for small states. Luxembourg equally favours 
military integration and wants to see WEU gradually become part of the second pillar 
(CFSP).241 
'Enhanced Co-operation' 
Fear of growing intergovernmentalism made Luxembourg take a favourable, though 
reserved stance for 'enhanced co-operation' or 'differentiated integration' during the 
Intergovernmental Conference.242 According to Jean-Jacques Kasel, Luxembourg has a 
strong interest in belonging to an inner core of member states whenever member states 
agree on deeper integration. The reason being that a small state can only voice its 
interests when sitting around the negotiating table and not by being absent from i t . 2 4 3 
This is also the reason why the country's participation in the third phase of EMU or in 
the Schengen co-operation was never contested. In the government's view the concept 
of 'enhanced co-operation' is inevitable in the event of future enlargement but should be 
subject to certain conditions. In order to prevent the concept to foster the creation of a 
directoire of states it was important to ensure that the principles and objectives for 
'enhanced co-operation' be agreed by all member states at the same time. Another 
condition is that the concept of flexibility should not become a universal panacea. It 
should only be used as a last resort, the EU being based on the principle of solidarity. 
For the same reason Luxembourg distances itself from the concept of a 'Europe a la 
carte', which would only lead to disintegration. Instead it views differentiated 
integration in the light of the 1976 Tindemans report, which states: " I I ne s'agit pas ici 
Luxembourg, 'L'Europe a l'aube du 21 e siecle' p. 246). 
2 4 0 Asylum and immigration policy, police cooperation and social policy are domains from JHA 
Luxembourg wants to see transferred to the first pillar. 
2 4 1 See 'Benelux Memorandum'. 
2 4 2 See 'Benelux Memorandum'. 
2 4 3 Information provided during a personal interview. 
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d'une Europe a la carte: l'accord de tous sur le but final a atteindre en commun lie 
chacun, ce n'est que l'execution qui est echelonnee dans le temps".244 
Greater Democratisation and a More E f f i c i en t Decision-making Process 
Luxembourg's goal to achieve a greater democratisation, transparency and efficiency of 
the decision-making process equally mirrors some equivocal supranationalism and 
needs to be nuanced. Luxembourg is in favour of a stronger Commission and wants to 
see the role of the latter strengthened in CFSP and JHA. A stronger Commission that 
retains its independence and its exclusive right of initiative (in the first pillar) while 
gaining new responsibilities is in the interest of small states. This is not only because 
strong supranational institutions are a safeguard against intergovernmental bargaining 
but also because the Commission is traditionally considered as a protector of small-state 
interests (see Chapter One). 
The government's stance to greater decision-making power for the European 
Parliament is equally ambiguous. Many commentators have viewed the EP as the real 
winner of the Amsterdam Treaty as its legislative powers have been considerably 
strengthened. Luxembourg was in favour of simplifying and reducing the decision-
making procedures to three (co-decision, assent and consultation). It equally favoured 
an extension of co-decision to policy domains where the Council of Ministers decides 
by QMV. Although the government favoured a strengthening of the EP's powers there is 
a certain off-the-record awareness that a major transfer of decision-making power to a 
European Parliament where Luxembourg is represented by only six MEPs is 
unbeneficial.245 
Concerning the Council's lack of transparency, Luxembourg is generally in 
favour of publishing the voting results and their explanation. Contrary to the 
Scandinavian idea of transparency, Luxembourg's leaders think it is no good making 
Council meetings accessible to the public on the grounds that the presence of a camera 
in the Council meeting room would destroy the informality in which ministers 
negotiate, thus forcing them to take positions in front of their domestic voters which are 
otherwise needless to take. 2 4 6 
" Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire' p. 168. 
2 4 5 European Commission, Note de dossier (Brussels, 7 avril 1995); Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 
'L'Europe a l'aube du 21 e siecle' p. 247. In 1990 Luxembourg's then Prime Minister Jacques Santer 
declared: "Honestly I do not think that a major increase of the competence of the EP would be very 
favourable for small countries. The four biggest member states have a majority of the voting right in this 
forum. A country like Luxembourg can only count on six Parliamentarians out of 518 [today 626]. Their 
influence is close to nothing. Even the seven small member states taken together cannot count on much 
more than a quarter of the votes" (Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'The Role of Small Countries in the 
Emerging European House' in Bulletin de Documentation 6/1990 p.42). 
2 4 6 Consider Prime Minister Juncker's statement: "Je suis contre l'idee de rendre publiques les seances du 
Conseil des ministres. Ce serait la fin de tout. (...) Je vous dis mon opinion: c'est ridicule. C'est un debat 
ridicule que de croire que la transparence des travaux du Conseil pourrait etre amelioree en faisant 
penetrer les cameras dans le batiment du Conseil des Ministres." (Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 
'L'Europe a l'aube du 21 e siecle' p. 247); the same idea was expressed by Jean-Jacques Kasel during a 
personal interview. 
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The eleven official languages and the ensuing language combinations that are 
currently in use are a factor rendering efficient decision-making ever more cumbersome. 
Unlike other member states, Luxembourg has a very tolerant attitude to the issue of 
'streamlining' the language use. The government supports the idea of reducing the use of 
eleven languages to three (English, French, German) within the preparatory Council 
machinery (Coreper and working groups) while maintaining the eleven official 
languages at senior Council level (Council of Ministers, European Council) for 
ministers' active language use.247 The reason for Luxembourg's liberal attitude is that the 
country's major spoken language, i.e. Luxembourgish, lacks the status of an official 
language anyway and that the country's major administrative languages, i.e. French and 
German, are not at risk of being removed, especially French being one of the more 
important working languages. An upgrading of German would pose no practical 
problem for Luxembourg either. 
6.2 Reforming the Council of Ministers 
The Voting System 
Luxembourg clearly takes the intergovernmental track concerning the reform of the 
Council's voting system. This issue, part of which has been left unsettled at 
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Amsterdam , is twofold. On the one hand there is an urgent need to take measures that 
would foster a more efficient decision-making (e.g. extension of QMV) in order to 
prevent paralysis of EU decision-making. On the other hand large member states would 
like to reduce the voting power of small states as they fear that the next enlargement 
round will cause a proliferation of small states that would weaken their grip on 
decision-making. Large member states therefore generally favour measures like voting 
arrangements based on the population criterion, a reweighting of votes and also a higher 
threshold for QMV. 
Luxembourg generally supports a more efficient decision-making procedure and 
can be situated in the camp of those that think that the threshold of QMV should be 
maintained at 70% or even be decreased in an enlarged Union. 2 4 9 In order to prevent 
paralysis of future decision-making, Luxembourg equally favours the extension of 
QMV to new areas. QMV is, with co-decision, a key concept of a federal European 
Union. Significant advances were made in the Amsterdam Treaty for the practice of 
QMV. Jean-Jacques Kasel confirmed that Luxembourg even could have accepted that 
QMV be extended to more areas than actually adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam.250 
Information provided by Jean-Jacques Kasel. 
2 4 8 In particular the issue of a population-based reweighting of votes remained unsolved (see below). 
2 4 9 See 'Benelux Memorandum'. 
2 5 0 Kasel also pointed out that Luxembourg could have accepted an extension of QMV to all the areas 
presented in the Dutch draft Treaty of Amsterdam, though the government would have done so with 
Prime Minister Juncker thinks that QMV should be applied to the three EU pillars 
provided that it would contribute to a greater efficiency of decision-making and 
provided it is politically possible.251 Generally a supporter of the principle of'unanimity 
minus one' for joint action in CFSP, the Luxembourg government would even go as far 
as accepting a weighting of votes in CFSP that would clearly put large states in a more 
advantageous position, in case QMV would be extended to the second pillar. The reason 
being: 
Cela signifierait en effet que, pour la premiere fois, dans un domaine essentiel 
de leur souverainete, ils [large member states] accepteraient de partager leurs 
prerogatives avec les petits. Des lors ils auraient droit a quelques garanties.252 
This statement shows that, again, Luxembourg is willing to give up its status quo i f 
there is a political wil l for deeper integration. Be it as it may, Luxembourg's 
supranational attitude on this issue needs to be placed in context. There are indeed 
domains where the application of QMV would be unacceptable for Luxembourg: the 
revision of the Treaties, European citizenship, new accessions, taxation and own 
resources. In its memorandum for the 1996 IGC, the Luxembourg government 
unequivocally states: 
Au niveau du Conseil une extension du vote a la majorite qualifiee s'impose en 
principe. L'unanimite doit cependant rester d'application pour tous les 
domaines touchant intimement a la souverainete des Etats et done a celle des 
Parlements nationaux tels que les revisions des traites, la citoyennete 
europeenne, les nouvelles adhesions, la fiscalite et les ressources propres.253 
These clearly are domains where Luxembourg's vital national interests are concerned. In 
particular taxation and the revision of the Treaties are matters that the Luxembourg 
government considers as an unacceptable inroad on national sovereignty.254 
Luxembourg equally opposes the Belgian proposal of amending the Treaties by 
a 3A majority, wishing to maintain unanimity on the grounds that "les traites restent le 
contrat de base auquel nos peuples ont adhere. II ne peut done etre question de les 
modifier sans l'accord de tous".2 5 5 Luxembourg is anxious that in such a case a small 
member state with little political impact might have to 'swallow' amendments which, i f 
difficulty. 
2 5 1 Juncker interview: 'Europe: Jean-Claude Juncker, porte-voix des 'petits" in Le Figaro (6 February 
1996). 
2 5 2 Juncker interview: 'Europe: Jean-Claude Juncker, porte-voix des 'petits". 
2 5 3 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Aide-memoire' p. 169. 
2 5 4 These are also domains where the views of the three Benelux partners differ: whereas Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands oppose the extension of QMV to taxation, Belgium strongly favours it. But not only 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands oppose any extension of QMV in the domain of taxation. Jean-Jacques 
Kasel, Luxembourg's Personal Representative during the IGC, once called for a vote concerning the 
extension of QMV to taxation. The outcome was 12:3 with 12 member states in favour of maintaining 
unanimity in this field (Kasel interview). 
2 5 5 Ministere d'Etat du Luxembourg, 'Declaration de politique etrangere, le 16 fevrier 1995' p. 70. 
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taken to the extreme, would make it unbeneficial for the small partner to stay within the 
Union. The predicament, however, is that there is no alternative for Luxembourg. 
An issue that poses the highly sensitive political question of the balance between large 
and small member states is the one of (re)weighting the votes. Until now, despite four 
enlargements, the representational balance between small and large states has not been 
changed. But unless a reform takes place, the next enlargement will cause a situation 
where those countries that have a minority in terms of population will have a majority in 
terms of votes in EU decision-making. The large member states are therefore contesting 
the current voting system on the basis of democratic representation. Although a variety 
of formulae have been suggested, the issue made little progress during the IGC. The 
Italian Presidency, responsible for launching the IGC in 1996, discerned two camps of 
member states: first, those that believe that the current weighting should be maintained 
and extrapolated when enlargements take place on the grounds that the principle of 
equality of states cannot be ignored and that there is nothing like a bloc of less 
populated states acting collectively against the group of larger states; second, those 
member states that believe that it is necessary to ensure that the Union's decisions are 
backed by a significant proportion of the population, either by reweighting the votes 
(i.e. by altering the current weighting to ensure a better balance between the number of 
votes and population) or by introducing a system of double majority 2 5 6 (either in terms 
of votes and population, or in terms of number of states and population).237 Luxembourg 
could initially be located in the first camp. In general terms, the Luxembourg 
government insists that any change in the weighted votes needs to respect the principle 
of federal-type overrepresentation of small states and needs to prevent the creation of 
automatic majorities or systematic blocking minorities. Although, as mentioned above, 
the Luxembourg government would accept a reweighting of votes in favour of large 
states for CFSP (once QMV be extended to the second pillar) such a reweighting would 
be unacceptable within the first pillar (Single Market). Prime Minister Juncker explains 
why: 
J'ai une longue experience des votes en ce domaine [first pillar] et je n'ai 
jamais vu les grands d'un cote et la meute des petits pays de l'autre... En 
remettant inlassablement ce point sur le tapis, les grands vont finir par croire 
aux petits qu'ils sont grands! Je n'ai pas besoin qu'on ecrive dans un traite que 
le Luxembourg est plus petit que la France ou l'Allemagne: je le sais et me 
comporte en consequence.258 
~ This notion was advanced in August 1993 by Karl Lammers and Wolfgang Schauble in a CDU/CSU 
paper. 
~ 5 7 Council of the European Union, Intergovernmental Conference on the Revision of the Treaties. Italian 
Presidency (January-June 1996V Collected Texts (Luxembourg, OOPEC, 1997) p. 95f. 
2 5 8 Juncker interview: 'Europe: Jean-Claude Juncker, porte-voix des 'petits". 
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This statement shows three things: first, it asserts that there is nothing like a small 
state/large state opposition and that the ensuing debate is artificial; secondly, in the 
practical world of international relations, small states are well aware that they have less 
political weight than their larger counterparts and behave accordingly within the 
Council; consequently, small states think it is futile, even humiliating, to inscribe their 
political inferiority within the Treaty. 
Luxembourg shows the same reluctance towards the proposal of a double majority. 
Although the 1996 Benelux Memorandum states that the demographic criterion could 
be used to see whether qualified majority corresponds to a majority of EU population, 
the Luxembourg government was initially hostile to the idea of a double majority: 
Je m'oppose a l'idee de nuancer le droit de vote en l'assortissant de criteres de 
population. Dans toutes les constitutions federates, les petits Etats ont un 
certain degre de surrepresentation, comme au Senat des Etats-Unis. Le 
federalisme c'est cela. Si nous voulons maintenir l'adhesion des petits peuples 
en Europe, nous ne pouvons pas leur soustraire leurs droits acquis.239 
It is easy to understand why a reform of the voting system has made little significant 
progress during the IGC. Member states, in particular small states, are reluctant to 
consider any alteration of their power under a new voting system. Therefore 
Luxembourg and other small states are not particularly in favour of a double-majority 
solution: any reform in this direction would imply that Luxembourg's vote would no 
longer be of any consequence in an enlarged Union, which would equal a loss of 
influence in the Council. Still, Luxembourg's Personal Representative was given 
permission by the government to accept such a solution: a double majority where the 
adoption of a decision by the Council would require the support of a certain number of 
member states representing a certain percentage of the population as well as the support 
of a specified number of members of the Council; the blocking minority should equally 
consist of a specified number of member states representing a certain percentage of the 
population. The failure at Amsterdam to agree to a more significant reform with 
regard to the weighting of votes means that the present system as set out in Article 
148(2) will continue to apply.2 6 1 
Package Solutions Acceptable for Luxembourg 
All the IGC proposals for institutional reform that continue to be topical, in particular 
proposals for changing the number of Commissioners and reweighting the voting rights 
2 5 9 'Le Premier Ministre defend les 'petits' pays dans la perspective de la conference intergouvemementale 
de 1996' in Agence Europe 43:6465 (21 April 1995). 
2 6 0 Information provided by Luxembourg's Personal Representative Jean-Jacques Kasel. Kasel made it, 
however, clear that this stance was less official. 
2 6 1 It was all the more difficult to reach a compromise at Amsterdam since France opposed the idea of a 
double majority and Spain tried to broker a higher number of weighted votes in case it would lose one of 
its Commissioners (see A. Duff (ed) The Treaty of Amsterdam. Text and Commentary (London. 1997) p. 
133). 
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among member states, threaten to upset the balance of power between large and small 
member states. Luxembourg is not outright opposed to most reform proposals but its 
support is not unconditional. The bottom line can be described as 'a loss of status quo 
only in return for more Europe!' The government is not willing to make any concessions 
unless large states are giving signs of political will for deeper integration and unless 
they are prepared to surrender greater parts of their sovereignty to the EU. The 
following statement by Luxembourg's Prime Minister can be considered as a catch 
phrase for Luxembourg's stance: " I f the level of ambition is high, our voting rights can 
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be small". Before the IGC had been launched, Luxembourg's Prime Minister 
declared: "Si la politique communautaire evolue de plus en plus comme une politique 
nationale, si l'approfondissement est suffisant, les petits Etats membres se resigneront a 
accepter un changement de statut".263 In other words, i f member states decide that 
political legitimacy will reside essentially with the nation states, then this fact must be 
reflected in the relative equality of the nation states in Brussels. If, however, the small-
country bias is ever to be reversed, the cost will have to be more integration. Small 
states fear a dilution of supranational elements of EU in favour of pure 
intergovernmental bargaining of the large member states. Unless they get guarantees of 
further integration they prefer to cling to their status quo. 
Some of the conditions the Benelux countries set in return for a loss of influence 
in the Council is the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union by 1 January 1999, 
the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy that deserves the name and 
the extension of QMV and codecision to most areas. The government, however, strictly 
opposes a European Commission where not every member state has the right to appoint 
a Commissioner.264 The government equally opposes a Commission where small 
member states will be given 'junior' Commissioners while large states have 'senior' 
Commissioners.265 If, however, there are visible signs for strengthening political union, 
small member states would accept that votes would be reweighted in favour of large 
member states, that is they would accept a decrease of their influence in the Council. 
The outcome of the IGC as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty is a step forward towards 
greater political integration, but only a half-hearted one. It introduces greater flexibility 
in decision-making; it extends the scope of QMV and co-decision to new policy areas; 
some domains of CFSP will be subject to majority decisions (QMV for common 
Quoted in B. Coleman, 'Power Broker: Luxembourg's Juncker Takes a Pivotal Role in EU's Top 
Projects' in The Wall Street Journal (30 January 1997). 
2 6 j Juncker interview 'Sur l'avenir de l'Union europeenne'; see also Europe Information Service, 'Vers une 
revoke des 'petits'? La leftre europeenne No 691 (16 February 1996). 
2 6 4 The 1996 'Benelux Memorandum' states: "La Commission doit comprendre un ressortissant par pays" 
and thus strictly opposes the French technocratic view to reduce the size of the Commission having 
regard only to regional balance (see A. Duff, The Treaty of Amsterdam, p. 132). 
2 6 5 See B. Coleman, 'Power Broker'; Juncker interview: 'Europe: Jean-Claude Juncker, porte-voix des 
'petits". 
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strategies) and to a constructive abstention clause. As far as the Presidency is 
concerned, the' EU will be represented in a different way: as before, it will be 
represented by the member state holding the Presidency of the Council but the troika 
will no longer consist of the incumbent, the preceding and the successive Presidents but 
of the Presidency, the Commission and the Secretary of the Council who will act as the 
Union's High Representative for CFSP. 
But no progress has been achieved on the composition of the Commission and 
the weighting of votes in the Council to rebalance QMV between larger and smaller 
states. This is because the interests of more and less populated states clashed most on 
these questions. This is also because these issues became intrinsically linked during the 
IGC negotiations so that a Protocol was inserted in the Treaty of Amsterdam stating: 
first, each member state will have one Commissioner; second, the condition being that 
the weighting of votes will have to be changed (either by reweighting the votes or by a 
double majority) in a manner acceptable to all member states; third, those states that 
give up their second Commissioner will be compensated. 
(...) The Commission shall comprise one national of each of the Member 
States, provided that, by that date, the weighting o f the votes in the Council has 
been modified, whether by reweighting of the votes or by dual majority, in a 
manner acceptable to all Member States, taking into account all relevant 
elements, notably compensating those Member States which give up the 
possibility of nominating a second member o f the Commission.267 
In other words i f the larger member states agree to giving up their second 
Commissioner, they will not do so without any compensation. This might consist in an 
increased voting weight in the Council at the expense of the smaller member states. 
Those will have to agree to loss of influence in the Council of Ministers as a 
compensation for maintaining a Commissioner. Article One of the Enlargement 
Protocol also shows that larger states prefer to lose influence in a supranational 
institution (the Commission) rather than in an intergovernmental one (the Council of 
Ministers). 
A second article included in the Enlargement Protocol commits the EU to 
convening the next IGC at least one year before the EU will have 20 member states: 
At least one year before the membership o f the European Union exceeds 
twenty, a conference of representatives of the governments of Member States 
shall be convened in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the 
provisions of the Treaties on the composition and functioning of the 
institutions. 
" The constructive abstention clause will allow one or more member states to abstain when decisions are 
adopted and implemented, without preventing the other member states from acting. 
2 6 7 Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European 
Union, Article 1. 
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The prospect of another IGC on institutional reform will continue to nurture the small 
state/large state cleavage on institutional questions. The IGC spent much time and 
energy on the issue of the size of the Commission and to changing the voting system in 
the Council. From Luxembourg's point of view, ambitions for deeper political 
integration have not been high enough. This is proven by the fact that Luxembourg's 
Permanent Representative declared almost a year after the IGC that Luxembourg is 
unwilling, at the current stage of integration to give up its Commissioner. But from 
an intergovernmental point of view, the Amsterdam Treaty can be considered as a 
success for Luxembourg concerning the defense of the principle of unanimity for areas 
of vital national interests and the right to keep its Commissioner. 
Information provided during a personal interview. Jean-Jacques Kasel hinted, however, that 
Luxembourg would be open for a proposal of a 'distributive justice' in an enlarged Union. This would 
consist of a rotating system within the Commission and e.g. ECJ and would mean that a member state that 
has no Commissioner for a term of office would still be represented by a judge in ECJ. 
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Conclusion 
To overcome inherent structural weaknesses conferred on Luxembourg by its small size, 
the smallest member state's active participation in the European integration process is 
not only seen as an opportunity but as a necessity for managing smallness. Of all the 
benefits that European Union membership offers for Luxembourg, the principle of 
equality of states, supranationality and the respect of the acquis communautaire are 
most important for ensuring equal status within EU institutions, for preventing much 
feared intergovernmentalist bargaining and the aggressive pursuit of national interests 
by larger member states, which would lead to the formation of a directoire. As has been 
demonstrated, Luxembourg itself pursues its identified national interests very 
persistently. What Luxembourg wants to prevent is intergovernmental bargaining which 
would be dominated by larger states, particularly in a majority voting situation. So the 
small state needs to defend the unanimity rule where a national interest is at stake and 
may adopt approaches of alliance, conciliation, neutrality, etc. where this may produce 
results. By studying Luxembourg's role and influence in the Council of Ministers it 
could be shown that active participation in the EU's central decision-making institution 
is indeed an effective way for the smallest member state to carve out a special role and 
exert a very specific influence on the European stage. In view of its small size 
Luxembourg has adopted an idiosyncratic small-state behaviour in the Council of 
Ministers and has consequently found opportunities of action which it consistently tries 
to exploit. 
To a certain extent Luxembourg's behaviour in the Council of Ministers and the means 
for defending its interests may be conditioned by its co-ordinating mechanism between 
the capital and the Council. The existence of an efficient national co-ordinating system 
contributes to a coherent negotiating stance and thus influences the role the country 
plays in the Council. Luxembourg's small and decentralised administration was shown 
to have important advantages such as short and informal communication ways and 
reduced hierarchical procedures thus enabling a swift, pragmatic and flexible approach 
to the definition of the national position. The great freedom of action that Luxembourg's 
polyvalent and multilingual Council representatives enjoy makes the co-ordination 
system, however, very actor-dependent. Too much depends on a good representation 
within the Council, i.e. on the personality, expertise and negotiating skills of single 
actors. Moreover, the absence of an institutionalised co-ordination mechanism and the 
technical departments' freedom of action poses the risk of incoherent bargaining 
positions both in horizontal and vertical Council co-ordination. As a consequence 
Luxembourg's Permanent Representation assumes a key role in the elaboration of the 
country's negotiating position, thus bypassing the formal competence of the Foreign 
Ministry. 
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Having identified the risks and benefits of Luxembourg's co-ordination system, we 
assessed the small state's negotiating status in the Council by distinguishing between its 
formal voting weight on the basis of the current voting system, and its actual political 
weight. Such an assessment has its limits though. Studies on formal voting weight can 
only be hypothetical due to a lack of valid information on member states' actual voting 
behaviour. An evaluation of the country's actual political weight has to rest to a large 
extent on the scarce information provided by those directly involved in the Council's 
decision-making framework. An analysis of Luxembourg's formal voting weight could, 
however, validate the hypothesis that the smallest member state has a disproportionately 
high influence in the Council with regard to its small size and the weaknesses derived 
from small-state status. With 2.3% of shares in the weighted Council votes and a 
population of only 0.1% of EU population, Luxembourg can be said to be highly 
overrepresented under QMV. The country also has equal status with its larger partners 
under unanimity and simple majority voting. In addition small states collectively enjoy 
a strengthened position because they outnumber large ones since the 1995 enlargement. 
Further, Luxembourg's potential coalition opportunities increased after the 1973, 1981 
and 1995 enlargements, a phenomenon known as the 'paradox of new members'. 
Tilings turn out to be different when analysing Luxembourg's actual political 
weight: only in theory is the smallest member state on equal footing with its larger 
partners. Empirical statements by Council participants showed that it would be naive to 
suggest that some member states do not carry more political weight than others. Well 
aware of its actual place in the Council hierarchy of political and economic weight, 
Luxembourg adapts its behaviour to these Realpolitik facts: its respect for the rules of 
the game make it act as a 'guardian of a communautaire spirit'; its lack of vital national 
interests in many policy fields and its fear of being a nuisance for others make it adopt a 
general low-profile approach in Council negotiations combined with a non-competitive 
relationship with its EU partners. It would be wrong, however, to infer that Luxembourg 
is limited in its opportunities of action. Paradoxically, the behaviour which small-state 
status forces it to adopt provides it with important opportunities of action. Based on its 
non-competitive relationship with other EU partners and its low-profile approach in 
many policy fields, Luxembourg is in the ideal position to play the role of neutral co-
ordinator and mediator, and to provide 'good offices' for the Union and its members. As 
a self-appointed guardian of a communautaire spirit it works closely with the 
Commission to observe the rules of the game and to preserve the supranational element 
within the Union's institutional and decision-making framework. Increased leverage is 
gained by forming alliances with member states to which it feels close for historical, 
economic or cultural reasons rather than on the basis of small-state status alone. As a 
member of the Benelux 'subsystem' it has greater weight and uses this central position to 
act as a spokesperson for other small member states. 
Once vital national interests are at stake, Luxembourg abandons its general low-
profile approach and the country's leaders seem to be prepared to resort to 
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intergovernmental tools or strategies. Next to a strong co-operation with the 
Commission and the search for allies or derogations, Luxembourg's leaders do not 
refrain from using the treaty-based veto or from threatening with the use of it, though 
only as a last resort. This shows that the smallest member is determined to defend its 
national interests with vehemence by relying on forceful arguments, close co-operation 
with the Commission, some reciprocal solidarity, and i f necessary resort to unanimity 
requirements. 
Having established Luxembourg's negotiating status in the Council, Luxembourg's 
influence was shown to be disproportionately high when the small member holds the 
six-monthly rotating Council Presidency. This is because the small state has increased 
opportunities for influencing decision-making at all levels of the Council hierarchy. 
Above that it is in a leading position on the international stage and well placed for 
fostering European integration. The strains and pressure the job exerts on a small state 
with limited human, financial and logistic resources are enormous. In this respect it is 
all the more astonishing that Luxembourg's Presidencies were among the most 
successful in the past in terms of a positive influence on European integration. This is 
largely because of Luxembourg's overall federal-mindedness, a favourable view of the 
Presidency, a strong co-operation with other EU institutions, in particular the Council 
Secretariat, the leadership abilities and experience of its chairpersons, the advantages of 
a small administration, and the role of a motor played by its Permanent Representation. 
In addition, the Presidency's co-ordinating and mediating role fits Luxembourg 
perfectly: the competence of neutral co-ordinators and mediators and the polyvalence 
and linguistic skills of Luxembourg's chairpersons are qualities few member states can 
offer. There are, however, clear limits to the small-state Presidency. Limited in its 
initiative function, Luxembourg is rather an administrator of policy initiatives launched 
by larger partners. The Gulf war and other international crises also showed the 
weaknesses of a small state with a lack of diplomatic and political weight when 
handling CFSP. In the more intergovernmental framework of CFSP, the political weight 
of the national actors claiming to represent the EU becomes far more significant. 
All this said, it is important not to generalise from Luxembourg's status in the Council 
to other small EU member states whose historical, economic and socio-political 
situation is undeniably different. Small states rarely have common interests within the 
EU. Small EU member states only seem to have a combined interest in their presence in 
the EU's governance structures and in the rules of the game. In order to develop any 
further analysis of the role of Luxembourg and small states in the Council of Ministers, 
a more elaborate research strategy would be required. This could involve an 
examination on decision-making, on specific issues identified as of particular interest, in 
order to test the tactics employed and the policy outcomes. Such an approach could help 
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establish both the comparative framework of small-state behaviour, and map the levels 
of influence and power they enjoy. 
The outlook for Luxembourg's future in the Council of Ministers conveys a bleaker 
picture. Although small states could successfully defend their status quo during the 
1996 IGC, institutional reform is pressing to adapt the European house to a larger 
community of members. Luxembourg may well insist on its representation in all EU 
institutions, including its right to hold the Presidency. But its leaders know that 
whatever solution will be found, the country will have to bow to a general loss of 
influence in the Council and in EU institutions as a whole. Any reform of the current 
Council voting system to one based on demographic criteria will inevitably weaken 
Luxembourg's favourable voting weight and hence its negotiating status. The general 
approach within Luxembourg's government is therefore: a loss of influence only in 
return for more Europe. Like other small member states, Luxembourg is unwilling at the 
current stage of integration to lose influence in the EU's main decision-making 
institution. A loss of influence does, however, not mean that there is no future for a 
small member in an enlarged Union. Once institutional reform has been pushed through, 
Luxembourg may find new roles. It may assume a strong role as defender of the rights 
of small states within a revitalised Benelux 'subsystem', or the concept of 'flexibility' 
may provide a way for having a powerful voice in the inner core of federal-minded 
states. 
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